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The most common form of authoritarian government in the modern world is one that holds
contested elections. Elections in these electoral authoritarian regimes have been shown to have a
variety of stabilizing effects for incumbents, even as organized opposition contestation poses some
risks. This project investigates how authoritarian leaders attempt to manage these risks through
electoral manipulation. In particular, it addresses two interrelated questions: why are some elections
manipulated more severely than others, and why do the techniques used to tamper with elections
vary across space and over time?
To answer these questions, I investigate principal-agent dynamics between leaders who wish
to influence the election result and the individuals who actually stuff the ballot boxes, buy the
votes, or forge the results. These low-level actors must bear the direct costs and risks of tampering
with the election, while the direct benefits of manipulation accrue to the leader. I find that this
principal-agent relationship helps determine the severity and type of election manipulation that
political leaders are able to generate.
In particular, two factors interact to shape the principal-agent relationship. First, agents are
more likely to manipulate on behalf of a leader who controls the bulk of patronage resources in the
society. Second, agents must evaluate the local risk of exposure and punishment for engaging in
illegal forms of manipulation, even if their patron wins. Where these risks are high, agents are more
likely to adopt harder-to-detect forms of manipulation, like vote-buying. When risks are low, tactics
like falsification are more likely.
I test this theory using multiple methods. I draw primarily on election forensics—statistical
analysis of precinct-level election results to identify non-random patterns in the data. I employ
multiple election-forensic tools to analyze election results in the subnational regions of Russia, Mexico,
iii
and Ukraine over time. I also conducted field interviews of election observers and administrators,
and a survey experiment of public attitudes toward electoral manipulation, both in Russia. The
results support the argument that patronage and agent risk drive the severity and type of election
manipulation in electoral authoritarian regimes, hybrid regimes, and unconsolidated democracies.
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When the last vestiges of the Soviet Union finally crumbled in December 1991, the dissipation
of the old regime set in motion a process of decentralization within Russia itself: many of the
newly-independent country’s regions sought to capture as much sovereignty from the center as they
could swallow, to use President Boris Yeltsin’s famous phrase. While many of the old system’s levers
of patronage and influence had passed into Yeltsin’s hands, the Communist Party of the Russian
Federation (KPRF) remained the only political party in the country that boasted a nationwide
network of supporters, activists, and organizational infrastructure. These factors, combined with
the economic pain of the transition to a market economy, resulted in the Communists’ victory in
Russia’s first regularly scheduled legislative election, in December 1995, six months before Yeltsin
himself was up for re-election.
Yeltsin prevailed in that contest, despite Russia’s political fragmentation, a well-organized rival
party in control of the legislature, difficult economic and social conditions, and approval ratings
in the single digits a few months prior to the election. He accomplished this feat in no small
part by drawing on the resources of the state and of allied business interests to manipulate media
coverage, voters, and the election results. That an incumbent in such a challenging position could
successfully manipulate an election is puzzling, since it flies in the face of dominant theories of
electoral manipulation. Traditional theories of manipulation hold that it should be rare in just
such a setting: where political competition is fierce and the risk of post-election protest is high.
Similarly, more recent models that emphasize the staying-power of the leader—captured most clearly
by approval ratings—drives local agents to participate in manipulation on his behalf; under this
framework, Yeltsin’s dismal prospects after the KPRF victory in 1995 should have driven agents to
play it safe. The outcome represented by Yeltsin’s victory in 1996 is one of the puzzles addressed by
the theory presented in this manuscript: how can political candidates facing low popularity, internal
political fragmentation, economic crisis, or other serious handicaps nevertheless produce enough
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electoral manipulation to win their elections?
Russian political history also provides a representative example of the second puzzle this project
seeks to address. In important ways, the 2011 Russian legislative election was a mirror-image of the
situation facing Yeltsin in 1996. The economy, while struggling to fully recover from the financial
crisis of 2008, was growing. The country’s internal fragmentation had largely been arrested during
President Vladimir Putin’s first two terms, in which regional authorities and wealthy oligarchs had
both been brought firmly under the Kremlin’s influence. Six months from the election, Putin’s
approval rating stood at 69 percent, and the ruling party—United Russia—was dominant in both
the national legislature and in regional legislatures across the country. Despite these advantages,
the ruling party suffered a significant defeat at the polls, losing 77 seats and its constitutional
supermajority in the legislature. Even so, the results were tainted by widespread allegations of
election manipulation, prompting a nationwide protest movement (Za Chestnye Vybory—For Fair
Elections). The 2011 Russian election is an example of something close to the worst-case scenario
for an electoral authoritarian leader: electoral defeat coupled with potentially destabilizing protest.
That such a negative outcome occurred despite all of the advantages available to the ruling party
represents the second puzzle studied here: how can incumbent leaders with strong states and deep
resources sometimes fail to produce enough electoral manipulation to win the election and stave off
mass protest?
This project offers a theory of electoral manipulation that explains both kinds of puzzling
outcomes: ‘over-production’ of electoral manipulation by weak parties and ‘under-production’ by
strong ones. In doing so it addresses broader research questions. Why does the severity of elections
vary from country to country, within countries during the same election, and within the same territory
from election to election? Why are different techniques used to bias electoral outcomes under different
circumstances? And which actors drive that variation? I identity two explanatory factors that
together account for type of electoral manipulation that is likely to occur in a particular case, as well
as the severity. These are access to patronage resources on the one hand, and local risks to agents
on the other. The appeal of participating in a rich patronage network draws agents to engage in
electoral manipulation; leaders who have consolidated control over large patronage networks can
generate more electoral manipulation as a result. However, local risks—public exposure, criminal
penalties, and so on—make manipulation risky for agents. These local risks are driven by factors
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like an independent and active media (which can investigate and publicize electoral malfeasance),
an independent judiciary, and—most importantly—a large and active opposition party presence.
These factors are generally not uniform features of a country, but tend to vary by locality. Just as
democratic countries may have subnational authoritarian enclaves (Gibson, 2013), non-democratic
countries may have pockets of elevated contestation and more active civil society (Gilley, 2010).
When local risks are high, agents are more likely to engage in forms of electoral manipulation
that are difficult to observe and trace, in order to avoid exposure and punishment. These include
tactics like vote-buying and voter pressure; agents who engage in these sorts of activities are difficult
to monitor and track, since they take place at varying times on or before election day, and at places
other than the polling station. As a result, I classify these hard-to-attribute methods as dispersed
forms of manipulation. By contrast, techniques like falsification and ballot stuffing generally occur in
the polling place on election day, making them easier to observe and for perpetrators to be identified.
These are centralized tactics.
The model makes predictions for both the level and type of manipulation, summarized in Figure
1 and Table 1 below. In brief, when a leader’s control over patronage is low, manipulation on
behalf of that party is relatively rare since inducing agents’ cooperation in the patronage network is
difficult. It is least likely to occur in places where local risks to agents are high; if the leader controls
enough patronage resources to attract election-manipulating agents, she is more likely to be able
to do so in places agent risk is low. When leaders control a greater share of patronage resources,
electoral manipulation increases in severity by tactic. In areas where opposition parties (in addition
to independent media and courts) are weak, agents can engage in centralized manipulation like
falsification of results. In high-risk areas agents are less likely to adopt centralized tactics, and more
likely to engage in dispersed vote-buying and voter pressure.
I test this theory using data from three country cases—Russia (2003-2012), Mexico (1994-2012),
and Ukraine (2002-2014)—and multiple methods. For each case, I use election forensic techniques to
identify potentially suspicious patterns in precinct-level election results and multilevel regression
analysis to show how evidence of election tampering varies according to local and national political
conditions. I also draw on field interviews and survey experimental results conducted in Russia, to
help discriminate between possible causal explanations for the statistical results. More details on
theory-testing are provided in the section on case selection and measurement later in this chapter.
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1.1 Existing explanations of electoral manipulation, and their limitations
Multiparty elections are the hallmark of modern politics the world over. Most single-party
communist states collapsed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and military regimes—largely bereft of
their Cold War-era sponsors—have become relatively scarce and short-lived. Multi-party national
elections, held in less than fifty percent of countries in 1985, were held in over seventy-five percent by
2005 (Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). In some cases, multiparty elections have signaled a transition
to a more liberal democratic mode of government (Brownlee, 2007; Howard and Roessler, 2006).
However, in the bulk of cases, transitions from closed forms of authoritarianism have led to limited
electoral democracy, competitive authoritarian regimes, or hegemonic authoritarian systems with
one dominant party (Donno, 2013; Levitsky and Way, 2010; Hadenius and Teorell, 2007). In each of
these regime types, multiparty elections are held and are conceived of as the only legitimate route
to political power, but at the same time are manipulated to varying degrees by governments and
political parties.
Due to the prevalence of these elections—unfree and unfair, but still contested and at least
somewhat risky for governments—researchers have increasingly worked to understand their function
in non-democratic societies. Multiparty elections have been shown to be beneficial for regime
longevity on average (Gandhi, 2008; Gandhi and Lust-Okar, 2009; Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007),
in part by helping ruling parties distribute spoils (Blaydes, 2011; Lust-Okar, 2006) and commit
to power sharing (Magaloni, 2008), co-opt opposition parties (Reuter and Robertson, 2015), and
signal dominance to other political actors (Greene, 2007; Magaloni, 2006). Nevertheless, allowing
contested elections creates an opportunity for opposition mobilization, international pressure, and
the revelation of citizens’ true preferences, and can sometimes be destabilizing as a result (Brownlee,
2009; Bunce and Wolchik, 2010; Little et al., 2015).
To mitigate these risks, ruling parties in non-democratic states rely on a variety of tools that can
unfairly influence the outcome of the election (Schedler, 2002). This toolkit includes methods that
involve voters directly, such as vote-buying, voter pressure, and multiple voting, as well techniques
where voter contact is not required (such as ballot-stuffing and the falsification of results). All
of these techniques are illegal and procedurally illegitimate, even in authoritarian regimes, which
exposes the perpetrators of such misdeeds to possible sanctions. The risk that low-level agents
of a political party may face criminal or political punishment for illegal/illegitimate activity is a
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primary driver of the theory of electoral manipulation I elaborate below; as a result, I do not consider
legalized forms of electoral manipulation (biased electoral rules or gerrymandering, for example) in
this project. There are, however, connections between the theory elaborated in this project and the
use of such legalized forms of manipulation in more competitive settings, including in consolidated
democracies.
As with holding multiparty elections, election manipulation carries its own risks and benefits.
The risks are well known: the possibility of mass protest in response to rigged elections figures
prominently in formal models of electoral manipulation (Fearon, 2011; Little, 2012; Magaloni and
Kricheli, 2010), as well as in more qualitative studies (Bunce and Wolchik, 2009; Tucker, 2007). More
recently, researchers have begun to articulate the stabilizing effects of electoral manipulation. In
particular, effective electoral manipulation can send a signal about the ruling party’s organizational
capacity and staying power to other political actors, like opposition parties, bureaucrats, and voters
(Gehlbach and Simpser, 2015; Simpser, 2013). The ruling party’s ability to sway elections can
encourage ambitious politicians to join with the ruling party and help prevent elite splits (Magaloni,
2006). Despite these benefits, there is wide variation in the degree to which elections are manipulated
(Simpser, 2013).
There have been a number of efforts to understand the causes of variation in the degree to which
elections are manipulated, which have yielded a variety of correlates. These include inequalities
in wealth and power (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002; Ziblatt, 2009; Frye et al., 2017; Anderson, 2000).
Similarly, poverty has been widely found to facilitate various forms of electoral malfeasance, especially
vote-buying (Birch, 2011; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005). These findings fit into a long scholarly tradition
that sees inequality and deprivation as impediments to the development of democracy (Acemoglu
and Robinson, 2006; Moore, 1993; Rueschemeyer et al., 1992).
Several other socioeconomic conditions have been tied to electoral manipulation. Dense ethnic
networks can also make manipulation more appealing, by easing the monitoring of voters and
reducing the likelihood that misdeeds will be exposed (Hale, 2007; Goodnow and Moser, 2012).
Voters with higher levels of education are less likely to be targets of vote-buying efforts (Kitschelt
and Wilkinson, 2007), while territories with larger populations are correlated with lower levels of
manipulation(Nichter, 2008; Simpser, 2013; Larreguy et al., 2016). Finally, researchers have found
both positive (Domínguez and McCann, 1998) and negative (Birch, 2011; Lehoucq and Molina, 2002)
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effects for urbanization on electoral manipulation.
Understanding the socioeconomic predictors of manipulation is important, but by far the most
theoretically significant predictor of electoral manipulation is the competitiveness of the election. An
older school of thought held that close elections raise the stakes for the participants, thus increasing
the marginal value of a manufactured vote and driving increased manipulation (Lehoucq, 2003;
Ziblatt, 2009; Argersinger, 1985; Cox and Kousser, 1981). The role of competitiveness can be
modified by other features of the political system. The winner-take-all nature of single-member
electoral districts makes fraud more common in such systems than in those that use proportional
representation (Birch and Van Ham, 2017), and high levels of corruption in a state can make the
spoils of victory more attractive (Birch, 2011). Similarly, presidential elections are likely to produce
higher levels of manipulation, presumably because the stakes are higher in such contests than in
legislative elections (Simpser, 2013).
This classic view has been challenged on two fronts. First, Simpser (2013) convincingly argues
that uncompetitive regimes are in fact likely to demonstrate the most severe electoral manipulation,
as resource—rich, politically unconstrained ruling parties utilize their manipulative resources to send
signals of dominance that can deter anti-regime activity by others. The second competitor to the
conventional wisdom is presented in a formal model by Rundlett and Svolik (2016). Their model,
which articulates principal-agent and collective-action problems inherent in election manipulation,
holds that low-level agents will be reluctant to engage in manipulation when they perceive that their
political principal is unlikely to win the election (a judgment they make based on the principal’s
popularity in the agent’s district).
These two theories make somewhat competing claims, and leave some empirical outcomes
unexplained. The signaling model struggles to account for occasions when strong, unrestrained
ruling parties fail to deliver the excessive levels of electoral manipulation that the model predicts.1
Likewise, the information-based model of Rundlett and Svolik fails to account for scenarios in which
deeply unpopular incumbents were nevertheless able to induce local agents to engage in electoral
1For example, the 2011 parliamentary election in Russia, in which the ruling party won only 49% of the vote.
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manipulation sufficient to remain in office.2 Finally, both models predict uniform changes in electoral
manipulation overall. Consequently, they cannot easily account for a growing body of research
that many electoral manipulation tactics behave as substitutes, with some techniques increasing in
severity even as others decline (Asunka et al., 2017; Harvey, 2016; Kuo and Teorell, 2017; Sjoberg,
2013; Van Ham and Lindberg, 2015).
The framework that I elaborate in this project addresses each of these unresolved questions in
the literature on election manipulation. It describes the conditions under which powerful ruling
parties might fail to deliver high levels of electoral manipulation—when patronage consolidation
begins to break down into rival networks, and/or when local risks to agents become sufficiently
widespread to prevent effective manipulation. Similarly, it can account for the success of unpopular
incumbents, so long as they can hold their patronage networks together. Finally, by accounting for
differential risk levels for agents who engage in dispersed versus centralized manipulation, it explains
observed variation in the kinds of manipulation that are observed in different political contexts.
1.2 Theory in brief
In order to reap the benefits of electoral manipulation, political candidates must rely on large,
pyramidal networks of agents to affect the results (Auyero, 2007; Hale, 2014), raising the possibility
that these agents may not always behave as the boss might prefer (Rundlett and Svolik, 2016).
Throughout this project, I consider a principal to be a national-level executive or party leader,
while agents are the front-line individuals tasked with directly influencing election results by illegal
means—the individuals who stuff the ballot boxes, buy the votes, and forge the results. As a result,
I refer to principal-level effects as national, and agent-level effects as local. However, this model can
be adapted to different electoral scales (i.e. the principal could be a mayor at the local scale).
Principals and agents care about different things. Agents care about access to patronage
resources—jobs, rents, and other resources—that they can gain as a participant in a political leaders’
election-manipulation network. For example, a neighborhood broker who engages in vote-buying
gains access to cash or other benefits (meant for distribution to voters) and may also be rewarded
with a political position in the local administration through which additional rents can be extracted
2The re-election of Boris Yeltsin in 1996 is an excellent example; Yeltsin trailed his Communist Party rival in the polls
for most of the campaign, at times polling in the single digits (Hough et al., 2010).
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(Zarazaga, 2014). A schoolteacher pressed into service as an election administrator, as is common in
Russian elections, may face pressure to participate in ballot-stuffing in order to preserve her job,
salary, or benefits. The greater share of patronage resources that a political leader controls, the
more attractive participation in her network is for agents. This increase in control over patronage
resources acts as an incentive for agents to engage in electoral manipulation, increasing the likely
severity of tampering with the election.
Political principals can benefit directly from electoral manipulation (Greene, 2007; Magaloni,
2006), since it improves their chance of winning close elections (Lehoucq, 2003), and widens the
margin of victory (Simpser, 2013; Gehlbach and Simpser, 2015). By contrast, agents perform their
assigned tasks in order to remain embedded within a principal’s patronage network. To induce agent
cooperation, principals in electoral authoritarian regimes tie access to the state and its associated
rents to electoral success (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2006; Reuter and Robertson, 2012, 2015).
This creates a powerful incentive for local agents to boost the principal’s vote-share by whatever
means are available, in order to remain within the privileged network.
However, if the principal appears less likely to control access to patronage due to electoral
defeat or intraparty rivalry, her offer of post-election patronage will appear less viable, making
it more difficult for principals to credibly commit to rewarding agents (Hale, 2006). Following
Hale (2014)’s conception of ‘patronal politics,’ I argue that a principal’s ability to credibly promise
post-election patronage is contingent on patronage consolidation: the share of resources controlled
by her patronage network, relative to those of potential rivals.3 To clarify, for a patronage network
to exist in the context of election manipulation, there must be continuous links between the political
candidate (the principal) and the front-line agent in a particular territory; rewards and favors flow
down from the candidate through a series of brokers to the individual agent in a particular local
context. It is important to be clear about the distinction between the existence of patronage politics
in a country generally, and the degree of consolidation of patronage networks. Patronage politics
may be pervasive in a given case, but divided among many competing networks. In such a case, this
theory predicts that it will be difficult for any one network to systematically mobilize large numbers
3This corresponds to Hale’s (2014) conceptualization of “single-pyramid” and “multiple pyramid” patronage systems
(p. 10).
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Figure 1.1: Overview of the theoretical model with regard to severity of manipulation
of agents.
Figure 1.1, a general schematic of the theory, makes this distinction clear. In the absence of
patronage politics, incidents of illegal electoral manipulation are likely to be rare and unsystematic.
Without a patronage-based reward system to incentivize election tampering, actions like vote-buying
or vote tampering are likely to be carried out by isolated overzealous partisans, if at all. This is
in line with the broader literature on clientelism, in which the loss of patronage resources (Greene,
2007) or the increasing cost of purchasing citizens’ votes as countries develop (Stokes et al., 2013)
leads to greater programmatic competition and reduced vote-buying. The electoral history of the
United States, among other developed democracies, is also illustrative.
Illegal election manipulation of all sorts was common in the rural United States for much
of the late 19th and early 20th centuries—including vote-buying, multiple voting, intimidation,
ballot-stuffing, pressure by employers and supervisors, and outright fraud (Argersinger, 1985; Cox
and Kousser, 1981). Machine politics based on patronage distribution, famously exemplified by
New York’s Tammany Hall, was common in cities across the country (Trounstine, 2009). By the
modern era in the United States, such occurrences became exceedingly uncommon, despite regular
accusations by political leaders (Minnite, 2017; Norris et al., 2018). Eventually, bowing to political
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pressure and strategic concerns, the federal government and the states adopted civil service reforms
that constrained the ability of elected leaders to rely on patronage rewards to mobilize agents at
election time (Folke et al., 2011; Theriault, 2003). Similar processes occurred in other early modern
democracies (Teorell, 2017). Once patronage networks are disrupted, manipulation on a systemic
scale becomes very unlikely. Node 1 on the diagram in Figure 1.1 represents this outcome; while not
included in this study, most developed democracies would fall under this category.
Given that patronage politics is important in a given case, the nature of the patronage system
is the next important theoretical distinction. Put simply, are there multiple competing sources of
patronage for agents? Or does one network control access to most patronage jobs, rents, and other
resources? When one patronage network predominates, agents have a strong incentive to support
that network’s principal: access to rents and resources outside that network is limited, competing
offers of patronage by opposition figures are necessarily discounted, and punishment of defectors
by exclusion from the network seems assured (Hale, 2014). In a society characterized by multiple
patronage networks, by contrast, the credibility of an individual principal’s offer is contingent on the
likelihood that the principal will win the election or leadership struggle. As a result, clients ‘hedge
their bets or pin their hopes on different networks in an uncoordinated fashion’ (Hale, 2014, p. 72).
The lure of a principal’s patronage network is only half of the equation for agents, however. They
must also consider the risk that their electoral misdeeds—falsification, vote-buying, intimidation,
and so on—may be met with legal or political penalties. This risk is clearest when incumbents lose
the election, as in the Rundlett and Svolik (2016) model. In this scenario, supporters of the outgoing
principal are obvious candidates for prosecution and exclusion from patronage resources (Hale, 2014;
Levitsky, 2003). A patron going down in defeat is not the only risk agents must consider, though;
agents can also find themselves facing punishment even if their principal remains in office. Possible
punishments for illegal election manipulation include criminal penalties like fines and even jail time,
but also political penalties: job loss, demotion or expulsion from the ruling party, and so on.
A variety of local political factors influence the degree of risk to agents. For example, pro-
incumbent manipulation is easier to accomplish and harder to expose when opposition parties have
limited representation on election commissions (Kovalov, 2014; Bader, 2012; Calingaert, 2006), while
election monitors can expose and deter some forms of manipulation (Asunka et al., 2017; Hyde,
2011; Kelley, 2012; Sjoberg, 2013). In regions where courts are more independent of the ruling party,
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opposition party figures are more likely to pursue election-related complaints in regional courts
(Popova, 2006) which can sometimes act to redress low-level electoral violations (Popova, 2012). By
increasing risks to agents, local constraints affect the relative value of a principal’s offer of patronage;
a particular patronage offer may be sufficient to convince an agent to engage in manipulation in a
local setting where constraints are low, but insufficient in cases where constraints are higher. As a
result, the interaction of patronage and constraints affects the level of manipulation observed.
The nodes at the bottom of the Figure 1 demonstrate the interaction effects predicted by the
theory with regard to the severity of manipulation. When patronage consolidation is low—meaning
that there are multiple networks competing for agents’ loyalty and for electoral success—and local
risks are low, the level of systemic electoral manipulation in that region is expected to be moderate.
For some agents, the uncertainty of patronage rewards in such an environment deters them from
participating in a manipulation effort, while for others this uncertainty is balanced out by the low
risk of exposure and punishment. As a result, substantial but not severe manipulation should be
observed. Examples of cases in the corresponding Node 2 include local PRI and PAN strongholds in
Mexico after economic and political liberalization broke up the PRI’s hegemonic control of patronage
resources.4
Alternatively, when patronage consolidation is low but local risks are high, participation in
manipulation efforts becomes a losing proposition for most agents; the risk of exposure outweighs the
possible patronage benefits. In these regions, despite the existence of patronage politics, elections
are likely to be relatively free of illegal manipulation due to the difficulty of recruiting agents as
Node 3 in the diagram indicates. In this study, states in Mexico where opposition parties broke
the PRI’s hold on power early in that country’s democratic transition—such as Baja California,
Jalisco, or Nayarit—provide examples of the combination of elevated risks for agents and fragmenting
patronage networks.
When patronage consolidation is high, the existence of a dominant network creates a powerful
incentive for agents to engage in illegal manipulation. The network’s resources and lack of significant
rivals helps it overcome a coordination problem; individual agents are likely to expect that other
4I use the term constraint rather than competition since partisan competition is only one potential limitation on
agents’ ability to manipulate, which also include the courts, civil society monitoring groups, the media, and others.
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agents will also be working on the dominant network’s behalf, increasing the odds of victory and
making their own continued access to patronage resources appear more secure (Rundlett and Svolik,
2016). Still, elevated local risks due to active opposition parties, courts, media outlets, or civil
society can moderate this incentive; some agents may find the risk outweighs the expected benefit.
Such cases are likely to result in moderate levels of manipulation, as shown at Node 5; the mixed
incentive structure mirrors those cases at Node 2 where patronage consolidation and local risks
are both low. Examples of this outcome are found in Moscow and other regions of Russia where
opposition groups are active, despite the overall dominance of the ruling patronage network reflected
by the governing United Russia party. Ukraine’s western regions also shift from Node 3 to Node 5
during the Yanukovych presidency, which in combination with constitutional reforms brought the
‘Donetsk clan’ patronage and its allies to national power.
Finally, when patronage consolidation is high and local risks are low, the most severe incidences of
electoral manipulation are too be expected—neither uncertainty about rewards or fear of punishment
is likely to deter agents in significant numbers. Russia’s Caucasus republics of Chechnya and
Dagestan are examples of such cases, falling under Node 4 in Figure 1.1.
Figure 1.1 sketches the theory with regard the severity of manipulation, but the theory also
has implications for the type of illegal manipulation that agents will be willing to deploy under
different circumstances. When local constraints make manipulation riskier, agents can choose to
insulate themselves from that risk by engaging in forms of electoral manipulation that are more
difficult to observe and trace back to perpetrators. For example, falsification and ballot fraud are
usually carried out by agents who occupy a public, official position in the election administration
and/or political parties (Birch, 2011, p. 61). Election commissioners, for example, have a variety of
means by which they can influence election results. However, discrepancies are easily traced back to
them, especially when there is political and legal pressure to do so. By contrast, forms of electoral
manipulation that are more dispersed—like vote-buying and voter-pressure—are harder to observe
and attribute to organizers, who may be employers (Frye et al., 2014), neighborhood brokers (Stokes
et al., 2013), and other non-state actors (Mares and Young, 2016). Unlike more centralized tactics,
partisan and civil-society monitors do not know where and when to look for these activities, making
them more difficult to trace than direct manipulation of the election administration (Birch, 2011).
The nature of this kind of clientelistic exchange—in which brokers often know their clients directly,
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Patronage consolidation low Patronage consolidation high
Local risk high
Limited or no manipulation
Example: Early competitive




Example: Russia, Moscow Oblast’
Local risk low
Centralized manipulation
(i.e. fraud in counting or tabulation)
Example: Western Ukraine, 2005-2010
(Yuschenko period)
Centralized manipulation (i.e.
fraud in counting or tabulation)
Example: Russia, Republic of
Dagestan
Table 1.1: Patronage consolidation, local risk, and manipulation type
and benefit from either an asymmetrical power relationship (Frye et al., 2014) or a sense of trust
(Kramon, 2016)—makes these techniques harder for monitoring organizations to expose.
Table 1.1 presents these expectations with case examples. As the table indicates, local risks are
the primary driver of the kind of manipulation agents employ. When risks are high, manipulation is
either severely curtailed (when patronage networks are unconsolidated) or takes the form of dispersed
tactics like vote-buying and voter pressure. When risks are low, centralized techniques like fraud are
the preferred tool of regimes and their agents in most cases due to the cost-effectiveness of those
tactics. Principals’ resources are not limitless, and they face a budget constraint on their ability
to generate electoral manipulation. Even cheaper dispersed tactics like pressuring voters through
their employers still require monitoring efforts and rewards for compliant businesses (Frye et al.,
2014, p. 207). Agents and brokers engaged in falsification or other types of manipulation must
still be organized and compensated (Langston and Morgenstern, 2009). Vote-buying is especially
costly (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002; Wang and Kurzman, 2007), and becomes increasingly so as
competitiveness increases (Corstange, 2018). As a result, incumbents are likely to prefer centralized
forms of manipulation in low risk areas, due to their cost-effectiveness (Harvey, 2016; Van Ham and
Lindberg, 2015). Consequently, if higher local constraints make agents less willing to tamper with
elections in administrative ways, principals may find agents both more expensive to hire (as they
turn toward vote-buying and similar tactics) and more likely to shirk their duties on election day
(as they become harder to monitor). This limits the ability of principals to compensate for higher
competitiveness by boosting payments for agents.
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1.3 Case selection and measurement
In order to test this theory, I draw on data from three country cases and make use of multiple
quantitative and qualitative methods. Several elections are analyzed for each country case, with
the time period covered varying according to the availability of precinct-level election data. For
Russia, these are the legislative elections of 2003, 2007, and 2011, and the presidential elections of
2004, 2008, and 2012. The Ukrainian case includes legislative elections in 2002, 2006, 2007, 2012 and
2014, along with presidential elections in 20045, 2010, and 2014. Lastly, precinct-level election data
is available for the widest range of elections in Mexico, including the general elections of 1994, 2000,
2006, and 2012, in addition to congressional elections in 1997, 2003, and 2009.
The case countries were selected for their variation in the two explanatory factors discussed
above, as well as in the dependent variable—the overall level of electoral manipulation. All three are
large, internally diverse countries with subnational variation in the degree to which ruling parties
dominate at the local level. For example, in Russia the ruling party faces serious competition in
places like Moscow, while maintaining near hegemonic status in many of Russia’s titular ethnic
republics. Likewise, (prior to the 2014 crisis) most eastern regions in Ukraine were dominated by
political machines allied with a largely pro-Russia and anti-reform party; machine politics was more
limited in most western regions, where pro-Europe, pro-reform parties competed for votes. Following
economic and political liberalization in Mexico, some regions remain strongholds for the old ruling
party, while others are closely contested by two of the three major parties.
Similarly, the three cases present diverging trajectories with regard to the consolidation of
patronage resources (and the development of democracy). All three cases began a process of
increased multi-party competition in the 1990s, as the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI)
lost its decades-long hegemony in Mexico while Ukraine and Russia emerged as multi-party polities
from the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mexico is a case of decreasing patronage consolidation, as
the PRI gradually lost its dominant access to patronage resources (Greene, 2007). Russia during
this time period is a case of generally increasing patronage consolidation, as Vladimir Putin worked
to restore the power of the federal center vis-à-vis regional bosses and wealthy oligarchs. Lastly,
5Unfortunately, only the election results for the re-run of the 2004 Ukrainian election are publicly available; the results
of the annulled election that sparked the Orange Revolution are not included in the dataset.
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Ukraine represents a middle (and complicated) case. Patronage consolidation is high for pro-Eastern
parties prior to 2005 and after 2010; it is low during the middle period due to constitutional reforms
and pro-Western control of the presidency. For pro-Western parties, patronage consolidation is
consistently low (due to their geographical base of support and the 2005-2010 constitutional system).
This national-level variation across cases, when combined with the widespread local political variation
within cases, allows me to test the interactive hypotheses generated by my theory.
Lastly, the overall level of electoral integrity varies both across and within the cases. While
elections were highly managed affairs during the period of PRI hegemony in Mexico, major institu-
tional changes instituted in the late 1980s and 1990s have led to significant improvements in the
electoral environment (Cantú and García-Ponce, 2015; Eisenstadt, 2003; Magaloni, 2006), though
irregularities remain (Larreguy et al., 2016, 2017; Benton, 2017). Russia’s experience is in this
sense a mirror-image of Mexico’s, as elections have become more tightly controlled, using illegal
and legal techniques, during Vladimir Putin’s 18-plus years as the country’s principal leader (Frye
et al., 2017; Moser and White, 2013; White, 2011). Electoral integrity in Ukraine has fluctuated
dramatically over the last two decades, improving in the aftermath of the 2004 Orange Revolution,
but deteriorating again under the presidency of Viktor Yanukovych (Kovalov, 2014). Figure 1.2 shows
this general trend from 1990 to 2014, using the ‘electoral component index’ measure from the V-Dem
project; higher scores on this index indicate higher levels of electoral integrity.6 In all three cases,
the overall trend obscures internal variation: some regions hold relatively fair elections, while other
regions experience more widespread tampering. The latter category includes, for example, several
of Ukraine’s eastern regions, republics in Russia’s Caucasus, and subnational partisan strongholds
scattered throughout Mexico.
There are additional advantages to this research design. All three cases are internally heterogenous
on important control variables, like GDP per capita or ethnic makeup of the population. As a result,
they are useful cases for the study of the effect of local political conditions on election manipulation.
Finally, analyzing patterns of manipulation within countries over time allows me to hold many
potential confounding variables constant across elections. These variables include political culture
6This is a component indicator of the broader V-Dem measure of electoral democracy; it is a measure of electoral
integrity, the extent of suffrage, and freedom of association.
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Figure 1.2: Overall electoral integrity across three cases
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and state-level institutional design, among others.
The identification and measurement of electoral manipulation poses a significant methodological
problem: the phenomenon is often clandestine, almost always illegal, and its empirical fingerprints
can be hidden among the noise of genuine votes. This challenge has spurred considerable innovation
among researchers in recent years, beginning with efforts to systematically code expert evaluations
of election quality (Hyde and Marinov, 2012; Coppedge et al., 2017) or election monitors’ reports
(Kelley, 2012). Such datasets are very useful for providing baseline prior expectations for overall
election manipulation in a country, often have wide geographical coverage, and can give valuable
insight into the techniques that are commonly used in particular states. However, they also have
drawbacks; expert’s retroactive evaluations can be flawed, and election monitors ability to observe
manipulation can be limited by political geography and by ruling-party adaptation (Kelley, 2012;
Sjoberg, 2013; Buzin et al., 2016). As such, while they inform some of the work in the following
chapters, they are not well suited for the questions at hand here; testing the theory outlined above
requires fine-grained estimates of electoral manipulation at the regional (or even local) level.
To achieve this level of detail, I primarily rely on election-forensic analysis of precinct-level
election results (each country case contains thousands of precinct-level observations per election year).
Election forensics is a growing family of statistical techniques aimed at detecting patterns in electoral
data that would be unlikely to occur in the absence of electoral manipulation (Beber and Scacco,
2012; Deckert, 2013; Deckert et al., 2011; Myagkov et al., 2009; Montgomery et al., 2015). I make
use of several techniques, including turnout-based tests and digits tests, to identify multiple forms of
electoral manipulation. In particular, digits tests are useful for detecting falsification, overall turnout
tests can capture general electoral manipulation, and specific subsets of turnout (like absentee voting)
can be used to detect techniques like vote-buying depending on the context (Harvey, 2016).
In addition to election forensics, I also draw on insights from field interviews of election monitors,
academic experts, leaders of an election-monitoring civil society group, and precinct election commis-
sioners. These interviews were conducted in Russia from September-December 2015. This qualitative
data helps clarify the causal mechanisms underlying the patterns detected in the election-forensic
models. Finally, in an effort to better understand the risks of engaging in electoral manipulation
for both agents and leaders, I employed vignette and list survey experiments using a nationally
representative sample of Russians in summer 2016.
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1.4 Contributions of the argument to prior research
The questions considered here are central to the study of regime durability in electoral authori-
tarian and unconsolidated democratic states. Where ruling parties can generate enough electoral
manipulation to cow potential challengers, elections can be stabilizing. However, when ruling parties
are unable to marshal enough resources to manipulate the election overwhelmingly, they run the risk
of destabilizing mass protest or outright defeat. This theory goes beyond prior work in explaining
why ruling parties sometimes fall unexpectedly short in their ability to manage elections, and why
they sometimes do surprisingly well. It points to the importance of factors that are more structural
than the competitiveness of the election itself, factors which are difficult to measure but nonetheless
explain much of the variation in illegal electoral manipulation. Under what circumstances will parties
be less likely to be able to generate electoral manipulation, potentially putting the status quo at
risk? This theory says that we should look less toward factors like incumbent approval ratings, and
more toward the ability of incumbents to maintain cohesive patronage networks and to isolate and
contain local political contestation.
The second major question addressed here is a relatively more recent one in the literature, but no
less important: given that an election is being manipulated, what explains variation in the techniques
used to bias the outcome? In other words, why are elections in some countries marked by widespread
vote-buying even though the count itself is fair, while in other countries vote-buying is rare but
coercion or falsification are common? There are several reasons this question is important. First,
it is impossible to answer the first question without an understanding of the second. For example,
researchers have elaborated general theories of variation in electoral manipulation, but only tested
those theories empirically using particular manipulation techniques. At best, this approach limits
the conclusiveness of those findings; at worst, it precludes the possibility that those theories may be
falsified when applied to alternative forms of manipulation. For example, Rundlett and Svolik (2016)
argue that electoral manipulation generally will decline as incumbent leaders become less popular;
they test this claim using a measure of falsification in a Russian election, and show that evidence of
falsification declines with incumbent-party popularity in line with their predictions. However, other
work shows that vote-buying and ballot-stuffing increase as falsification declines, challenging their
general model of manipulation (Harvey, 2016). This theory provides a framework for understanding
this substitution effect. When centralized manipulation is unobtainable due to the risk of exposure
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for agents, principals with the resources can turn to dispersed tactics like vote-buying; others must
content themselves with legal forms of manipulation or a clean election.
Furthermore, understanding variation in the forms electoral manipulation takes will improve
the theory and practice of electoral manipulation, by indicating how and why ruling parties seek to
avoid the detection of some kinds of manipulation. In particular, it will be useful to know whether
observed shifts in some forms of electoral manipulation away from monitored precincts (Asunka et al.,
2017; Sjoberg, 2016) are driven by the risk of protest and instability feared by political leaders—as in
the conventional wisdom—or by the risk of exposure and punishment feared by low-level agents, as I
argue here. Distinguishing between these two mechanisms will improve our theoretical understanding
of why election monitoring succeeds or fails in promoting clean elections (Kelley, 2012), and also has
implications for the sorts of policy tools that may effectively deter manipulation. For example, if the
agent-based explanation is predominant, it is not necessary to look to large-scale collective action to
deter manipulation, but rather to sharpening the difference in the incentive structures of candidates
and their agents. In particular, this theory implies that reformers and opposition supporters might
emphasize breaking the patronage-based link between political leaders and election-manipulating
agents, and enhancing local risks through broad-based local contestation and investments in critical
media and independent courts.
Lastly, while sensitivity to local political conditions is important both for theorizing about and
measuring electoral manipulation, this theory is cross-regional. For it to be applicable, it requires
only that patronage networks exist that can deliver resources to election-manipulating agents, and
that there be some degree of risk—in some part of the country, at least—that such agents might be
publicly exposed and face criminal or civil penalties. The first criterion tends to limit the theory’s
ability to explain behavior in economically advanced democracies, while the latter often rules out
the most politically closed electoral authoritarian regimes. As a result, the explanatory power of
the theory is best suited to countries ranging from the hybrid regimes to new or unconsolidated
democracies. In the current period, this is one of the largest families of regime. Of the countries
with multiparty electoral regimes in 2014, 46 fell into this middle range—essentially the size as the
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group of more consolidated democracies, which numbered 48.7 As such, this project aims to make a
significant contribution to our understanding of electoral behavior in a broad class of states, which
are reflected in the three cases selected for investigation: democratizing Mexico, more authoritarian
Russia, and hybrid Ukraine.
1.5 Chapter outline
The following chapters test this theory under different levels of patronage consolidation, and
in different social and political contexts. In Chapter 2, evidence from Russia is presented to show
that patronage consolidation and local constraints have an interactive relationship with electoral
manipulation, even in a relatively authoritarian setting. As patronage consolidation increases,
election-forensic analysis shows that falsification (a centralized tactic) become more likely in low-
constraint regions of Russia, but not in high-constraint regions. In the latter regions, instead, more
dispersed forms of manipulation increase in severity. Qualitative evidence from field interviews is
also highlighted.
Chapter 3 presents the results from Mexico. In this chapter, levels of falsification and overall
manipulation are estimated, and then analyzed using logit models and a difference-in-difference
model, respectively. This chapter shows that falsification benefiting the opposition Partido Acción
Nacional (PAN) becomes more likely in regional PAN strongholds, even as falsification becomes more
difficult for the declining PRI. This provides a useful test of the theory: deconsolidation of PRI-based
patronage allows the PAN to capture some patronage resources, and convert those resources into
falsified results in regions where PAN domination makes the risk of local exposure low.
The difference-in-difference model compares overall levels of electoral manipulation across two
adjacent states with similar socioeconomic profiles but different political trajectories. In the state of
Durango, the PRI has maintained unbroken control of the state government, while in neighboring
Nayarit, the PAN and PRI have alternated control. The results of the model indicate that evidence
of manipulation is statistically and substantively significantly lower in Nayarit—where opposition
contestation creates higher local constraints—than in Durango. The results demonstrate the changes
7These are the author’s calculations based on the countries contained in the V-Dem 7.1 dataset. The group of
mid-range countries was determined by scores on the Polity index greater than -8 and less than 8, while those with a
score of 8 or higher were counted as established democracies.
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in local competitiveness can drive shifts in manipulation patterns, holding levels of patronage
consolidation constant. The next chapter, focused on Ukraine, tests the reverse proposition.
Chapter 4 returns to the post-Soviet space by analyzing patterns of electoral manipulation
Ukraine. As in Chapter 3, the Ukraine chapter also examines falsification (using a vote-share
test) and evidence of overall manipulation (using a turnout test). The results show that electoral
manipulation in Ukraine is unusually deflationary; that is, parties emphasize tactics that reduce their
opponents’ vote-shares rather than those that inflate their own totals. The election-forensic evidence
in this chapter indicates that Ukraine’s pro-Eastern parties have been victims of such deflationary
techniques in regions where risks to opposing agents are low. Ukraine’s crisis-driven political history
over the last two decades allows for tests of how this pattern responds to significant shifts in patronage
consolidation. When the pro-eastern Party of Regions was able to gain consolidated control of
the instruments of patronage, evidence of deflationary manipulation in western regions all but
disappears. However, agents appear to have quickly shifted their allegiance to pro-western networks
in the aftermath of the Euromaidan revolution and the conflict in Donbass; evidence of deflationary
manipulation against pro-eastern candidates increases significantly during that period, especially
in pro-eastern regions. This chapter helps demonstrate the contributions of the consolidation and
constraint model of electoral manipulation presented here versus the local-information model of
Rundlett and Svolik (2016), which makes predictions contrary to these findings.
Finally, Chapter 5 draws on survey-experimental data to show that risks to agents (rather than
the risk of protest faced by principals) are what drives the election-forensic patterns identified in the
preceding chapters. In particular, vignette- and list-based experiments suggest that supporters of the
largest parliamentary opposition party (the Communist Party of the Russian Federation) were more
likely to support harsh punishment for election-manipulation agents in competitive elections than
were supporters of the ruling party, while they were not more likely than ruling-party supporters to
favor post-election protest. This is presented as evidence that the observed shift away from easily
monitored forms of electoral manipulation (like falsification) in more competitive regions is driven
by agents’ fear of punishment in regions where opposition parties are relatively active, rather than
principals’ fear of protest. That is, the ruling party’s own supporters are shown to be just as likely
to support protest against manipulation, suggesting that there is little benefit in shifting observable
manipulation to friendlier territory.
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CHAPTER 2
Centralized and dispersed manipulation in Russia
During the 2011 Russian legislative election campaign, the city manager of Izhevsk, a regional
capital, was filmed while speaking to a meeting of local veterans’ groups. In the video, city manager
Denis Agashin speaks bluntly about the rewards the veterans can expect if they contribute to the
ruling party’s victory in the polls. ‘If the party receives less than fifty percent of the vote in your
district,’ Agashin declares, ‘that means nothing will change. . . .If the party receives between 50 and
54 percent, we will fund [the local veterans’ groups] with 500,000 rubles.’ Agashin went on to add
rewards for even more specific targets up to 1,000,000 rubles for a 60% vote-share.1 Despite multiple
efforts by opposition parties to bring political and criminal penalties against Agashin2, he was largely
protected from punishment by the local dominance of the ruling party, United Russia’s. Others have
not been so fortunate. For example, in 2009 a district court in Saratov oblast levied a 200,000 ruble
fine against the chair of a precinct election commission for falsifying votes in favor of United Russia;
still others have received suspended prison sentences.3 Such punitive outcomes are not uncommon
even in a relatively closed case like Russia: after the 2016 legislative election, the Russian Central
Election Commission reported 32 criminal cases related to electoral manipulation, in addition to
approximately 1,000 administrative cases and 300 fines (Tikhonova, 2016).
These anecdotes illustrate the personal risk undertaken by those who actually tamper with
elections, an aspect of manipulation that has been largely overlooked by research that emphasizes
the costs and risks borne by political leaders (Simpser, 2013; Magaloni, 2010; Ziblatt, 2009; Hyde,
1See http://www.newsru.com/russia/30oct2011/agashin.html for a summary of the event, and the video clip.
2These included efforts to remove him from office, and pressure on the regional prosecutor to bring criminal charges.
See http://www.dayudm.ru/article/51302/ (Russian) for details.
3A website for the Honest Elections Public Council, a Kremlin-approved non-governmental agency, maintained a list
of dozens of other incidents of arrests, administrative charges, and criminal proceedings against individuals who have
allegedly helped manipulate an election. The organization and website are now defunct, but an archive is available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20170809084414/http://www.chest-vibor.ru/chronicles/.
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2011). A recent principal-agent model of electoral manipulation addresses this gap, by highlighting
risks faced by agents if their patron loses the election. However, this emphasis on the risk of electoral
defeat does not account for evidence that shows illegal electoral manipulation tactics are often used
as substitutes, with one tactic increasing in severity as another declines (Harvey, 2016; Kuo and
Teorell, 2017; Sjoberg, 2013). In particular, some forms of manipulation stubbornly persist even as
the risk of patron defeat increases along with growing levels of competition and democratization
(Asunka et al., 2017; Van Ham and Lindberg, 2015).
The model presented here helps reconcile these findings by arguing electoral defeat for their
patron is not the only risk that agents face. Instead, local political conditions—like active opposition
parties or independent courts—can make participation in electoral manipulation costlier for agents,
even if their patron remains in power, by increasing the local risks of exposure and political or
criminal penalties for the perpetrator. However, agents can insulate themselves from local risks by
engaging in forms of manipulation that are harder to observe and trace, such as vote-buying and
voter pressure, which helps explain the persistence of these tactics even as political competitiveness
increases. These hypotheses are supported by election-forensic analysis of two types of electoral
manipulation, using electoral data from more than 90,000 precincts in each election year, across
Russia’s eighty-plus regions during six national elections from 2003-2012.
This article makes several contributions to existing research. First, it adds to a dynamic literature
on the function of democratic institutions in authoritarian contexts. The modal authoritarian regime
today is one that has adopted democratic institutions like multi-party elections (Levitsky and
Way, 2010; Magaloni and Kricheli, 2010). Researchers have investigated the benefits that elections
can provide for incumbents in authoritarian systems, by revealing information (Brownlee, 2007),
co-opting the opposition (Gandhi and Przeworski, 2007), distributing spoils (Blaydes, 2011), and
testing the competence and loyalty of party subordinates (Reuter and Robertson, 2012). More
recent works, including this paper, build on this literature by probing the underlying mechanics of
authoritarian elections, and the conditions that make them likely to succeed or fail in propping up
incumbents (Donno, 2013; Frye et al., 2014; Reuter and Robertson, 2015).
Second, it addresses an ongoing debate over a central question in the study of authoritarian
elections: why are some elections manipulated more severely than others? There have been a number
of efforts to understand the causes of this variation: as signaling efforts by dominant ruling parties
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(Simpser, 2013), as a response to opposition strength (Magaloni, 2010), and as a function of state
patronage (Greene, 2007), domestic institutional design (Birch, 2007), or socioeconomic structures
(Frye et al., 2014; Nichter, 2008; Stokes, 2005; Ziblatt, 2009). One of the best current explanations for
variation in the severity of electoral manipulation is a formal model provided by Rundlett and Svolik
(2016), referred to hereafter as the incumbent-popularity model. However, these models generally
treat electoral manipulation as a single tool, rather than a family of substitutable techniques as recent
empirical work (cited above) has shown. The results presented here demonstrate that the central
mechanism of the incumbent-popularity model—local information about incumbent popularity—is
incomplete without taking into account incumbent’s broader patronage resources. Furthermore,
they show that local conditions do more than convey information about an incumbent’s national
popularity, but can actively constrain ruling parties’ options. Contrary to the predictions of the
Rundlett and Svolik model, I find no relationship between levels of manipulation and incumbent
approval rating, and show that extensive manipulation may still occur in highly contested areas so
long as the effort relies on harder-to-detect forms of manipulation. This has three implications for
understanding electoral manipulation.
First, cleaner elections will not necessarily follow from declining incumbent popularity if she is
able maintain control over patronage resources. A prominent example of this dynamic would be the
1996 presidential election in Russia, in which the deeply unpopular Boris Yeltsin was able to muster
the support of a patronage network consisting of oligarchs and regional power brokers and generate
enough clientelistic support and electoral manipulation to win a second term (Hale, 2014, pp. 135,
267; Myagkov et al., 2009). Second, by showing that less attributable forms of manipulation are
less susceptible to agency loss than other techniques, it offers an explanation for the persistence of
manipulation in more competitive settings as long as patronage resources are consolidated by the
incumbent (see also Greene (2007)). Finally, it highlights the important role that civil society groups
and opposition parties can play in shaping patterns of electoral manipulation at the subnational level,
in contrast with the incumbent-popularity model’s focus on national conditions; this subnational
focus complements previous work on opposition effects at the national level (Bunce and Wolchik,
2010) and helps interpret recent dynamics in Russian politics.
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2.1 Principals, agents, and electoral manipulation
Electoral manipulation refers here to illegal efforts to influence the outcome of an election,
including activities like vote-buying and tampering with election returns, but excluding legal
mechanisms of biasing election results. Electoral manipulation has a variety of benefits for candidates
and leaders: it can send a signal about the ruling party’s organizational capacity and staying power
to other political actors (Gehlbach and Simpser, 2015; Simpser, 2013), and can induce ambitious
politicians to join with the ruling party and help prevent elite splits (Magaloni, 2006), leaving
opposition parties to recruit from a pool of relatively extreme ideological activists (Greene, 2007).
Despite these benefits, there is wide variation in the severity of electoral manipulation (Simpser,
2013).
Previous research has identified a variety of factors that affect the prevalence of electoral
manipulation, including inequality in wealth and power (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002; Ziblatt, 2009),
poverty (Nichter, 2008; Simpser, 2013; Stokes, 2005), education levels (Kitschelt and Wilkinson,
2007), and urbanization (Birch, 2011; Domínguez and McCann, 1998; Lehoucq and Molina, 2002).
Additionally, dense ethnic networks can make manipulation more appealing, by easing the monitoring
of voters and reducing the likelihood that misdeeds will be exposed (Goodnow et al., 2014; Hale,
2007), while population size is negatively correlated with tampering (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002;
Nichter, 2008; Simpser, 2013). Corruption levels (Birch, 2011) and electoral system design (Birch,
2007) also influence manipulation.
The competitiveness of the electoral environment has been identified as a central factor in several
theories, first a positive driver of manipulation (Argersinger, 1985; Lehoucq, 2003; Lehoucq and
Molina, 2002; Ziblatt, 2009). However, Simpser (2013) convincingly argues that ruling parties with
few constraints and large resource advantages engage in excessive manipulation in uncompetitive
environments as a signal of dominance. While this argument helps explain the puzzle of excessive
electoral manipulation, its implications are less clear for cases in which dominant ruling parties fail
to deliver excessive manipulation; principal-agent models can offer an explanation.
Unlike many prior formal-theoretic models of electoral manipulation (Gehlbach and Simpser,
2015; Little, 2012; Magaloni, 2010), Rundlett and Svolik (2016) devise a formal principal-agent and
collective-action model of electoral manipulation in which manipulation is deterred not by leaders’
fear of protest but by front-line agents’ fear or punishment. Their approach usefully addresses both
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excessive manipulation and under-production of manipulation by strong governments. However, it has
two main limitations, which this paper addresses. First, the model assumes that all forms of electoral
manipulation are equally subject to principal-agent problems. However, electoral manipulation
tactics are known to shift in response to changes in the local environment. For example, the presence
of election monitors has been shown to lead to increases in harder-to-observe tactics such as voter
pressure and covert spending to help favored candidates (Simpser and Donno, 2012; Beaulieu and
Hyde, 2008), along with increased falsification in unmonitored precincts (Sjoberg, 2013). Likewise,
increased local competitiveness is associated with more vote-buying and voter pressure, and less
administrative fraud (Harvey, 2016). The incumbent-popularity model does not account for these
differences, since it predicts that all types of electoral manipulation should rise and fall with the
leader’s popular support.
Second, the assumption that agents’ local political environment serves only as a signal of the
principal’s unknown national popularity obscures two important features of electoral authoritarian
politics: that an incumbent’s popularity is only one aspect of her overall likelihood of retaining office
(Gerschewski, 2013), and that local politics in some regions can be sufficiently open and competitive
as to meaningfully constrain the ruling party’s freedom of action (Belokurova and Vorob’ev, 2011).
In short, the model advanced by Rundlett and Svolik (2016) is a significant step forward in
understanding electoral manipulation, but the underlying mechanisms driving the model cannot
account for observed local variation in manipulation tactics. The following theory addresses this
puzzle by tying local risks to the type of manipulation employed by agents, and by broadening the
conception of the incumbent’s staying power to include patronage resources rather than popularity
alone.
2.2 Theory and hypotheses
For the purposes of this paper I consider a principal to be a national-level executive or party
leader, while agents are the front-line individuals tasked with directly influencing election results by
illegal means. As a result, I refer to principal-level effects as national, and agent-level effects as local.
I argue that, while principals benefit from increased electoral manipulation, agents’ willingness to
manipulate elections is conditional on two broad factors: the national consolidation of the patronage
network the principal controls, and the local-level constraints faced by the agent. These two factors
interact to influence agent behavior. When patronage networks are consolidated, agents have a strong
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incentive to participate in electoral manipulation on behalf of the dominant network; however, local
factors like high partisan contestation can make engaging in manipulation risky for agents. Agents
can reduce their exposure to local risk by shifting to harder-to-trace forms of electoral manipulation
like vote-buying or voter pressure, rather than more easily monitored and traced activities like
falsification.
In order to reap the benefits of electoral manipulation, political candidates must rely on large
networks of agents to affect the results. These networks are usually pyramidal, with actors at each
level responsible for overseeing a larger number of actors at the next level down (Auyero, 2007; Hale,
2014). Political candidates’ dependence on agents raises the possibility that agents’ may not always
behave as the boss might prefer (Rundlett and Svolik, 2016).
Political principals can benefit directly from electoral manipulation (Greene, 2007; Magaloni,
2006), since it improves their chance of winning close elections (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002), and
widens the margin of victory (Simpser, 2013; Gehlbach and Simpser, 2015). By contrast, agents
do not directly benefit from each manufactured vote they generate. Instead, agents perform their
assigned tasks in order to remain embedded within a principal’s patronage network. For example,
Russia’s primary election-monitoring group recorded numerous incidents of voters being pressured
to support the ruling party by their employers during the 2011 election. The following example is
representative:
At Kindergarten No. 620 [in St. Petersburg], a meeting was held in which employees
were compelled to take absentee ballots in order to vote on school grounds. It was said
that otherwise the district would be cut off from funding, but that voting by absentee
would be rewarded with cash bonuses and time off. . . . It was pointed out that [Duma]
Deputy S. Shatunovskii (a member of United Russia) had done a lot for the district and
it was necessary to support him (Golos 2011).
As the anecdote illustrates, local school administrators pressured their employees with the risk of
job loss and the promise of bonuses, in order to remain within the ruling party’s patronage network.
This sort of voter pressure / vote-buying is common in sectors that rely on state patronage for their
success (Frye et al., 2014). Other forms of manipulation which rely more directly on state actors,
such as ballot-stuffing or falsification of results, are also carried out in order to retain access to
patronage. Principals in electoral authoritarian regimes tie access to the state and its associated
opportunities for rents and patronage to electoral success (Diaz-Cayeros, 2006; Lust-Okar, 2006;
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Reuter and Robertson, 2012, 2015), and can use the same resources to penalize opponents (McMann,
2006). This creates a powerful incentive for local agents to boost the principal’s vote-share by
whatever means are available, including misuse of the election administration apparatus, in order to
remain within the privileged network.
However, if the principal appears less likely to control access to patronage due to electoral defeat
or intraparty rivalry, her offer of post-election patronage will appear less viable to agents, reducing
their incentive to work on her behalf (Hale, 2006). Following Hale’s (2014) conception of ‘patronal
politics,’ I argue that a principal’s ability to credibly promise post-election patronage is contingent
on the share of resources controlled by her patronage network, relative to those of potential rivals.4
When one patronage network controls a large share of resources, agents have a strong incentive
to support the principal: access to rents and resources outside that network is limited, competing
offers of patronage by opposition figures are necessarily discounted, and punishment of defectors
by exclusion from the network seems assured (Hale, 2014). In a society characterized by multiple
patronage networks, by contrast, the credibility of an individual principal’s offer is contingent on the
likelihood that the principal will win the election or leadership struggle. As a result, clients ‘hedge
their bets or pin their hopes on different networks in an uncoordinated fashion’ (Hale, 2014, p. 72).
Consequently, agents are more strongly incentivized to participate in electoral manipulation efforts
when patronage networks are more consolidated.
However, conditions at the agent’s level can constrain agents’ ability to engage in manipulation,
by increasing the risk of exposure and punishment, even if the principal’s access to patronage appears
secure. Local agents are valuable to principals in part because of their deep knowledge of their
local environment, which better enables them to monitor voters, distribute clientelistic benefits, or
otherwise alter election results (Frye et al., 2014; Zarazaga, 2014). However, this local knowledge
also allows agents to make strategic judgments about the level of local risk involved in manipulating
an election. In more competitive settings, local agents have an ‘exit option,’ and may stop mobilizing
voters or switch parties if the status quo becomes too risky (Stokes et al., 2013, pp. 121-126). A
variety of political factors influence local risk. For example, when opposition parties have limited
4This corresponds to Hale’s (2014) conceptualization of “single-pyramid” and “multiple pyramid” patronage systems
(p. 10).
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or no representation on election commissions, pro-incumbent manipulation is easier to accomplish
and harder to expose (Kovalov, 2014; Bader, 2012; Calingaert, 2006). The presence of election
monitors deters election-day forms of electoral manipulation (Hyde, 2011; Sjoberg, 2013), and makes
it more likely to be exposed (Kelley, 2012). Monitors are more likely to be present in politically
open territories (Buzin et al., 2016), and more likely to be effective in more competitive districts
(Asunka et al., 2017). In cases where a dominant party machine exercises control over regional
courts, opposition party figures are less likely to pursue complaints in regional courts (Popova, 2006),
reducing the risk to agents of engaging in manipulation. Even authoritarian regimes may allow lower
courts to remain somewhat independent, in order to reduce corruption, increase investment, and
enhance regime legitimacy (Moustafa and Ginsburg, 2008). In turn, these courts sometimes act to
redress low-level electoral violations. For example, Popova (2012) finds that district courts in Russia
were more likely to hear election-related cases in competitive districts, and that pro-government
candidates were not systematically more likely to win than pro-opposition candidates (pp. 94-95). By
increasing risks to agents, local constraints affect the relative value of a principal’s offer of patronage;
a particular patronage offer may be sufficient to convince an agent to engage in manipulation in a
local setting where constraints are low, but insufficient in cases where constraints are higher. As a
result, the interaction of patronage and constraints affects the level of manipulation observed.
Qualitative evidence indicates that this effect is not purely driven by leaders’ fear of losing
legitimacy. Exposed agents can face punishment, even in relatively uncompetitive regimes in which
incumbent leaders retain power. A report on the punishment of election commissioners for violations
of the election law from 2009 to 2015 in Russia found that, while most infractions are punished by
small fines, significant punishments could be brought in cases with sufficient local political pressure
(Golos, 2015). In some cases recorded by the monitoring group, election commissioners were found
guilty of criminal offenses and faced stiff penalties, including fines of over half an average annual
salary.
In addition, I conducted field interviews during the autumn of 2015 also provide first-person
accounts of the importance of patronage consolidation and local constraints in determining the severity
of electoral manipulation. Given the political context in Russia during this time period—in which civil
society groups like Golos and the Levada Center were being branded as foreign agents for accepting
Western funds—respondents were understandably reluctant to discuss electoral manipulation with
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an American researcher, even when assured of anonymity.5 Nevertheless, I conducted roughly a
dozen semi-structured interviews with election-monitoring organizers, academics, election monitors,
and precinct election commissioners.
On the subject of local constraints, one election monitor made the following representative
comment, when asked how electoral manipulation could be reduced by regional authorities:
The [local] administrations still have lots of United Russia representatives, school directors,
and so on. A governor can’t change this structure quickly, even if he wants to. It requires
lots of work and attention. He can’t change the overall structure of the electoral
commissions, which are mostly representatives of the state. This would be better if
there were more representatives from parties and civil society on the commissions. The
system here doesn’t work. By the system, I mean journalists, courts, and punishment for
manipulators.
An academic expert highlighted the importance of local constraints by noting the success of
election monitoring during a gubernatorial election in Irkutsk, in which the Communist Party
candidate won—a first since the reestablishment of gubernatorial elections.
In the recent gubernatorial election in Irkutsk, KPRF deputies from the State Duma
monitored the election, people with national clout. They were able to engage in a highly
concentrated monitoring effort, which can’t be done at the federal level. And this was
successful.
The significance of the consolidation of patronage resources was a constant theme. One election
monitor said the following:
Administrative resources are not part of the parties, per se, they exist independently–
they’re part of the structure. The structure stays mostly the same, even if the parties
change (for example, the staffs of the electoral commissions). The power vertical is too
well constructed. . . . Manipulation requires administrative resources to work, and the
security forces are used to punish illegal agitation. Without financing from the gray /
black budget, it doesn’t work. If administrative resources exist, then manipulation exists.
Another expert put it this way:
In the 2011 election, why was the outcome worse than expected for the ruling party?
Weak governors couldn’t produce good outcomes. There was a lack of trust in the
5Also around this time, Western researchers were not infrequently being expelled from Russia and given multi-year
bans from entering the country, even when they were not studying politically sensitive subjects.
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political elite, which made local actors less likely to believe they will be protected by
those above them.
In sum, a greater local risk of exposure and punishment can make participating in manipulation
less appealing to agents. However, this effect does not mean that incumbents are unable to find
agents willing to manipulate elections in competitive, monitored localities; instead, agents can choose
to engage in forms of electoral manipulation that are more difficult to observe and trace back to
perpetrators. Agents who engage in forms of manipulation that take place in in the polling center
or the election administration are more exposed to local risks, since these activities are easier to
observe and to attribute to their perpetrators. These forms of manipulation are usually carried
out by agents who occupy a public, official position in the election administration and/or political
parties (Birch, 2011, p. 61). Election commissioners, for example, have a variety of means by which
they can influence election results. However, discrepancies are easily traced back to them, especially
when there is political and legal pressure to do so. By contrast, forms of electoral manipulation
that are more dispersed—like vote-buying and voter-pressure—are harder to observe and to trace
back to organizers, who may be employers (Frye et al., 2014), neighborhood brokers (Stokes et al.,
2013), and other non-state actors (Mares and Young, 2016). Unlike more centralized tactics, partisan
and civil-society monitors do not know where and when to look for these activities, making them
more difficult to trace than direct manipulation of the election administration (Birch, 2011). For
example, a Russian NGO report finds that the phrase ‘unidentified persons’ arises frequently in
criminal cases against election commissioners, to designate the shadowy individuals who coordinate
multiple-voting rings, and pay or intimidate commissioners to influence the vote. Lack of evidence
means these unidentified persons are rarely called to account (Golos, 2015). This is not to say that
vote-buying, voter pressure, and related tactics are impossible to detect. Rather, the nature of
this kind of clientelistic exchange—in which brokers often know their clients directly, can exercise
their political influence in clients’ day-to-day life, and benefit from either an asymmetrical power
relationship (Frye et al., 2014) or a sense of trust (Kramon, 2016)—makes these techniques harder
for monitoring organizations to expose.
An objection might be raised: do agents in competitive circumstances have an incentive to work
especially hard for their principals, in order to deliver as many votes as possible and possibly keep
the boss in office? This could be true in exceptional circumstances, but in most cases the number
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of votes that any individual agent can influence has a negligible effect on the overall result. This
creates the coordination problem identified by Rundlett and Svolik (2016). As the election becomes
more competitive, the efforts of more agents are necessary to secure victory; at the same time, the
diminishing prospect of success makes it less likely that so many agents will in fact cooperate.
Finally, manipulation on a national scale can be very expensive, and principals’ resources are
not limitless. Even relatively cost-effective tactics like co-opting employers to pressure voters
requires monitoring efforts and rewards for compliant businesses (Frye et al., 2014, p. 207). Agents
and brokers engaged in falsification or other types of manipulation must still be organized and
compensated (Langston and Morgenstern, 2009). Vote-buying, however, is especially costly (Lehoucq
and Molina, 2002; Wang and Kurzman, 2007), and such efforts become increasingly expensive as
competitiveness increases (Corstange, 2018). As a result, incumbents are likely to prefer centralized
forms of manipulation in low risk areas, due to their cost-effectiveness. This pattern has been
documented both domestically in Russia (Harvey, 2016) and cross-nationally (Van Ham and Lindberg,
2015).Consequently, if higher local constraints make agents less willing to tamper with elections in
administrative ways, principals may find agents both more expensive to hire (as they turn toward
vote-buying and similar tactics) and more likely to shirk their duties on election day (as they become
harder to monitor). This limits the ability of principals to compensate for higher competitiveness by
boosting payments for agents.
In summary, national patronage consolidation attracts election-manipulating agents, but this
attraction must be weighed against risks created by local political conditions. Agents are more willing
to tamper with elections when incumbent’s control of patronage appears more secure. However,
where local constraints are high, agents engage in harder-to-trace manipulation in order to insulate
themselves from the risks of exposure. Since cost-efficient manipulation by election administrators
does little to protect agents from exposure, they are more willing to perform activities like falsification
in places where local risks are already low. Two testable hypotheses can be drawn from this theory.
A third hypothesis tests the corresponding prediction from the incumbent popularity model.
Hypothesis 1: Higher local constraints will be associated with more vote-buying and
voter pressure as patronage consolidation increases.
Hypothesis 2: Lower local constraints will be associated with more falsification as
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patronage consolidation increases.
Hypothesis 3 (incumbent popularity): Increases in the principal’s national approval rating
will be associated with higher levels of falsification, vote-buying, and voter pressure,
especially in regions where the ruling party is popular.
2.3 Case selection: local and national political conditions in Russia
Russia provides an excellent case with which to test the theory. The country is large and diverse,
with wide variation in socioeconomic variables across its 80-plus regions. There is also wide variation
in local political opposition, with the ruling party’s margin of victory in the 2011 election ranging
from one percentage point in the most competitive regions to 99 points in the least. National
patronage consolidation has increased on average during the time period covered here, as regional
power centers and oligarchic clans lost influence relative to the Kremlin. This evolution of the
national political system, combined with a diversity of local political environments, provides ample
opportunity to study agents’ behavior under different conditions. In addition, Russia provides a
tough test for the theory. If the principal-agent dynamics proposed here can be detected in Russia,
a case where patronage consolidation is relatively high and local constraints are relatively limited
in the broader comparative context, principal-agent problems may be even more prevalent in less
authoritarian hybrid regimes.
Institutional reforms, organizational investments in the ruling party, strong economic growth,
pressure on outside elites, and consistently high approval ratings for Putin himself strengthened the
president’s position as the country’s chief patron. In the 2008 presidential election, the Kremlin
successfully performed the transfer of the presidency from Putin to his chosen successor, Medvedev,
while Putin took up the role of prime minister. However, as the 2011 Duma and 2012 presidential
elections approached, tensions began to appear in the ‘tandem-ocracy’. Commentators began to
consider Medvedev and Putin as representatives of ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ factions in the elite
(Black, 2014). Speculation about which of the two would run for the presidency in 2012 continued
until September 2011, when Medvedev urged the United Russia party conference to endorse Putin
for that office. This announcement, and its apparent disregard for the public’s role in the matter,
exacerbated divisions in the elite, exemplified by the resignation of long-serving finance minister
Alexei Kudrin (Butrin et al., 2011). In this context, United Russia won only forty-nine percent of
33
the vote and lost more than seventy seats in the Duma—a major setback. In addition, the election
prompted widespread allegations of manipulation and large protests in many Russian cities (Buranov
et al., 2011). Since beginning a third term, Putin has re-established the single-pyramid structure
of patronage in Russia, after a modest fracturing during his years away from the presidency (Hale,
2014, pp. 267-291).
2.4 Data and measures
In order to test the theory, it is necessary to estimate two types of electoral manipulation:
easier-to-monitor administrative falsification and harder-to-monitor vote-buying / voter pressure. To
do so, I employ the same techniques used by Harvey (2016) to measure vote-buying/ voter-pressure
and falsification. I use these methods to estimate the level of both types of electoral manipulation in
each of Russia’s subnational regions, per election-year. These models draw on electoral data at the
precinct level (more than 90,000 precincts in each election), while second-stage models incorporate
control variables at the regional (83 regions) and election-year levels (6). In both sets of models,
I include socioeconomic control variables to incorporate local context (Myagkov et al., 2009) and
reduce the risk of false positives (Deckert, 2013).
The digits-based test proposed by Beber and Scacco (2012) is useful for estimating falsification of
results by election officials (Weidmann and Callen, 2013; Sjoberg, 2013; Cantú, 2014; Skovoroda and
Lankina, 2017). To estimate one form of manipulation by formal agents—falsification of results—I
conduct chi-square tests for the uniform distribution of trailing digits for the ruling party and the
second-place finisher in each region per election-year. In an election without administrative fraud, the
trailing digits for each party should be roughly evenly distributed from 0 to 9. I test for deviations
from the uniform that are statistically significant at the .05 level for both parties ; the binary variable
any fraud is marked as 1 if either party’s results are significantly non-uniform, and 0 otherwise. This
variable is used as the dependent variable in a second-stage logit model. This approach measures
falsification of results only; it does not measure behaviors like stuffing the ballot box with pre-filled
ballots (Sjoberg, 2016).
With regard to vote-buying and voter pressure, I use a modified version of the turnout-based
measure proposed by Myagkov et al. (2009) by comparing the share of votes cast by absentee to
the ruling party’s absolute vote-share across precincts using a first-stage multilevel model (see also
Moser and White (2017)). Since absentee ballots are used to facilitate vote-buying, workplace
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mobilization, and multiple voting (Golos, 2011; Frye et al., 2014; White, 2011), a larger positive
correlation between the share of absentee ballots and United Russia’s absolute vote-share is more
indicative of these kinds of manipulation (especially after controlling for demographic factors that
might affect honest use of absentee ballots). The regression coefficient linking absentee voting and
ruling-party vote-share is used as the dependent variable in a second-stage feasible generalised least
squares (FGLS) regression to account for the fact that the dependent variable is itself a regression
estimate (Lewis and Linzer, 2005).
2.5 Explanatory variables: local political constraints
I operationalize local constraints, first, by using a measure of local partisan opposition. I include
two additional measures in the appendix: expert ratings of the openness of the local political
environment to social and political activity, and a dummy variable recording whether a region is a
titular ethnic republic within the Russian Federation. Local opposition is constructed by finding
United Russia’s margin of victory proportional-representation portion of the most recent regional
legislative election prior to the national election at hand (that is, the measure is lagged and taken at
a lower administrative level). In rare cases where United Russia lost the regional election, its margin
of victory is negative. I subtract the margin of victory from one, so that higher values correspond to
a larger opposition presence. However, regional legislative election results are not available prior to
the 2004 national election. In order to include data from 2004 and 2003, I rely on the margin of
victory in gubernatorial elections.67
It may be objected using margins of victory in one election (regardless of the timing and level) to
explain electoral manipulation in another election introduces a problematic level of endogeneity to
the analysis. I use the variable for two reasons. First, it captures the ability of opposition parties in
6Similarly, the results of gubernatorial elections cannot be used for all elections, since Russia abolished gubernatorial
elections between 2005 and 2012.
7There is a clear difference between the two types of elections that affects the value of competitiveness when measured
in this way. The proportional nature of legislative elections allows more parties to be competitive, systematically
narrowing the margin of victory in these elections. By contrast, the winner-take-all nature of the election tends to
make these elections two-way contests, possibly producing wider margins of victory. To account for this difference,
I first center and scale each variable according to its variance before combining them. The distribution of these
variables is sufficiently similar that the benefit of being able to make use of the data from the 2003 and 2004 elections
in the study outweighs the cost of combining them in this fashion. Histograms for the raw and scaled data are
available in the appendix.
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the regional legislature to criticize the regional administration, to mobilize supporters, to influence
regional election commissions, and to divert patronage resources away from the ruling party—all
of which are constraints that make pro-regime manipulation more difficult. Second, the empirical
strategy uses local opposition to predict levels of two distinct types of manipulation, not the level of
overall manipulation or United Russia’s success in national elections. In other words, while it is true
that a wide margin of victory in a regional election may be indicative of a high level of manipulation
in that election, and thus be uninformative about the overall level of electoral manipulation in a
federal election in the same territory, it says nothing about the type of manipulation that may have
been used—which is the dependent variable of interest. Finally, as robustness checks, I include two
non-electoral measures of local constraints in the appendix, discussed above. Both of these variables
produce results that are substantively similar to those presented here.
2.5.1 Explanatory variables: national consolidation
A variable like patronage consolidation is not easily visible; the concept describes informal
networks of responsibility between patrons and clients, and the degree to which patrons must
compete among themselves for the service of clients. Measures like GDP, GINI, or the oil price
may capture the wealth of the overall patronage system, but not the interaction of competing
networks within the system (Hale 2014, p. 33). A measure of the number of presidential loyalists in
cabinet positions, for example, would likewise represent only a partial picture; loyalty is difficult to
observe, and loyalists may also be stationed in major industries, important governorships, and in the
security ministries. Instead, I use the variable UR governors share, which indicates the percentage
of regional governors formally affiliated with the ruling party, United Russia. This variable captures
the gradual consolidation of regional political machines under the influence of the Kremlin during
the time period covered, as previously independent politicians joined the party and brought their
autonomous political machines into the fold (Reuter, 2010, 2013). While this measure may not be
universally applicable, United Russia’s importance as a political party is largely tied to the ability of
its high-ranking members to channel patronage resources to their clients (Remington, 2008; Reuter
and Remington, 2009; Turovskii, 2010). Over time, the measure ranges from .28 in 2003 to .66 in
2012. As a robustness check in the appendix, I also use a measure of centralized executive power
from the Polity dataset. To test the implications of the incumbent-popularity model of manipulation,
I use the average approval rating of Vladimir Putin in the three months before the election, gathered
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in representative nationwide polls conducted by the independent Levada Center, a respected Russian
polling organization.
2.5.2 Control variables
Several socioeconomic variables are known to influence the likelihood and severity of electoral
manipulation, and are included in all models. In addition, some control variables must be included
in order to account for potentially non-manipulative explanations for suspicious patterns in the
electoral data. Including these variables is also important since limited within-region variability
during the ten years covered here makes a fixed-effects model less useful. I discuss these variables
below. All socioeconomic controls are taken from the Russian Federal State Statistical Service.
Since large populations may be more difficult to control and require more resources to manipulate,
I include a measure of the population size in each region. The number of pensioners per 1,000
residents in a region is included, since many pensioners are directly dependent on the state for
their livelihoods and may be easier to pressure into voting for the ruling party (a problem that is
particularly acute for residents of homes for the elderly). Additionally, pensioners may be disposed
to vote as a group for or against government candidates (Colton and McFaul, 2003; Hemment, 2009).
Poverty is well known to affect individuals’ susceptibility to vote-buying efforts and other forms of
clientelism (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007; Stokes et al., 2013). Consequently I include a measure of
the percentage of the population falling below the official poverty line. A similar logic applies to
the unemployed; I include a measure of the official unemployment rate for each region. Researchers
have found mixed effects for the degree of urbanization on electoral manipulation, and so I include a
measure of the percentage of a region’s population living in cities.
Higher levels of education among the population should make vote-buying and similar forms
of manipulation more difficult. As a measure of the level of education among the population of a
region, I include the number of individuals with higher education (bachelor’s degrees and above) per
1,000 residents. Since they owe their employment to the state, government employees may be more
vulnerable to political pressure than ordinary voters (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007). I include a
measure of the size of government in each region by adding the number of employees of the regional
and local governments, and dividing by 1,000 residents. Finally, I include a dummy variable to
control for presidential elections, which may produce higher levels of manipulation due to their high
stakes for incumbents (Simpser, 2013).
37
To my knowledge, the correlates of ‘honest’ voting by absentee in Russia have not been tested.
However, several of these variables are also plausible controls for non-manipulative absentee voting.
Use of an absentee certificate allows an individual to vote in person at a precinct other than where
they are registered, meaning that a more mobile population is likely to generate more honest absentee
ballots. Large urban centers might draw more economic migrants and generally foster more internal
movement, as may regions with a more highly educated population, while pensioners may be less
likely to find themselves outside their precinct on election day.
2.6 Results and discussion
The results of the second-stage models, which use any fraud and absentee coefficient as dependent
variables, are presented in Tables 2.1 and 2.2. These results are supportive of Hypothesis 1 and 2. At
low levels of national consolidation, there is no statistically significant difference between low- and
high-constraint regions in levels of either falsification or vote-buying / voter pressure. As patronage
networks consolidate, the incentive to manipulate is expressed differently based on the degree of
local constraints. More falsification is observed in low-constraint regions, while more vote-buying /
voter pressure is seen in high-constraint regions. Hypothesis 3, which tests the incumbent-popularity
model, is not supported. Models 1 and 4 provide a baseline by using control variables only. The
remaining models use local opposition as a measure of local constraints, interacted with UR governors
share or Putin approval. The unit of observation in the models is the region-year.
Model 2 shows that the interaction of local opposition and consolidation of patronage via United
Russia significantly influences the level of administrative fraud observed. To better interpret the
interaction effect, Figure 2.1 depicts changes in the marginal effect of local opposition on falsification
as the level of patronage consolidation increases. As the figure shows, local opposition has a negative
marginal effect on falsification at higher levels of patronage consolidation, indicating that falsification
is more severe in less competitive regions (Hypothesis 1). As predicted, increases in the predictability
of post-election patronage drive falsification upward in areas where agents are locally unconstrained,
but not in areas where local constraints make such forms of manipulation more likely to be detected
and punished. By contrast, Figure 2.2 shows that there is no significant effect for local opposition at
any level of Putin approval, suggesting that incumbent popularity does not drive falsification.
Turning to dispersed manipulation, Model 5 shows that local opposition and UR governors have





Presidential −0.155 −0.117 −0.173
(0.231) (0.235) (0.240)
Population (log) −0.377∗ −0.535∗∗ −0.435∗∗
(0.208) (0.220) (0.214)
Pensioners (log) −2.024∗∗∗ −1.867∗∗ −1.411∗
(0.749) (0.816) (0.790)
Poverty 0.104 0.537 −0.188
(1.383) (1.727) (1.463)
Higher education 0.026 −0.004 0.025
(0.038) (0.043) (0.039)
Gov. employment (log) −0.846 −1.072∗ −0.789
(0.533) (0.574) (0.543)
Urban 0.110 0.989 0.445
(1.027) (1.089) (1.056)
Unemployment −0.009 −0.027 −0.005
(0.022) (0.026) (0.023)
Local opposition 0.568 0.204
(0.406) (1.075)
UR governors share 1.247
(1.106)




Local opp : Putin approval −0.560
(1.398)
Constant 14.349∗∗∗ 13.890∗∗ 10.366∗
(5.195) (5.603) (5.735)
Observations 463 451 451
Log Likelihood −258.905 −245.319 −247.989
Akaike Inf. Crit. 535.809 514.638 519.978
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Presidential 0.157∗∗∗ 0.152∗∗∗ 0.153∗∗∗
(0.029) (0.029) (0.030)
Population (log) −0.013 −0.008 −0.019
(0.027) (0.028) (0.028)
Pensioners (log) 0.430∗∗∗ 0.375∗∗∗ 0.351∗∗∗
(0.099) (0.103) (0.105)
Poverty 0.211 0.054 0.098
(0.185) (0.227) (0.193)
Higher education −0.004 −0.001 −0.004
(0.005) (0.006) (0.005)
Gov. employment (log) 0.015 0.014 −0.011
(0.070) (0.073) (0.070)
Urban 0.556∗∗∗ 0.493∗∗∗ 0.533∗∗∗
(0.136) (0.139) (0.137)
Unemployment −0.006∗∗ −0.004 −0.006∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Local opposition −0.062 0.146
(0.052) (0.137)
UR governors share −0.127
(0.140)




Local opp. : Putin approval −0.116
(0.179)
Constant −2.633∗∗∗ −2.247∗∗∗ −2.090∗∗∗
(0.688) (0.711) (0.757)
Observations 476 464 464
R2 0.174 0.209 0.198
Adjusted R2 0.159 0.190 0.178
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 2.2: FGLS models of absentee coefficients (dispersed manipulation)
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Figure 2.1: Marginal effect of local opposition on falsification, by UR governors share
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Figure 2.2: Marginal effect of local opposition on falsification, by Putin approval
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Figure 2.3: Marginal effect of local opposition on vote-buying / voter pressure, at varying levels of
UR governors share
local opposition on vote-buying / voter pressure, conditional on UR governors. As the figure shows,
local opposition has no significant effect when the national patronage system is less consolidated. By
contrast, at higher levels of consolidation, the marginal effect of local opposition increases: once the
principal’s offer of post-election patronage is more secure, agents engage in vote-buying and voter
pressure in places where local constraints are high. Figure 2.4 shows that local opposition has a
significant positive relationship with vote-buying / voter pressure, but this effect is not conditional
on Putin approval. Together with Model 3, the results show that the incumbent-popularity model is
not supported.
Taken together, these results show that electoral manipulation is affected by the interaction
of patronage consolidation and local political conditions, and that different types of manipulation
are affected in distinct ways. When patronage networks are more consolidated, administrative
fraud increases in areas with low local opposition while remaining low in more contested areas.
Conversely, under more consolidated patronage, higher levels of vote-buying and voter pressure
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Figure 2.4: Marginal effect of local opposition on vote-buying / voter pressure, at varying levels of
Putin approval
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efforts are observed in more competitive regions. Neither type of manipulation responds to changes
in incumbent popularity in the way that incumbent-popularity model predicts.
These results confirm that principal-agent problems are characteristic of electoral manipulation
efforts. However, patronage consolidation and local risks appear to be more relevant than the leader’s
popularity, with important implications. The incumbent-popularity model holds that unpopular
incumbents preside over reduced electoral manipulation as agents defect, but the consolidation-
constraint model shows this is not the case. Patronage networks break up when clients no longer
expect the network to be a viable source of favor and resources (Hale, 2014). In an electoral
authoritarian regime, incumbent popularity may be one element of this expectation, but a decline
in popularity is neither a necessary nor a sufficient condition for fragmentation of the incumbent’s
patronage network. Other factors can insulate an incumbent’s network from fragmenting even in
the face of low approval ratings, including the age of the network, ethnic or community connections
(Hale, 2014), the availability of repressive tools (Gerschewski, 2013), and the absence of a credible
rival network. In other words, manipulation can persist even when incumbents are unpopular, so
long as they have other resources to draw on in shaping expectations. As a result, low popularity
alone will not translate directly into cleaner elections.
Secondly, the incumbent-popularity model obscures the role that local opposition actors and civil
society groups can play in shaping patterns of electoral manipulation, even when the incumbent
controls consolidated patronage networks. These results show that falsification and mobilizational
forms of manipulation are inversely correlated as local constraints increase. Where local actors
are able to increase the risk of engaging in manipulation for agents, for example through election
monitoring or active opposition parties, dispersed forms of manipulation are more likely than
centralized falsification. While these forms of manipulation may have other benefits for incumbents
(Harvey, 2016), they are nonetheless more expensive and prone to agency loss than are centralized
forms of manipulation. As a result, strategic behavior by civil society groups and parties can drive
up the cost of manipulation for incumbents and perhaps reduce the overall level of manipulation.
In the Russian case, this underscores the substantive importance of civil-society monitoring groups
like Golos (Skovoroda and Lankina, 2017) and nationwide anti-corruption protest movements (Kara-
Murza, 2017) in raising the cost of election management for the ruling party at the local level. In
sum, researchers interested in understanding variation in electoral manipulation should look toward
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patronage networks and local political factors, rather than toward incumbent popularity alone.
Likewise, if governments, international actors, or civil society groups are interested in reducing levels
of electoral manipulation, breaking up patronage networks and building up local structures that can
challenge acts of manipulation are the key tasks; tasks which are in some ways more difficult than
challenging the incumbent’s popular standing.
Finally, the results suggest important scope conditions for Rundlett and Svolik’s (2016) information-
based principal-agent model. The model proposed here is most applicable to hybrid regimes and
electoral democracies, where local political conditions do vary. The information-based model they
propose may be more applicable in fully closed authoritarian regimes that nonetheless hold elections.
In such regimes, local agents may be genuinely naive about the true extent of the incumbent’s level of
support due to rampant preference falsification, and local constraints may be practically nonexistent
with little variation across regions. In such a scenario, the effects posited here will be limited.
Consequently, the information-based model may be more predictive in hegemonic-party regimes at
a moment of transition; while the present model is more predictive for the bulk of hybrid regimes
and new democracies. Lastly, it should be noted that both approaches are primarily concerned with
illegal forms of electoral manipulation that create risks to agents and are less applicable to legalized
techniques for biasing elections.
Some evidence for the proposition that the consolidation-constraint model applies cross-nationally
can be gleaned from election-observer reports from other former Soviet countries, a useful comparison
as a result of shared institutional features and historical experiences. Observer reports from OSCE
monitors suggest that problems with counting and tabulation of votes are more severe in those
countries that are most patrimonial and have the lowest local constraints, such as Belarus (OSCE,
2016), Uzbekistan (OSCE, 2017), and Tajikistan (OSCE, 2015). Problems with the voting process
itself are relatively more common in less consolidated and more locally competitive Ukraine (OSCE,
2014).
The results also suggest directions for future research. This project examines ruling-party
manipulation in a country where patronage is highly consolidated in comparative context, and where
even highly competitive areas are generally controlled by the ruling party. These conditions make
electoral manipulation an especially risky prospect for agents of opposition parties. However, in
more competitive countries, it is entirely possible that deconsolidation of patronage networks might
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reduce ruling-party manipulation while increasing manipulation by opposition parties, as agents’
cost-benefit analysis swings in favor of the newly empowered opposition. Future research might
investigate this possibility.
2.7 Conclusion
Electoral manipulation is an important tool for parties and governments in electoral authoritarian
regimes and unconsolidated democracies. Effective manipulation can improve candidates’ chances of
winning the election, send signals about the strength of the organization, and induce other political
actors to comply with the interests of the candidate. However, all of these benefits accrue to the
candidate. The candidate’s agents, on the other hand, expose themselves to political and legal risks
by tampering with the election, even if their political patron wins the election. This asymmetry
of preferences gives rise to a principal-agent problem that can result in levels of manipulation that
are insufficient to deliver a major victory. The severity of this problem is affected by local risks to
agents, the consolidation of patronage around the principal, and the type of electoral manipulation
employed. Manipulation is generally low when patronage is less consolidated. As leaders gain more
consolidated control over patronage resources, falsification (riskier for agents) rises in local areas
where risks are low, while vote-buying and voter pressure (less risky tactics) increase in places where
opposition activity and civil society are more prominent.
This theory has several implications for future research on electoral manipulation and democ-
ratization. First, it supports a principal-agent model of manipulation, but shows that patronage
consolidation, not popularity, drives the appeal of manipulation for agents. Second, it emphasizes the
role of local political conditions as constraints on manipulation. This implies that understanding the
subnational balance of power is essential for predicting electoral manipulation and for analyzing its
causes or effects. Third, it demonstrates that electoral manipulation can be better understood if it
is treated as a family of distinct tactics—each with its own costs, benefits and susceptibility to local
constraints—rather than as a single concept. Lastly, the results highlight the risks incumbents take
when engaging in electoral manipulation during close elections in countries where the ruling party
is not dominant at the local level. In this setting, administrative fraud is difficult to obtain, and
principals are forced to rely more heavily on dispersed tactics. The result is likely to be a partially
manipulated election in which tampering is widespread enough to attract public attention, but not





Principals, agents, and pro-opposition electoral manipulation in Mexico
The prior chapter on election manipulation in Russia shows the effects of increasing patronage
consolidation on multiple forms of election manipulation, in the context of low- to moderate levels of
local risk; during the period covered by the study, the ruling United Russia party never loses full
control of a regional government. Consequently, that case cannot be used to test further implications
of the consolidation and constraint model of election tampering. In particular, the Russian case
can tell us very little about how opposition parties may seek to benefit from electoral manipulation
as democratization increases the opposition’s access to patronage resources increases and produces
pro-opposition partisan strongholds. How, then, does election manipulation shift as patronage
networks become less consolidated and opposition parties start to gain control of a share of the
resources? And what happens when former opposition parties gain their own political strongholds,
reducing the risk of exposure and punishment for their agents? Under the theory proposed by
Simpser (2013), election manipulation in such settings would be expected to be rare, as parties
lack the preponderance of resources necessary to use manipulation as a signal of dominance. The
principal-agent framework articulated by Rundlett and Svolik (2016) suggests that pro-opposition
manipulation should be common in opposition strongholds, irrespective of national conditions, as
local agents estimate the ultimate outcome of the election by looking at the local state of play.
The consolidation and constraint model makes alternative predictions under these conditions,
which are tested here. Specifically, it predicts that agents in opposition-party strongholds will only
be able to deliver increased election manipulation as the system of patronage begins to favor that
party. That is, unlike in the Rundlett and Svolik model, low local competition alone is not enough to
trigger increases in election malfeasance by local agents. Instead, low local risks of exposure must be
accompanied by increasing access to patronage resources for the party with which to recruit agents.
This interactive hypothesis is tested using a two-stage model of falsification in Mexico’s states from
1994 to 2012, and with a difference-in-differences model of overall electoral manipulation in two of
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Mexico’s states over the same period.
The results of the analysis below are supportive of the consolidation and constraint model,
and are also strongly suggestive of the importance of local agents in driving these dynamics. In
particular, the differences-in-differences analysis shows that evidence of overall manipulation in favor
of both the PAN and the formerly hegemonic PRI decline more dramatically in a state that has
experienced alternation in the state governor’s office from the PRI to the PAN and back again,
compared with a state in which the PRI has maintained unbroken control. Even holding PRI
governorship constant after the second alternation, and with both states experiencing the same
national conditions, manipulation is reduced in the more competitive state. This suggests that
agents, rather than PRI leaders, are the key decision-makers in driving levels of manipulation under
risky setting. A deeper investigation of the agent-driven dynamic is undertaken in Chapter 5.
This article proceeds in four sections. First, I provide a brief overview of the history of electoral
manipulation, patronage, and local competition in Mexican politics over the period studied. I then
propose hypotheses for the relationship between electoral manipulation and political competitiveness
in the Mexican context, and describe data and measures. This is followed by the results and a brief
conclusion that discusses their implications.
3.1 Electoral manipulation and principal-agent dynamics in Mexico
Mexico provides an excellent test case for the application of the consolidation and constraint model
of electoral manipulation to rising opposition parties. The decline of the Institutional Revolutionary
Party (PRI) as a national hegemonic party allows for wide variation in the level of national patronage
consolidation over time. Beginning in the 1980s, the PRI lost control over state legislatures and
governorships with increasing regularity. Prior to the 2016 state elections PRI governors presided in
just over half of Mexico’s states; in those elections, the PRI lost seven out of twelve gubernatorial
elections, further eroding its position in the states. These local victories by the opposition National
Action Party (PAN) and the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), in combination with regular
protest actions, led to major reforms of the Mexican electoral administration through the 1990s.
These reforms established an independent electoral tribunal, reducing the ability of the PRI to
directly influence election results. At the same time, the decision to liberalize Mexico’s economy
made it difficult for the PRI to rely on patronage to motivate voters, limiting the effectiveness of
one of the party’s traditional sources of dominance. These trends culminated in the loss of the PRI
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majority in Congress in 1997, and its loss of the presidency in 2000, ending over seventy years in
power. The years since have been marked by an uneven consolidation of multiparty democracy.
Though national competitiveness has generally increased in Mexico over the time period examined
here (1992 – 2012), this trend has not been felt equally in each of Mexico’s thirty-one states (and
one Federal District). In some regions, the PRI has continued to dominate politics, while in others
the outcome of legislative and gubernatorial elections is much more in doubt. This national and
subnational variation in political uncertainty helps shape the costs and expected benefits of electoral
manipulation for individual agents, by exposing them to (or insulating them from) national pressures.
Through most of the 20th century, Mexican politics were dominated by the PRI. The party’s
use of state patronage, clientelism, corporatism, and—at times—outright electoral manipulation
enabled it to retain control of Congress and a powerful presidency for decades. As the PRI was able
to effectively stitch together a large, cross-class coalition of supporters who received various benefits
either directly from the party-state apparatus, or indirectly through government policy, outright
fraud was rarely necessary to secure the PRI’s electoral dominance which relied instead on robust
patronage and clientelistic networks (Magaloni, 2006). However, electoral fraud was often employed
to magnify the party’s majority (Klesner, 2001), and at least once to prevent a likely electoral defeat.
The infamous breakdown of the computers used to calculate the results on election night in 1988,
followed by the PRI’s narrow victory once the computers were restored, led to widespread allegations
of fraud and popular mobilization in protest (Domínguez and McCann, 1998).
In response to deepening economic malaise in the 1970s and a 1982 debt crisis, the PRI-state
embarked on a process of economic liberalization in the 1980s. The economic dislocation and
breakdown in patronage consolidation associated with this program (job loss, reduced benefits,
market-derived rather than state-provided welfare) deprived the PRI of many of its traditional
sources of electoral support (Greene, 2007). This trend, in conjunction with the post-1988 protests
and the determined efforts of the opposition parties to contest state and local elections during the
1980s, produced the first real bouts of electoral competition in Mexico’s post-civil war history (Beer,
2001; Eisenstadt, 2007). The PRI, a party of the center, was challenged on the right by the PAN
and on the left (after the 1988 schism) by the PRD. At first, this electoral competition was limited
to subnational contests. Representatives of the PAN or PRD were able to win municipal and state
elections, and use resources and networks captured at those levels to challenge the PRI at the level
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of the presidency and the federal Congress. The PRI lost its first governorship in 1989, and the pace
of local and state defeats accelerated into the 1990s.
The opposition parties and their activists used these victories, along with post-election protest
against allegedly unfair elections in which the PRI prevailed, to win concessions from state and
federal governments (Eisenstadt, 2007; Barracca, 2007). Such concessions included restrictions on
the powers of the Electoral College (made up of the members of the PRI-dominated federal Congress)
to certify election results, the 1993 creation of a federal electoral tribunal to adjudicate electoral
disputes, and the 1996 decision to place that tribunal within the judicial branch of government rather
than the PRI-controlled executive (Berruecos, 2003; Simpser and Donno, 2012). In the wake of these
and other reforms, the PRI lost its majority in Congress in 1997 followed by the presidency in 2000.
As a result of these opposition victories, Mexico’s party system shifted from an authoritarian
hegemonic one dominated by the PRI, to a kind of bifurcated three-party system in which the PRI
was contested by the PAN in some parts of the country, and by the PRD in others (Klesner, 2005;
Ferreira Do Vale and Wences, 2014). However, limits to electoral competition have persisted. In
many states, the PRI continues to dominate subnational politics and continues to rely on machine
politics to secure that dominance (Benton, 2012; Cantú, 2014; Hiskey and Bowler, 2005; Lawson,
2000). Likewise, representatives of the PAN and PRD—having secured access to patronage resources
themselves—have in many cases turned to the same methods that gave the PRI the upper hand
in years past (Olvera, 2010; Hilgers, 2008). Election observers and defeated parties continue to
raise criticisms of election integrity in some states. In regions where opposition parties have gained
control, agents considering tampering with an election on behalf of the PRI are less likely to be
rewarded and more likely to face political punishment, which may encourage such agents to more
readily sell their services to the opposition.
3.2 Hypotheses, data, and methods
The principal-agent model of electoral manipulation holds that increasing local competitiveness
reduces agents’ willingness to engage in electoral manipulation. In Mexico, national patronage
consolidation under the PRI has generally decreased over the time period studied, which should
generally reduce the level of electoral manipulation. However, this deconsolidation has enabled
political parties other than the PRI to claim a share of patronage resources, enabling them to
seek election-manipulating agents if they so choose. Similarly, an overall increase in partisan
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competitiveness has turned some states into opposition strongholds as the PRI’s hegemony has waned.
In these states, the pendulum of local competitiveness has swung in the opposite direction—from
PRI dominance to opposition dominance. This pattern is not present in Russia, where the ruling
party’s dominance is unquestioned over the period studied, or in Ukraine where local partisan
affiliations are more fixed. Consequently, it allows for a test of the theoretical implication that
electoral manipulation may rise in opposition strongholds as patterns of patronage change. In sum,
the breakdown of the PRI’s near-complete control over patronage resources has reduced that party’s
ability to deliver election manipulation, but has enabled opposition parties to do so for the first
time. This is especially likely to be true in states where parties other than the PRI have developed
local strongholds, creating reduced risk of exposure for their partisan agents. In Mexico, then, the
principal-agent model of manipulation suggests the following hypotheses.
Hypothesis 1: Lower patronage consolidation should result in increased pro-PAN election
manipulation in states where local risks for the opposition are low.
Hypothesis 2: Lower patronage consolidation should result in decreased anti-PAN election
manipulation in PRI local strongholds.
Hypothesis 3: Manipulation on behalf of the PRI and PAN should decline in areas where
partisan competition is high.
This study uses election-forensics tools to analyze precinct-level election results in Mexico. The
number of precincts in each election ranges from approximately 100,000 to 140,000, divided among
thirty-one states and the Federal District. Legislative and presidential votes are included separately
in the analysis, resulting in eleven total elections from 1994 to 2012. Limitations of the dataset place
constraints on the electoral forensic approaches that can be used. In particular, precinct-level data
on the number of registered voters (and, consequently, data on turnout) is only available for the
2006, 2009, and 2012 elections—a period that is well into the consolidation of Mexico’s multiparty
system. This limitation precludes a nation-wide analysis of turnout-based estimates of electoral
manipulation during Mexico’s shift away from a hegemonic party system. As a result, I test the
principal-agent model of manipulation in Mexico using two approaches.
First, a digits-based measure of manipulation can be conducted for the full time period, since
the digits test only requires the number of votes for each party by precinct. This approach aims to
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capture non-random manipulation in vote-totals by human beings, such as falsification of election
protocols. Electoral manipulation is measured in three steps using this method. Each Mexican
state is divided into two or more voting districts, based on population size. As a first step, the
distribution of trailing digits for the PAN is calculated for each district within every state, using the
precinct-level results of each election. Estimating fraud at the district level allows for measurement
as close to the precinct level as possible, and maximizes the number of observations available for
analysis. In total, there are 3,386 district-year observations.
Next, the distribution of the party’s trailing digits is compared to the uniform distribution using
a chi-square test. This test relies on the intuition that in a clean election, ones-digits from a party’s
vote total ought to be uniformly distributed across precincts, but that falsification of the results by
human beings skews this random pattern in detectable ways. Finally, the dummy variable PAN fraud
takes a value of one for each region if the results of the chi-square test are statistically significantly
non-uniform (p < .05), and a value of zero otherwise. This approach is similar to that taken by
(Weidmann and Callen, 2013), in a study of electoral fraud in Afghanistan. This variable is then
used as the dependent variable in multilevel logit models (with random intercepts) that draw on
data from all of Mexico’s states, for all available election years.
This test only detects a specific form of manipulation: falsification of election results by election
officials (Beber and Scacco, 2012). While vote-buying, clientelism, and patronage have been considered
to be the primary methods by which the PRI manipulated elections during its dominance (Magaloni,
2006; Greene, 2007; Larreguy et al., 2016; Fox, 1994), Mexican parties have relied on a variety of
tools—including falsification—to tamper with results. For example, the PRI employed mapaches
(raccoons) to falsify election results, especially in regions where only the PRI could afford to station
party monitors in polling places (Langston and Morgenstern, 2009). While the process of falsification
is often centrally coordinated (Simpser 2013), and occasionally centrally carried out (as in the 1988
Mexican election, in which the central computer used to tabulate the results mysteriously shut down
as election results began to come in (Lehoucq, 2003)), it is more often enacted at the ‘retail’ level
in contemporary Mexico. A common technique, known as fraude hormiga,1 involves precinct level
1This term literally translates as ‘ant fraud.’
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officials adding or subtracting a small number of votes from the final results. These adjustments are
small enough at the precinct-level to avoid nullification of the local results under Mexico’s election
law, but can be large enough in aggregate to affect the overall outcome. Fraude hormiga is facilitated
where parties are able to buy off election workers and/or install partisan poll workers on election
day (Cantú, 2014).
The explanatory variables in these models capture variation in local risk and national patronage
consolidation. The local level of risk is measured by political alternation, a dummy variable which
records whether or not the PRI has ever lost control of a state’s governorship prior to the election at
hand. Loss of the governor’s mansion by the PRI puts the abstract notion of multiparty competition
into practice in the real world. It is also a marker of underlying, unobservable factors of politics in
each state that that affect competitiveness, such as the local strength of the PRI political machine.
A region in which the PRI lost the governorship in the early 1990s should be very different politically
than one in which the PRI retained unbroken control through 2012. As a second approach, alternation
is replaced by the dummy variable PAN governor, indicating whether that party controls the state
governorship on election day. Both measures are similar to that employed by Hiskey and Bowler
(2005). Control of the state executive apparatus should make pro-PAN manipulation less risky for
agents. Conceptually and empirically, these two variables overlap considerably (Pearson’s correlation
coefficient = .62). PAN governor indicates whether the sitting governor at the time of the election
represents that party, while alternation indicates whether or not there has ever been a handover of
power in the governor’s mansion. In most cases, such a handover occurred from the PRI to the PAN.
The degree of nationwide patronage consolidation is likewise captured using three variables.
First, non-PRI governors captures the overall share of state governorships claimed by parties other
than the PRI. The variable is an indicator of the overall ability of the PRI to channel its patronage
resources to the state level. Conversely, it is also an indicator of the ability of rival parties to marshal
their own patronage resources, based in the states, in competition for national offices; as the PAN
and PRD used local victories to push for further concessions at the national level. Second, the
dummy variable PAN president takes on a value of one for elections in which the sitting president
represents the PAN (that is, for elections that took place during the presidencies of Vicente Fox
and Felipe Calderón). This period represents the full loss of control over national patronage levers
by the PRI, and the newfound ability of the PAN to move some of those levers. Lastly, a dummy
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variable unified government takes on a value of one for elections in which the same party (in this
case, the PRI) controls the presidency and the lower house of Congress.
A set of control variables helps account for other possible sources of variation in electoral
manipulation or support for the major parties in Mexico. These include the size of the population
and the population density, which can affect the ease with which elections can be manipulated.
Additionally the wealth of the state, measured by its gross regional product (in thousands of 2015
US dollars) divided by its population, can affect parties’ ability to buy votes or mobilize voters,
among other effects. Pensioners, measured here by the percentage of the population over sixty, may
be susceptible to electoral pressure due to their dependence on the state. In addition, I control for
presidential elections.
Since the dependent variable in these models—PAN fraud—is binary, I analyze it using logit
regressions. To account for the fact the observations are nested within states, I employ a multilevel
model, which allows for ‘partial pooling’ of the observations within each state. This is a compromise
approach between completely pooling all observations (ignoring variation between states), and
modeling each state separately (ignoring similarity between states and overfitting the model to the
data within each case) (Gelman and Hill, 2006). The model allows for varying intercepts, such
that the predicted value of the dependent variable (the probably of manipulation of the PAN vote
totals) varies across states. This test illuminates how one particular type of electoral manipulation
is employed during Mexico’s political liberalization, nationwide.
The second test uses a turnout-based measure of overall manipulation, not just falsification.
This allows for a broader test of the effect of local and national competitiveness on manipulation
levels. This measure uses a multilevel regression model to compare precinct-level turnout with a
party’s absolute vote-share—the proportion of registered voters who cast votes for that party—for
each Mexican state during each election. This is an extension of a method proposed by Myagkov
et al. (2009), which produces a coefficient estimating the relationship between turnout and a party’s
vote-share cross-sectionally and over time. Larger coefficients suggest that high-turnout precincts
systematically favors a party, which could be indicative of ballot stuffing, falsification of the count in
those precincts, a vote-buying effort, or other forms of manipulation.
Turnout data is not available nationwide for the whole time period studied here, but can be
estimated for the two states used in the difference-in-differences model. Since overall manipulation
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is the dependent variable here, the predictions of the model are more straightforward. Electoral
manipulation should decline over time in both cases, as overall patronage consolidation declines and
reduces the ability of parties to recruit agents. However, this effect should be more pronounced in
the treatment case—where local competitiveness is higher.
In order to conduct the second test of the theory, I estimate precinct-level turnout for two
neighboring states—Nayarit and Durango—which can then be used to construct a turnout-based
measure of electoral manipulation. This measure is then used as the dependent variable in a difference-
in-difference model, which tests the effect of local competitiveness on patterns of manipulation, while
both cases underwent the same national changes in competitiveness. Exact precinct-level turnout
data is not available before 2006; however, it can be estimated for prior elections. Data on the
number of registered voters, while unavailable at the precinct level, is provided in aggregate form at
the level of the municipality. Since each municipality is associated with a known number of precincts,
it is possible to divide the number of registered voters evenly among the precincts. The estimated
number of registered voters, in combination with the known number of votes cast, is then used to
compute precinct-level turnout. While this approach will introduce some measurement error into an
independent variable (turnout), the error is likely to be at random—the true, unknown number of
registered voters in some precincts will be somewhat above average in some precincts and somewhat
smaller in others, but these errors should be randomly distributed across observations. As such,
measurement error in precinct-level turnout should not bias the results of the model. The large
number of precincts in each state—approximately 1,000 in Nayarit and 1,500 in Durango—helps
mitigate the negative effect of this measurement error.
The turnout-based measures of electoral manipulation derived in this way are used to compare
patterns of manipulation over time in the neighboring regions of Nayarit and Durango. The PRI has
governed Durango continuously since the establishment of the party. However, in Nayarit, the PAN
won control of the governor’s mansion in the 1997 election, only to lose it back to the PRI after one
six-year term. Comparing patterns of electoral manipulation in these two states, using the PRI’s
uninterrupted rule in Durango as a control, thus allows for the study of two treatment effects. First,
what is the effect of the PRI’s loss of power on manipulation? Second, and more important for this
study, do these effects carry over once PRI government is restored?
This approach has several advantages. First, Nayarit and Durango are relatively similar in
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demographic and economic terms. There are two other pairs of states in which one saw uninterrupted
PRI control while the other elected an opposition governor for one term: Michoacán and Colima,
and Nuevo León and Coahuila. However, these pairs are considerably more heterogeneous, limiting
the effectiveness of the control states in each case. By contrast, using Durango and Nayarit in the
difference-in-difference model allows for a controlled comparison that draws on all available election
data for the two states, from 1991 to 2012. Over this time period, national changes in the electoral
environment—such as the introduction of the electoral tribunal in 1993, the strengthening of the
tribunal’s independence and judicial authority in 1996, the PRI’s loss of Congress in 1997 and of
the presidency in 2000—affect both states at the same time. Since national political conditions
are experienced in common and local socioeconomic conditions are comparable, the effects of local
competition on electoral patterns can be considered causal with greater confidence.
Finally, the return of PRI governance creates a stronger test for the principal-agent model of
manipulation. After the 2003 election, the same party controls the governorship in both states.
However, in Nayarit, political actors experienced six years of PAN government. This experience of
alternation in government makes the risk of electoral manipulation more real for agents. Alternation
puts agents’ expected benefits at risk, by reducing the likelihood that agents will be rewarded with
patronage benefits if the opposing party wins the election. In addition, the loss of the governorship
may result in altered patronage flows—both from the federal level to the state, and from the state
level to the municipalities—as patrons work to reward their supporters and punish opponents
under a new partisan environment. This unpredictability, in conjunction with the possibility of
political or criminal punishment for violating the election law, makes agents less willing to engage in
manipulation. In turn, this may drive up the price that agents demand in order to deliver votes,
reducing principals’ capability to hire numerous, effective agents.
This effect should be observable in Nayarit after the PRI loses the governorship. However,
reductions in electoral manipulation during the PAN’s rule might plausibly be characterized as
an effect of redirected patronage flows due to PAN control of the state executive, rather than an
effect of alternation and local risk. In other words, an apparent decrease in the severity of electoral
manipulation during that period could reflect variation in the interest or capability of PAN leaders
to engage in electoral manipulation compared to the PRI, rather than decision-making by agents.
By contrast, once the PRI regains control of the Nayarit governorship, it is safer to assume that PRI
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party leaders in Nayarit and Durango share similar incentives and capabilities. This allows for a
stronger, though still indirect, test of the effects of competition on agent behavior. This method holds
national effects and subnational leadership constant, and closely controls for local socioeconomic
conditions. Treatment effects are thus more plausibly associated with the behavior of agents, though
such behavior cannot be directly measured.
The difference-in-difference models are estimated as follows. The estimated level of electoral
manipulation for the PRI and PAN, and their predictors, are estimated using multilevel model in
which intercepts and slopes are allowed to vary by municipality. This variation is what allows for the
relationship between turnout and a party’s absolute vote-share to be estimated and predicted. The
turnout-based estimate of electoral manipulation is estimated at the first level of the model, where the
relationship between turnout and absolute vote-share is calculated. At the second level of the model,
the state-level predictors of these estimates are calculated. In this case, these state-level predictors
are the treatment variables first alternation and second alternation. The first alternation dummy
variable takes a value of one after the election of a PAN governor in Nayarit; second alternation is
set to one after the PRI returns to power.
The difference-in-differences models draw on precinct-level vote and turnout data from Nayarit
and Durango, from 1991 to 2012. In total, there are just under 40,000 precinct observations across
this time period, divided into 59 municipalities. The first-level dependent variable is the absolute
vote-share for the PRI or the PAN. The absolute vote-share is modeled as a function of percent
turnout, a dummy variable for presidential elections, and a dummy variable that tracks whether
or not the PRI has a majority in the municipal council at the time of the election (PRI municipal
majority). In addition, the treatment group dummy variable marks whether each precinct is located
in Nayarit or Durango. The dummy variable post-treatment 1 indicates whether the election takes
place after the first transfer of power in Nayarit (in separate models, post-treatment 2 marks elections
after the PRI’s return to office).
The coefficients for percent turnout are allowed to vary by municipality. These estimates form
the dependent variable at the second level of the model, and are predicted by treatment group,
post-treatment, and the interaction between to the two. This formulation allows for the difference-
in-difference estimator to be calculated. To determine the difference-in-differences estimator, it is
necessary to know the value of the dependent variable under four conditions: in the control and
59
treatment groups prior to the treatment, and in both groups after the treatment. As the following
equation shows, the coefficients from the second level of the model can be used to estimate these
four conditions.
βj = γ0(turnout) + γ1(treat) + γ2(post− treat) + gamma3(treat : post− treat) + ε
When both treatment and post-treatment are equal to zero, only γ0 remains in the equation,
providing the estimated level of manipulation in the control case before treatment. Using the same
approach, values for the remaining three conditions can be calculated. Finally, the difference-in-
difference estimator is calculated as follows, where t stands for the treatment group and p stands for
the post-treatment time period. Put in the context of this study, the estimator finds the difference
in the level of manipulation in Nayarit before and after alternation in power, and compares it to the
level of manipulation in Durango (where no alternation has taken place).
δ = (E[Y |t = 1, p = 1]− E[Y |t = 1, p = 0])− (E[Y |t = 0, p = 1]− E[Y |t = 0, p = 0])
3.3 Results
3.3.1 Fraud score models
Tables 3.1 and 3.2 report the results of the digits-test models of fraud affecting the PAN. The
tables shows seven distinct models. Model 1 includes control variables only, to facilitate goodness-
of-fit comparisons with the treatment models; it is included in both tables for ease of comparison.
Models 2 through 4 use alternation as the measure of local risk, and non-PRI governors, PAN
president and unified government as measures of patronage consolidation, respectively. Models 5
through 7 replace alternation with PAN governor. The results show that patronage consolidation
and local levels of risk jointly affect the estimated levels of manipulation affecting the PAN.
The results of all six models that contain interaction terms support Hypothesis 1 and 2, and
offer improvements in goodness-of-fit compared to the base model as measured by AIC. Marginal




(1) (2) (3) (4)
Pop. density (log) 0.04 0.01 0.08 −0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Population (log) 0.12 0.14 0.09 0.16
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.26)
Over sixty 0.03 0.07 −0.05 0.09
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Post-primary education −5.31∗∗∗ −4.42∗∗ −6.64∗∗∗ −3.64∗
(1.84) (2.10) (1.96) (2.12)
Presidential 0.02 0.06 0.10 0.04
(0.13) (0.13) (0.14) (0.13)
Piped water −0.03 −0.03∗ −0.03 −0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
Alternation −2.19∗∗∗ −0.70∗∗ −0.17
(0.70) (0.32) (0.21)






Non-PRI govs. share : Altern. 4.80∗∗∗
(1.67)
PAN pres. : Alternation 0.42
(0.36)
Unified gov. : Alternation −1.38∗∗
(0.64)
Constant −0.22 −0.49 0.79 −1.13
(4.15) (4.13) (4.05) (4.13)
Observations 3,386 3,386 3,386 3,386
Log Likelihood −895.52 −889.35 −889.75 −890.05
AIC 1,807.05 1,800.71 1,801.50 1,802.10
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01




(1) (5) (6) (7)
Pop. density (log) 0.04 0.01 0.08 −0.01
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13)
Population (log) 0.12 0.16 0.11 0.15
(0.26) (0.26) (0.26) (0.25)
Over sixty 0.03 0.05 −0.06 0.07
(0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Post-primary education −5.31∗∗∗ −5.20∗∗ −7.38∗∗∗ −3.73∗
(1.84) (2.13) (2.02) (2.11)
Presidential 0.02 0.03 0.07 0.04
(0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Piped water −0.03 −0.03 −0.02 −0.04∗
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
PAN governor −1.85∗∗ −1.15∗∗ 0.02
(0.75) (0.48) (0.27)






Non-PRI govs. share : PAN gov. 4.41∗∗
(1.82)
PAN pres. : PAN gov. 1.22∗∗
(0.49)
Unified.government : PAN gov. −1.50∗∗
(0.65)
Constant −0.22 −0.82 0.34 −0.88
(4.15) (4.10) (4.10) (4.04)
Observations 3,386 3,386 3,386 3,386
Log Likelihood −895.52 −891.73 −888.59 −890.37
AIC. 1,807.05 1,805.45 1,799.17 1,802.74
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.2: Logit models of PAN fraud, using PAN governor
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For brevity, the plots here correspond to Models 2 and 5; marginal effects plots for Models 3, 4, 6,
and 7 are shown in the appendix. Lastly, to illustrate the substantive significant of the interaction, a
predicted probability plot is shown that corresponds to Model 2.
Figure 3.1, for example, shows that the marginal effect of non-PRI governors share on PAN
fraud is positive and significant in states that have experienced alternation in government, but
is not statistically significant in states where the PRI has maintained unbroken control over the
executive. In other words, as the PRI’s overall share of governorships decreases (and other parties
gain access to patronage resources via those governorships), the likelihood of falsification affecting
the PAN increases only in regions where the PRI has lost control. This suggests that as the PAN
captures more patronage resources by capturing a larger number of state governorships, it is able
to deliver pro-PAN manipulation in places where the PRI no longer governs. Figure 3.2, which
shows the marginal effect of non-PRI governors conditional on PAN control of the state government,
helps confirm this interpretation. When a PAN governor is in office, a decrease in the PRI’s overall
control of patronage resources results in increased PAN fraud. Though the digits test underlying
the dependent variable cannot provide the direction of the estimated fraud, the most plausible
assumption is that this increase in manipulation is in support of the PAN (given its control over the
executive).
Figures 3.3 and 3.4 report the marginal effects for the opposite version of the interaction, that is,
the effect of local risk conditional on the level of patronage consolidation; both show support for
Hypothesis 2. They show that at low levels of non-PRI governors share—that is, when the PRI’s
hold over state governorships is dominant nationwide—alternation and PAN governor both result
in significant reductions in the likelihood that PAN vote-shares will appear manipulated. As with
the interpretation of Figures 3.1 and 3.2, the most plausible explanation for this pattern is that a
shift away from PRI control of the state increases the risk of exposure and punishment for pro-PRI
agents, deterring fraud that reduces the PAN’s vote-share. Of course, it is also likely that the loss of
the governorship also restricts the ability of the PRI to channel patronage resources to the state;
testing the relative importance of local risk vs. patronage interruption is a focus of the subsequent
difference-in-differences test.
Finally, Figure 3.5 shows the predicted probability of fraud affecting the PAN by the degree of
local risk and the level of nationwide patronage consolidation. The left panel of the figure shows
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Figure 3.1: Marginal effect of non-PRI governors share on PAN fraud
Figure 3.2: Marginal effect of non-PRI governors share on PAN fraud
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Figure 3.3: Marginal effect of alternation on PAN fraud
Figure 3.4: Marginal effect of PAN governor on PAN fraud
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Figure 3.5: Predicted probability of falsification of PAN results
that the reduction in the PRI’s consolidated control over patronage resources has only a modest
(and statistically insignificant) negative relationship with falsification affecting the PAN. In the time
period covered by the dataset, the probability of PAN fraud in a PRI stronghold hovers around 7.5%.
This low, but still substantively relevant, probability likely reflects the fact that by the 1990s, the
PRI’s ability to falsify elections wholesale was already greatly diminished. However, the effect in
states where the PRI has lost power is positive and significant, rising from about 3% in the period
of greatest PRI control over resources to about 7% when the PRI is weakest. This suggests that
the erosion of patronage consolidation, and the associated distribution of resources to opposition
parties, allowed the PAN to essentially match the PRI’s ability to generate election fraud in the
post-hegemonic period. These results are consistent with the consolidation-and-constraint model of
principal-agent dynamics in electoral manipulation, as greater access to resources and reduced local
risk allow opposition parties to recruit agents who otherwise would have surely cast their lots with
the previously dominant party.
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3.3.2 Difference-in-differences models
While these results are supportive of hypotheses drawn from the principal-agent model, the
nature of the data makes it difficult to draw firm conclusions. The digits test only detects one
particular type of manipulation; additionally, the confidence intervals on the predicted probability
of fraud in PAN-controlled regions are wide due to the small number of PAN governors during the
early years in the dataset. As a result, it is useful to turn to the more focused comparison of two of
Mexico’s states—Nayarit and Durango—using the difference-in-differences design. This approach
has three benefits. First, it allows for the estimation of overall manipulation, using a turnout-based
measure. Second, the turnout-based measure provides some idea of the direction of manipulation,
unlike the digits-test.2 Finally, it allows for a more focused comparison by attempting to mimic
random assignment of observations in treatment and control groups.
As Table 3.3 shows, these two western states have similar features. While Durango is more
populous, the difference between the two regions is well within one standard deviation for Mexican
states as a whole (both states fall below the median state, with a population of 2.4 million). Likewise,
while Nayarit is considerably more densely populated than its northern neighbor, both states have a
relatively low population density compared to Mexico’s nationwide median. The two states resemble
each other very closely with regard to the levels of development and income, the size of the indigenous
population, the share of the population with post-primary education, and the proportion of the
population claiming Catholic faith. These similarities make a controlled comparison between the
two states plausible. The fact that both states are relatively close to the median nationwide value
of many of these variables increases the external validity of the comparison within Mexico overall.
Finally, since causal inference in a difference-in-differences design requires that the control case stand
in for an unobservable counterfactual(in which the treatment group did not receive the treatment),
the usefulness of the design hinges on the assumption that values of the dependent variable in both
the treatment and control cases move in parallel before the treatment is applied. This assumption is
defended in the appendix.
2For example, if the digits-test produces a positive result for the PAN in a PRI-controlled region, it is natural to
assume that the PAN’s vote-totals have been adjusted downward by PRI officials. However, the statistic itself
provides no sense of the direction of the manipulation.
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Nayarit Durango Natl. median St. Deviation
Population 976,000 1,518,000 2,447,000 2,729,000
Population density (logged) 3.58 2.48 3.96 1.3
Gross regional product per cap. (logged) 4.54 5.88 4.84 3.8
Indigenous population 4% 2% 2% 9%
Households with piped water 87% 91% 89% 9%
Post-primary education 40% 36% 39% 10%
Percent Catholic 80% 78% 77% 8%






PRI municipality 0.009∗∗∗ −0.006
(0.003) (0.005)
Treatment group −0.012 0.002
(0.012) (0.015)
Post-treatment 1 (first alternation) 0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)
Post-treatment 2 (second alternation) 0.002
(0.004)
Turnout : Treatment group 0.012 −0.004
(0.031) (0.032)
Turnout : Post-treatment 1 −0.113∗∗∗
(0.004)
Turnout : Post-treatment 2 −0.120∗∗∗
(0.007)
Turnout : PRI municipality 0.011∗∗ 0.047∗∗∗
(0.006) (0.008)
Turnout : Treatment group : Post-treatment 1 −0.042∗∗∗
(0.003)





Log Likelihood 44,683.980 33,538.510
Akaike Inf. Crit. −89,341.960 −67,051.010
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.4: Difference-in-difference model of PRI manipulation
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(Nayarit) Control (Durango) Difference
Pre-treatment period 0.56 (.03) 0.57 (.02) -0.004 (.000)
Post-treatment period 0.39 (.004) 0.44 (.007) -0.06 (.000)
Difference -0.17 (.000) -0.13 (.000) -0.055 (.000)






PRI municipality 0.009∗∗∗ 0.012∗∗∗
(0.003) (0.004)
Treatment group 0.030∗∗ 0.035∗∗
(0.012) (0.015)
Post-treatment 1 (first alternation) −0.010∗∗∗
(0.002)




Turnout : Post-treatment 1 0.146∗∗∗
(0.004)
Turnout :Post-treatment 2 0.062∗∗∗
(0.006)
Turnout : PRI municipality −0.032∗∗∗ −0.042∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.008)
Turnout : Treatment group : Post-treatment 1 −0.062∗∗∗
(0.003)





Log Likelihood 47,399.980 36,662.070
Akaike Inf. Crit. −94,773.960 −73,298.150
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 3.6: Models of PAN manipulation in Nayarit and Durango
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(Nayarit) Control (Durango) Difference
Pre-treatment period 0.18 (.03) 0.24 (.02) -0.07 (.000)
Post-treatment period 0.16 (.003) 0.30 (.006) -0.14 (.000)
Difference -0.01 (.000) 0.06 (.000) -0.074 (.000)
Table 3.7: Difference-in-differences results for PAN manipulation in Nayarit and Durango (Model 11)
The expectation is that evidence of fraud for both parties will decline in Nayarit after alternation,
relative to Durango. Due to the alternation in government in Nayarit, from PRI to PAN to PRI
again, the state is not an opposition stronghold. Rather, it is a competitive area in which partisan
contestation is likely to make engaging in manipulation riskier for agents of either party.3 Table
3.4 shows the regression output for the difference-in-difference models of PRI manipulation; the
relationship between turnout and the PRI’s absolute vote-share by precinct. Model 8 uses the first
alternation in Nayarit, from PRI control to the PAN, as the treatment variable. Model 9 uses
the second alternation, when the PRI returned to power. Since this model considers rule by the
PAN to be the treatment, it excludes the 2000 and 2003 elections, when the PAN was in power in
Nayarit (and the treatment was, in a sense, still being applied).4 This second transition provides
a stronger test of the local-risk aspect of the theory with regard to manipulation on behalf of the
PRI, since national conditions as well as partisan control of the state executive and its resources are
held constant. Consequently, to test the effect of local risk on pro-PRI manipulation, I calculate the
difference-in-differences estimator according to Model 9. The estimated levels of manipulation in all
four conditions (pre-treatment, post-treatment, control group, treatment group) are shown in Table 4,
along with the difference-in-differences (in bold). During the pre-treatment period, both Nayarit and
Durango experience almost identical levels of manipulation on behalf of the PRI. PRI manipulation
levels fall in both states during the period after alternation in power in Nayarit, as predicted, as
national political conditions become more competitive and the PRI loses ground. However, the shift
is more rapid in Nayarit than in Durango, suggesting that local risk has an important interactive
effect on agent behavior.
3Manipulation in favor of the PAN is likely to occur even in Durango during the post-treatment period, which overlaps
with increased national patronage consolidation around the PAN via that party’s control of the presidency.
4Including data from all elections does not meaningfully change the results.
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The effect of alternation in government on PRI manipulation, measured by the difference-in-
differences estimate, is statistically significant (p < .001). Moreover, it is substantively significant:
according to the model, at any given level of turnout, the average absolute vote-share of the PRI
should be 5.5 percentage points higher in Durango than in Nayarit. In a region like Nayarit,
where the number of registered voters is over half a million, the difference amounts to thousands
of votes—enough to sway a close election in that state, especially in Mexico’s multiparty system.
Furthermore, small fraudulent boosts to a party’s vote-share in individual precincts are a known
form of electoral manipulation in Mexico; small enough to escape detection at the precinct level, in
aggregate they can affect the outcome of national elections (Cantú, 2014).
Tables 3.6 and 3.7 show that estimated PAN manipulation also conforms to the principal-agent
model’s predictions. The results presented in Table 3.7 indicate that estimated PAN manipulation
holds steady in the treatment case, while increasing in the control case. The coefficients for turnout
and turnout*PRI municipal control reported in Model 10 suggest that the increase in Durango is
driven by PAN-controlled municipalities within the PRI-controlled state. This result within Durango
implies that the principal-agent effects already identified between the national and regional levels
also transpire between the state and local levels, an avenue for future study. At the same time, the
comparison between the treatment and control groups overall shows that estimated manipulation
levels are lower in the more competitive state.
These results suggest that increased competition—and thus increased risk—reduces manipulation
generally (though particular tactics may increase in use, even as the overall level declines, as the
earlier digits test shows). Estimated PAN manipulation levels are lower in Nayarit after the transition
to a PAN governor (Model 11) than in PRI-controlled Durango during the same period. This finding
is surprising from the perspective of traditional understandings of electoral manipulation. Once the
PAN gains control of the machinery of state, should it not be able to use them to its advantage?
Why are PAN manipulation estimates lower in Nayarit after alternation than in Durango, where
decades of PRI control should have stamped out any PAN efforts to mobilize supporters?
Taken together, the results of Models 8-11 are more easily interpreted under a principal-agent
framework driven by patronage and risk. Political uncertainty drives up the cost of manipulation for
all agents, making electoral manipulation both less effective and less attractive to principals—even
as the PAN takes control of both the state and national executives. Meanwhile, in a politically
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stable region like Durango, machine politics remains a relatively effective tool. While the loss
of resources associated with national shifts away from PRI hegemony lead to a decline in PRI
manipulation in Durango, agents working on behalf of the PRI are relatively confident that the
state-level political structure in which they are embedded will endure, insulating them from local
risks. By contrast, in more competitive local areas, agents face greater risks as national conditions
become more competitive—reducing their incentive to engage in manipulation. These results support
Hypothesis 3.
3.3.3 Conclusion
The Russian case, presented in Chapter 3, shows how patterns of electoral manipulation corre-
sponded to the predictions of the principal-agent model as patronage consolidation increased over
the course of Vladimir Putin’s rule. In that case, pro-regime electoral manipulation increased with
the consolidation of resources around United Russia and the presidency, conditional on local political
circumstances. The Mexican case complements that analysis, by showing that the principal-agent
model is borne out in conditions of decreasing patronage consolidation as well. In the case of Mexico,
the probability of fraud affecting the PAN increases modestly in PAN-controlled states, as the
PRI loses control of state governorships across the country. The Mexican case shows that elevated
national competitiveness does not necessarily cause electoral manipulation to wither away. Rising
national fortunes for an opposition party in a new democracy can induce agents to manipulate on
that party’s behalf, as the opposition gains the ability to distribute patronage rewards to agents
who deliver electoral success. However, this result only occurs in the opposition party’s newfound
strongholds. As in Russia, this effect is multilevel: agents’ willingness to manipulate on behalf of the
PAN increases only in PAN-controlled strongholds, where agents can credibly expect to be included
in rewards and shielded from political or legal punishment.
The Mexican case also offers additional evidence that agents’ decision-making is responsible
for these shifts in electoral manipulation over time. Unlike in Russia, Mexico provides variation in
party leadership at the national and state levels. This variation is exploited both in the analysis
of the patterns of ones-digits in each party’s returns, and in the difference-in-difference model of
turnout and absolute vote-share. However, it is especially informative in the latter model. Since
the difference-in-difference model compares two states over the same time period, measured when
both were governed by the PRI, the model holds national-level and state-level principals constant.
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As a result, the reduction in PRI- and PAN-associated manipulation estimates in the treatment
case, following a double alternation in state government, is suggestive of an agent-driven dynamic.
Increased competitiveness is understood to intensify principals’ interest in electoral manipulation;
the fact that competition appears to push manipulation levels down in the more competitive state
indicates that agents’ wariness of exposure and punishment limits the ability of principals to generate
as much manipulation as they might like.
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CHAPTER 4
Patronage consolidation and deflationary manipulation in Ukraine
Of the three cases considered here, Ukraine is in several ways the most difficult in which to test
the consolidation and constraint model of electoral manipulation. Parties in Ukraine, especially those
with roots in its western regions, have tended to be personalized and short-lived, making it more
difficult to track their electoral performance over time. Additionally, over the time period for which
electoral data are available (2002 to 2014), Ukraine were beset by multiple political crises. The two
most significant of these include the 2004 Orange Revolution and the 2014 Euromaidan revolution
and subsequent military conflict in the east. These are by no means the only crises to befall the
country, however, and it is telling that the so-called Cassette Tape or Kuchma-gate scandal—which
implicated President Kuchma in a variety of high-level misdeeds including the abduction and murder
of a critical journalist—is considered a lesser incident in recent Ukrainian political history. While
these patterns make it more difficult to analyze patterns of electoral manipulation than in Russia,
for example, where a single ruling party predominates, it also offers opportunities to test the theory
in the context of large shifts in patronage consolidation.
In particular, the Ukrainian case provides a useful test against the hypotheses of the local-
information model of electoral manipulation (Rundlett and Svolik, 2016).1 The local-information
model claims that when election-manipulating agents perceive their patron’s popularity to be
low locally, they extrapolate from this information that their patron is likely to be unpopular
nationally and begin to doubt that she will win the election. As a result, they become less likely
to engage in electoral manipulation, fearing that patronage rewards will be revoked and the risk of
punishment will increase. This theory produces two testable hypotheses that compete with those
of the consolidation and constraint model. First, it expects that agents in local strongholds will
1Ukraine is less effective as a test of the signaling model of manipulation, since it does not meet Simpser’s requirements
for excessive manipulation to occur: an unconstrained government and a dominant ruling party.
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continue to engage in manipulation on behalf of the locally dominant party, even if national political
conditions worsen for that party. As will be shown below, this pattern does not emerge in Ukraine,
where manipulation efforts against the pro-eastern Party of Regions decline dramatically—even in
pro-western regions—during a period of high patronage consolidation. Second, the local-information
model predicts that agents in areas where a party is unpopular will refrain from manipulation
on behalf of that party, even if that leader is dominant at the national level; instead, evidence of
manipulation in favor of pro-western parties can be seen even in highly pro-eastern regions in the
aftermath of the Maidan protests.
In both cases, the results of election-forensic analysis of data from Ukraine support the consoli-
dation and constraint model, and do not uphold the local information approach. I test these two
hypotheses using precinct-level election results for Ukraine’s major pro-eastern party in each election
year from 2002 to 2014.2 Analysis of the east-party data is more likely to be useful for testing the
theory than the pro-western parties. First, the eastern parties—based in the more industrial part
of the country—are more strongly rooted in patronage politics than the major pro-western parties.
And it is the pro-eastern Party of Regions that provides the only instance during the time period
studied where a party gains unambiguously consolidated control over state and para-state patronage
resources—the 2012 legislative election during which the Party of Regions holds the presidency and
control over the legislature. This control over patronage networks then rapidly deteriorates in the
wake of the 2014 Euromaidan protest movement, annexation of Crimea, and prolonged conflict in
the Donbass region. This trajectory makes it possible to test the effect of patronage consolidation
on east-party results. The pro-western parties do not achieve high levels of patronage consolidation,
due to splits between the major pro-western leaders, constitutional reforms, and a societal base of
support less dependent on patronage resources.
Lastly, the Ukrainian case also offers an opportunity to test the theory on a different class of
manipulation techniques. While the ruling party in Russia appears to mostly engage in inflationary
manipulation techniques (at least on election day itself), deflationary tactics appear to predominate
in Ukraine. In addition to mobilizing tools like vote-buying or voter pressure, which can only be
2In most cases this party is the Party of Regions; however in 2002 it the Communist Party of Ukraine, and in 2014
the Opposition Bloc (essentially the rump Party of Regions following the Maidan crisis).
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employed where a principal’s patronage network extends, party’s in Ukraine have also tried to use
‘technical parties’ and ‘clone candidates’ to divert votes away from their genuine opponents. More
importantly for this study, such techniques have also allowed parties to stack regional and local
electoral commissions with pliant supporters; enabling fraud and other forms of electoral malpractice.
Testing the consolidation and constraint model in this context indicates that agents weigh the
benefits of patronage against local risks even when employing these kinds of techniques, which may
be subtler and harder to observe than tools like ballot-stuffing.
In sum, this chapter shows that deflationary manipulation is characteristic of elections in
Ukraine, and that the local information model does not accurately predict those patterns of electoral
manipulation. Using two election-forensic techniques, it demonstrates that deflationary techniques
deployed against pro-eastern parties and candidates are less likely in regions with higher local
constraints against such manipulation, and respond as predicted to shifts in patronage consolidation.
That is, during the Yanukovych presidency when patronage resources were highly consolidated around
the Party of Regions, evidence of deflationary manipulation against that party drops dramatically,
even in highly pro-western regions. In turn, in elections after the Euromaidan crisis, evidence of
deflationary manipulation against pro-eastern candidates increases, especially in pro-eastern regions.
These results contradict the expectations of the local information model, and support the theory
articulated here.
4.1 Context: Ukrainian politics and elections
Though analysts should be wary of over-emphasizing the point, Ukraine’s political divisions are
largely regional. Voters in the country’s east have generally supported parties and candidates that
adopt a more interventionist economic policy and take a more favorable view toward Russia. By
contrast, voters in the west have usually supported parties and candidates with economic and foreign
policies that are oriented towards the market and towards Europe (Birch, 2000). The two regions
are characterized by ethnic and linguistic divisions, with the west home to more ethnic Ukrainians
and Ukrainian-speakers, while Russian ethnicity and language is more common in the east.
These differences can be attributed, in part, to historical legacies: much of western Ukraine
was ruled by the Austro-Hungarian Empire prior to World War I, and by Poland, Romania, or
Czechoslovakia during the interwar years. Government policy in these regions, before they were
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incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1939, was relatively democratic and favorable to the development
of Ukrainian national identity. By contrast, eastern Ukraine was part of the Russian Empire, which
emphasized a Ukrainian identity that was a regional subset of the broader Russian ethnicity and
language (Katchanovski, 2006). Despite the well-documented importance of language (Fournier,
2002; Kulyk, 2011) and ethnicity (Barrington, 2002) in Ukraine, however, the regions’ voters are not
homogeneous blocs. For example, using a survey experiment, Frye (2015) finds that a hypothetical
candidate’s position on closer ties with Europe or Russia is more likely to drive a voter’s preference
than either the candidate’s reported ethnicity or language. Furthermore, many of Ukraine’s eastern
regions are more diverse linguistically and ethnically than is generally reported (Sasse, 2010).
Finally, as in other post-communist countries, Ukraine’s economic transition created a class of
oligarchs who were able to gain control of the state’s major economic assets. In Ukraine, these
oligarchs are often linked in regional clans and can use their resources to back local politicians. These
patterns can be seen even in independent Ukraine’s earliest elections, but intensified following the
Orange Revolution (D’Anieri, 2011). Spoken language in Ukraine is an inexact proxy for ethnicity,
which in turn is an inexact proxy for identity and political orientation (Sasse, 2001).
While regional attitudes follow the general contours described above, it is important to note
that major Ukrainian political parties have not been characterized by stark ideological conflicts so
much as by regional loyalties, affiliation with particular leaders, and the distribution of patronage.
Parties in Ukraine are highly personalized, and frequently depend on the resources, reputation, and
charisma of particular leaders for their electoral success (Rybiy, 2013). This is especially true of the
western-oriented parties associated with Viktor Yushchenko and Yulia Tymoshenko (Kuzio, 2012;
Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015). This personalization contributes to parties’ ideological fluidity3 and
voters’ difficulty in placing parties on an ideological spectrum (Rybiy, 2013).
This weak ideological commitment on the part of voters, combined with social inequality and
overlapping political and economic responsibilities of local leaders (Allina-Pisano, 2010), allows
parties to rely on ‘administrative resources’ like access to state employment, favorable (or unfavorable)
business treatment, and selective law enforcement to build and maintain networks of supporters
3Some parties are exceptions to this rule: the ideologically cohesive Communist Party of Ukraine and Svoboda
(Freedom) did well in the 2012 parliamentary election, winning 13% and 10% of the vote, respectively (Rybiy, 2013).
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(D’Anieri, 2011; Protsyk and Wilson, 2003). Tools like these give political leaders the ability to
raise funds, mobilize voters, and manipulate elections (Hale, 2003). These tools are usually held by
regional or local actors in Ukraine, rather than being institutionalized at the national level (Way,
2005). In particular, such methods are characteristic of the pro-eastern parties exemplified by the
Party of Regions (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015; Kuzio, 2012).
A large public sector and a relatively compliant judiciary (Kudelia, 2012) provide ample op-
portunity for the executive branch to apply pressure to voters and opposition figures in Ukraine.
Post-Soviet reforms subordinating regional governors to the president created “a strong vertical exec-
utive power running from the president down to the village level"; in order to retain office, regional
and local officials were required to mobilize voters on behalf of their bosses (Konitzer-Smirnov, 2005,
p. 7). As in Russia (Frye et al., 2014), state employees and workers in industries that are vulnerable
to state regulation are susceptible to pressure from above. In one particularly stark example, school
children at a school in eastern Ukraine informed their parents that their teachers would be fired
if the parents did not support the government in an upcoming election (D’Anieri, 2007). During
the 2004 presidential election, which sparked the Orange Revolution, the government leaned on
administrative resources to encourage “the police, the army, prisons, public universities, schools, and
hospitals, to campaign and vote for Prime Minister Viktor Yanukovych,” who enjoyed the backing of
the sitting president and many Ukrainian oligarchs (Katchanovski, 2008). Moreover, government
officials engaged in tampering with the electronic results of the second round of the election; the
combined efforts of mobilization and falsification appeared sufficient to tip the election in favor of
Yanukovych and against his pro-Western rival Viktor Yushchenko—a rare example of a stolen election
(Simpser, 2013).The Party of Regions, which was led by Yanukovych and came to be the dominant
party in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, relied on a mix of state administrative resources, political
patronage, and intra-elite bargaining to maintain its support in the region (Kudelia and Kuzio,
2015; Myagkov et al., 2009). Patronage, clientelism, and voter pressure are all common features of
the Ukrainian election system, and—like Russia—it is characterized by a political hierarchy that
links the president to local officials through intermediaries like regional officials and oligarchs. As
a result, we might expect to see widespread electoral manipulation under either the signaling or
local-information frameworks.
One peculiar feature of election management in Ukraine is an apparent emphasis on deflationary
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tactics; that is, efforts to reduce one’s opponents vote-share rather than (or in addition to) inflating
one’s own. Ukrainian parties have attempted to influence election results by using manufactured
parties and candidates to drain votes away from rivals and to gain additional influence on election
commissions. Ukrainian elections have often been characterized by an abundance of so-called
‘technical parties,’ small parties artificially created by main parties in order to divert votes away
from their opponents. One such technical party, which voiced strong opposition to Yanukovych and
the Party of Regions and whose leader was reminiscent of former Orange-Revolution hero Yulia
Tymoshenko, diverted as much as 300,000 votes from the nationalist party UDAR, depriving it of
six to eight seats in parliament (Kovalov, 2014). Perhaps more important than confusing voters and
diverting votes, however, is the role that technical parties play on Ukraine’s election commissions.
Ukraine’s election law divides the country into 225 district election commissions. Rules deter-
mining membership on the committees have varied from year to year, but have generally granted
automatic representation to representatives of the parliamentary parties, with remaining seats
filled by non-parliamentary parties via lotteries. This setup allows for small, hastily registered
parties—operating informally on behalf of major parties or politicians—to gain representation on the
district commissions. This problem became especially egregious in 2012, when the Central Election
Commission implemented a change in the lottery process five days before the drawing: instead of
individual lotteries for each district commission, a single lottery would be held that would determine
the makeup of all 225 commissions. As a result, small parties that had nominated only one or two
candidates nationwide gained representation on all district commissions, while larger opposition
parties were excluded (Kovalov, 2014; OSCE Office for Democractic Institutions and Human Rights,
2013). District election commissions then implemented a similar nominating procedure for all their
subordinate precinct election commissions.
This system can be especially problematic when combined with the deep patronage roots enjoyed
by the Party of Regions in eastern Ukraine, which it used to gain outsize influence on the commissions.
In one notable example, OSCE observers in a single election district of Donetsk oblast’ determined
that 1,667 of the 2,551 precinct election commissioners in the district worked for an enterprise headed
by the Party of Regions candidate—meaning that more than two-thirds of precinct commissioners
presided over balloting for their employer (OSCE Office for Democractic Institutions and Human
Rights, 2013). While the presence of technical representatives on election commissions was perhaps
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most extensive in the 2012 campaign, it figured prominently in previous elections as well. In the first
round of the 2004 election, technical candidates had the right to nominate up to 66,000 members of
precinct election commissions; while both major candidates took advantage of technical candidates,
the OSCE concluded that Viktor Yanukovych benefited the most, finding that supportive technical
candidates gave him “a de facto majority on election commissions” (OSCE Office for Democractic
Institutions and Human Rights, 2005, p. 9). The 2010 election, in which Yanukovych was first elected,
was relatively free of electoral fraud, with candidates emphasizing voter mobilization (Herron, 2011),
though the analysis presented here suggests that some of these mobilization efforts may have been
extra-legal and/or characterized by the misuse of state resources (OSCE Office for Democractic
Institutions and Human Rights, 2010).
Partisan control of election commissions at various levels facilitates electoral manipulation in
various forms, which observers frequently witnessed in Ukraine. In 2004, the OSCE observed—among
other issues—ballot box stuffing, irregularities with absentee voting, large numbers of voters being
turned away from the polls, implausible turnout figures, and suspicious tabulation process. All of
these forms of electoral manipulation are either implemented or influenced by election commissioners
at the precinct, territorial, or central level. Similar problems were observed by the OSCE in 2012,
when observers negatively assessed the vote count in eleven percent of monitored precincts, and
tabulation was negatively assessed in almost half of the 161 district election commissions monitored
(OSCE Office for Democractic Institutions and Human Rights, 2013, pp. 27-32).
4.2 Theory: Consolidation and constraint in Ukraine
The above review makes clear that the conditions exist in Ukraine for parties and candidates to
make use of illegal electoral manipulation. International election observer reports indicate that such
tactics were substantial in the legislative elections of 2002, 2012, and 2014, as well as during the first
two rounds of the 2004 presidential election, with considerable regional variation in the severity of
manipulation efforts (OSCE Office for Democractic Institutions and Human Rights, 2013, 2005).
Other elections were considered to be markedly cleaner (Hale, 2010; Katchanovski, 2008; OSCE Office
for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, 2007; OSCE Office for Democractic Institutions and
Human Rights, 2010, 2006). While the local-information model attempts to explain this variation
via the popularity of candidates in agents’ local territories, it is more accurately explained through a
focus on local risks to agents and shifts in the consolidation of patronage networks around the Party
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of Regions.
4.2.1 Local constraints in Ukraine
Given the divisions of the country, local constraints in Ukraine must be conceptualized for each
broad political group, referred to here by the shorthand terms ‘pro-western’ and ‘pro-eastern.’ Risks
will vary not only by local political conditions, but by party group; in one particular locality the
risk of exposure might be severe for pro-western agents, but non-existent for pro-eastern agents.
For example, the pro-eastern Party of Regions has been able to exert influence over local courts in
regions it controls (Katchanovski, 2008), reducing the risk that local agents will face punishment for
supporting the party in illegal ways but perhaps increasing the risk for supporters of pro-western
parties. The Party of Regions inherited much of the political culture and resources of the Communist
Party of Ukraine, and used these advantages to build a locally dominant coalition of government
administrators, red directors (communist-era managers of large firms), and local business / oligarchic
interests (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015; Zimmer and Haran, 2008). As a result, the heartland of the
PoR is politically sealed off (Osipian and Osipian, 2006).
The situation is more complicated in regions where pro-western parties tend to dominate. Machine
politics, essential to delivering votes in places like Donetsk and Luhansk in the east, were difficult to
export to territories in Western Ukraine (Sushko, 2002; Zimmer, 2005), due in large part to a more
politically active civil society there (D’Anieri, 2005). The presence of a more active civil society and
the relative absence of locally dominant economic interests led to the development of more highly
personalized parties, primarily oriented around the figures of Yushchenko and Tymoshenko during
this period (Kudelia and Kuzio, 2015; Kuzio, 2012). As a result, these two blocs competed with each
other for votes within their territories (Kuzio, 2013), limiting the ability of either bloc to develop
the kind of local political monopoly that reduces risks toward election manipulating agents.
The development of active civil society in the west accelerated as a result of the Kuchma-gate crisis,
and was nurtured by opposition parties during the Orange Revolution (Kudelia, 2007). However,
the historical roots of civil society and multiparty democracy run deeper in Western Ukraine than in
the East. During perestroika, dissidents and former political prisoners in Western Ukraine formed
Rukh (the Ukrainian Popular Movement for Restructuring) to challenge the Communist Party; while
Rukh gained popularity in Kyiv and central Ukraine, it never gained much of a foothold in the east
(Kuzio, 2010). In surveys from the early post-Soviet period, respondents from western Lviv were
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twice as likely as residents of Donetsk to attempt to “resolve social problems” by contacting mass
media, contacting officials, or joining an organization, and three times as likely to have signed a
petition or participated in a demonstration (Aberg, 2000). These connections persisted through the
Orange Revolution: protesters in that movement were motivated less by democratic ideology and
more by the fact that they were highly networked, with higher incomes, and less dependent on the
state (Beissinger, 2013).
In sum, local risks vary considerably across Ukraine by both party and region. The risk of
exposure for pro-western agents is especially high in eastern regions where the political machine
organized around the Party of Regions predominates, due to that party’s success in creating a
subnational enclave prior to the Euromaidan crisis, Russian intervention, and civil war. However, the
existence of competing pro-western parties and a robust civil society in many western regions makes
electoral manipulation difficult to achieve undetected in those regions as well. These differences are
largely structural, as described above; they rest on broad historical and social factors rather than on
parties’ see-sawing electoral fortunes. As a result, the level of risk in a particular locality does not
shift much over time in Ukraine. Instead, shifts in manipulation patterns over time are due largely
to major changes occur in the consolidation of patronage during the period studied.
4.2.2 Patronage consolidation
Soviet Ukraine was characterized by heavy reliance on patronage and clientelism, transmitted by
informal networks operating within the formal Communist Party and command economy structures
in a system Kitschelt (1995) terms patrimonial communism. This framework persisted in post-Soviet
Ukraine, as many political and bureaucratic officeholders remained in place, while communist-era
managers and officials became private-sector owners of capital (Zimmer and Haran, 2008). Especially
in the heavily industrialized eastern parts of the country, where small-scale enterprises are less
common (Aslund, 2005), large portions of the population are dependent on state- or employer-based
patronage (Zimmer, 2005). A power vertical has been solidly established in the eastern part of
the country, based on an alliance of regional and local administrative officials and business actors
(Zimmer, 2005). Nationally, the pro-presidential constitution of 1996 subordinated regional governors
and local executives to the president (Konitzer-Smirnov, 2005), a structure which remained largely
unchanged under the post-Orange constitution.
However, the Cassette Scandal crisis—in which illicit recordings of the president allegedly ordering
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a kidnapping, among other unsavory details, were made public—limited the ability of President
Kuchma to further consolidate control over the patronage resources and hand them to his preferred
candidate in the 2004 presidential election, Viktor Yanukovych. As a result of the ensuing political
crisis, the party system fractured, oligarchic alliances were ruptured, momentum toward a super-
presidential constitution was scuppered, President Kuchma’s succession plans were thrown into
turmoil, and an opposition movement based in civil society began to form (Kuzio, 2007). The
scandal helped lay the foundations for the 2004 Orange Revolution, in which hundreds of thousands
of citizens took to the streets to protest electoral manipulation in the presidential elections. The
subsequent opposition victory in a repeat election upended the party structure, and helped usher in
a new constitution that divided power more evenly between the presidency and the parliament.
As part of a compromise following the Orange Revolution, a new constitution was adopted which
greatly increased the patronage capabilities of the parliament and prime minister. As a result of
the new constitution, the parliamentary majority gained more discretion over the nomination of
prime ministers, more influence over the defense and security ministries and the prosecutor general,
and shifted much executive staffing power away from the president and to the cabinet (Christensen
et al., 2005). This shift reinforced the de facto competing-pyramid structure of patronage in the
post-revolutionary period, by expanding and legitimizing the influence of the parliamentary majority
while still retaining some patronage powers in the office of the presidency (Hale, 2014).
The competing pyramid structure would not survive long into the Yanukovych presidency, when
the Party of Regions was eager to press its advantage in patronage resources. After defeating
Tymoshenko’s network in the 2010 presidential election, Yanukovych moved swiftly to encourage
elite defections within the Rada, building a pro-presidential coalition that secured control of the
premiership (Hale, 2014; Kudelia, 2012). Subsequently, Yanukovych was able to win restoration of
the pre-revolution constitution favoring the president; he rapidly reconsolidated patronage networks
that had become fragmented during the Orange period.
This centralizing period would be short-lived however, as massive crowds during the 2014
Euromaidan crisis helped depose Yanukovych, leading to the seizure of the Crimean peninsula
by Russia, the de facto secession of two of Ukraine’s most populous and industrialized regions, a
prolonged civil war, and the effective collapse of the pro-eastern Party of Regions. The patronage
networks that had helped propel the success of the Party of Regions locally and nationally began to
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unravel (Hale, 2014).
In this context, to say that the consolidation of political patronage varies wildly over time is
an understatement. Presidents Kuchma and Yanukovych, who drew their political support in large
part from the eastern political machines, regularly sought to integrate other regions of Ukraine
into the power vertical (Kudelia, 2012; Pleine, 2016). With the exception of applying pressure
to state employees at election time, it proved challenging to export the ‘Donetsk’ model to wider
Ukraine (Zimmer, 2005). At the same time, variation in consolidation tracks closely with changes
in government: pro-eastern parties and presidents have generally presided over periods of growing
consolidation, while the more western-oriented President Yushchenko oversaw the period of greater
parliamentary influence. As a result, the influence of partisanship and patronage consolidation
largely overlap empirically.
In addition to the shifting consolidation of state-based patronage, analysts of Ukrainian politics
must also contend with a complex arrangement oligarchic ‘clans,’ which deploy their resources to
support favored parties. Unlike in Russia, where the major oligarchs generally do not risk challenging
the Kremlin Ukraine’s oligarchic clans have been more fractious. Focusing on pro-eastern parties
helps navigate this dynamic, since the pro-eastern oligarchic clan is relatively more unified than
their pro-western counterparts. During Kuchma’s presidency, three regional oligarchic clans became
influential in politics: the Dnipropetrovsk network, the Donetsk network, and the Kyiv network.
All three were generally aligned with Kuchma until the Orange Revolution (Pleine, 2016), and
used their resources to influence election outcomes (Katchanovski, 2008). The revolution split the
political-oligarchic patronage networks into three competing camps—one each aligned with Viktor
Yushchenko, Yulia Tymoshenko, and Viktor Yanukovych—a framework that persisted until the 2010
presidential election (Hale, 2010). Even after being cast into the political wilderness nationally by
the Orange crowds, Yanukovych and the Party of Regions could rely on regional patronage networks
and elected local mayors to retain influence in the east (Hale, 2010).
When Yanukovych assumed the presidency in 2010, the fractiousness of the opposition coalition
of oligarchs gave way once again to a more united patronage pyramid around the presidency and
the Donetsk clan. In turn, this informal patronage network collapsed as a result of the Euromaidan
and subsequent civil war, generally reconstituting itself around oligarch Petro Poroshenko after his
2014 presidential victory (Pleine, 2016). Poroshenko, though his own election was largely clean, used
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patronage resources to good effect (especially in the East, where networks still remained largely
intact) in the subsequent legislative elections (Fedorenko et al., 2016).
In sum, Ukraine is a case where many of the conditions are in place for widespread electoral
manipulation to occur. Patronage systems are embedded in society, especially in eastern regions
of the country. Presidential influence over governors potentially unites the state apparatus in a
network that can mobilize patronage resources to deliver votes for the incumbent. There are deep
links between the state and business interests (Kudelia, 2012). Nevertheless, the actual level of
manipulation has varied considerably between elections and across regions, according to international
monitors and experts (Hale, 2010; Herron, 2010, 2011, 2014; Katchanovski, 2008). This variation can
be explained largely by shifts in patronage consolidation. Patronage is substantially less consolidated
than in Russia; there is no ruling party akin to United Russia and oligarchic clans compete to
influence election results. The constitution has at times fostered competition between patronage
networks affiliated with the president and those affiliated with the prime minister. Local constraints
are generally higher where pro-Western parties prevail than in pro-Eastern regions, but were elevated
generally by the electoral reforms that were in force from the third round of the 2004 presidential
election through the 2010 presidential election.
4.2.3 Hypotheses
Within the Ukrainian context, as discussed in the literature above and reinforced using new data
below, electoral manipulation in Ukraine is largely deflationary. When focusing on election results
for the Party of Regions and its relatives, this implies the need to conceptualize patronage reward
and local risk for the perspective of pro-western agents—those who are engaging in manipulation to
reduce the party’s electoral success. Consequently, local risks are higher in regions where the Party
of Regions is more dominant; such areas should produce less manipulation against eastern parties.
On the other hand, lower risk for pro-western agents operating in regions where western parties
dominate will likely result in more evidence of deflationary manipulation against eastern parties.
However, agents make evaluations about risks in the context of expected patronage benefits;
behaviors that might be too risky to attempt when patronage offers appear uncertain may look
more appealing in light of a highly consolidated patronage network with apparent staying power.
In the Ukrainian context, such a scenario occurred with the success of Viktor Yanukovych in the
2010 presidential election coupled with subsequent legal and constitutional reforms solidifying the
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president’s ability to dispense patronage. During this period, patronage consolidation increased
on the Party of Regions; this is expected to draw agents away from participation in pro-western
electoral manipulation and make manipulation against the Party of Regions less likely.
The interaction effect of these two dynamics—local risk and patronage consolidation by the
Party of Regions should both deter manipulation against that party—is summarized below. The
hypothesis holds that in regions where local risks to pro-western agents is high, manipulation against
pro-eastern parties will be rare. On the other hand, it should be fairly common in places where
risks to western agents are low. When patronage networks become more consolidated under the pro-
eastern Yanukovych, however, the pull of that network should draw agents away from participation
in anti-eastern manipulation efforts; instead, the theory predicts they will either join the pro-eastern
network, or sit out the election.
Hypothesis 1: Greater patronage consolidation during the Yanukovych presidency results
in reduced deflationary manipulation against pro-eastern candidates; this reduction is
largest where local risks are low.
The sudden loss of patronage consolidation brought on the Euromaidan crisis should have a
reverse effect. By making pro-western patronage dramatically more appealing, the fragmentation of
the Party of Region’s network should entice agents in pro-eastern regions to engage in manipulation
that deflates eastern candidate’s vote-shares. That is, even if risks remain relatively constant, the
reorientation of patronage networks around pro-western parties should make it more likely that
agents work to support western parties. In places where local risks to pro-western agents are low,
the shift will have a smaller effect; in such regions, low risks already make it likely that agents will
engage in manipulation even when western patronage consolidation is low.
Hypothesis 2: Reduced patronage consolidation during Euromaidan crisis will result in
increased deflationary manipulation against pro-eastern candidates; this increase will be
largest where local risks are high.
4.3 Data and methods
To test these hypotheses, I draw on precinct-level results from nine elections in Ukraine from
2002 to 2014. This includes three presidential elections—the third round of the 2004 elections, along
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with both rounds of the 2010 and 2014 elections—and four legislative elections (2002, 2006, 2007, and
2012). Unfortunately, the dataset excludes the first two rounds of the 2004 presidential elections, for
which precinct-level results are not available. Each election-year includes data from approximately
30,000 to 35,000 precincts nested within Ukraine’s 27 regions. As a result of the annexation of
Crimea and the conflict in Eastern Ukraine, the legislative and presidential elections in 2014 draw
on approximately 28,000 precincts within 23 regions—Crimea, Sevastopol, Donetsk, and Luhansk
regions drop out of the data. This precinct-level data is used to conduct election-forensic estimates of
falsification and overall evidence of electoral manipulation. Unlike in the Russian case, I am unable
to estimate levels of vote-buying and related tactics, since Ukraine did not release precinct-level
numbers of absentee or mobile-ballot-box voting until the 2014 elections. Explanatory and control
variables are taken at the regional level.
4.3.1 Dependent variables
Two dependent variables are estimated by region. First, a turnout test is used to estimate overall
levels of manipulation (Myagkov et al., 2009). Second, a vote-share test designed by Rozenas (2017)
is used to estimate the number of precincts in each region that may have been subject to falsification.
To estimate the overall degree of manipulation, I conduct turnout tests on the results for the major
pro-eastern party in the election. These tests assume that, in a clean election, a party’s absolute
vote-share (the party’s number of votes divided by the number of registered voters) should increase
consistently across precincts within a territory, as precinct turnout increases. This approach assumes
homogeneous precincts, an assumption which is bolstered by testing precincts within regions or
through the use of relevant socioeconomic control variables to weed out potentially confounding
relationships (Deckert, 2013). I employ both approaches here.
First, I use multilevel models to estimate the relationship between turnout and absolute vote-
share for both parties, for each region-year, along with standard errors for those coefficients. The
coefficients generated at this first stage are then used as dependent variables in a second-stage model.
Turnout coefficients in the Ukrainian case appear systematically different from those in the Russian
case, discussed in a previous chapter. While the ruling United Russia party regularly produces
large turnout coefficients, suggesting that the party draws relatively more votes from the population
as turnout increases—likely illicitly—major parties in Ukraine frequently exhibit negative turnout
coefficients. A negative coefficient indicates that a party systematically loses absolute vote-share as
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turnout increases; that is, it draws fewer votes in absolute terms when turnout is high than when
turnout is low—a suspicious outcome, though one that is of course not impossible under a clean
election. A notional example helps clarify this.
A party’s absolute vote-share per precinct is the number of votes it receives divided by the total
number of registered voters in that precinct. Turnout is the total number of votes cast divided by
the number of registered voters. If there are 1,000 registered voters in each precinct, a precinct
with ten percent turnout will have 100 total voters, and a precinct with ninety percent turnout will
have 900. Assuming that a party has an approval rating of about forty percent across all precincts,
under a clean election the party will receive about forty votes in the low-turnout district, and about
360 in the high turnout one. The corresponding turnout coefficient, represented by the slope of
the line between the two points, will be about 0.4. For the party to produce a negative turnout
coefficient, significant deflation in vote-share must occur; in other words, the number of votes it
receives in high-turnout regions must be exceedingly low. In the current example, if the party wins
forty percent of votes in the low-turnout precinct and one percent of the votes in the high turnout
precinct (i.e. 9 out of 900 votes), it will produce a small negative turnout coefficient of -0.04. In
other words, to earn even a small negative coefficient a party must suffer dramatic losses in absolute
vote-share as turnout increases. Here, the party wins 40 out of 100 votes in the low-turnout precinct,
and only 9 votes out of 900 when turnout is high.4
Negative turnout coefficients for Ukraine’s major parties are not small, as Figure 4.1 illustrates.
Large numbers of precincts show turnout coefficients that are not only negative, but substantially
so. Such an outcome is highly unlikely to occur in a clean election, as discussed above, but a small
positive turnout coefficient cannot be easily regarded as suspicious—a party might simply have a
very low latent level of support in a region. As a conservative indicator of possible deflationary
manipulation, then, I code a dummy variable that takes on a value of one for regions with a negative
turnout coefficient. This binary variable, deflationary manipulation, is used as a dependent variable
in logit models.
4The alternative source of a negative coefficient, in which the party’s vote-share in the low-turnout precinct is highly
inflated, is not mathematically possible. In the running example, assuming that the party wins forty percent of votes
in the high-turnout precinct, it would have to win 390 votes in the low-turnout precinct (where only 100 votes are
cast) in order to produce a small negative turnout coefficient.
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Figure 4.1: Histogram of turnout coefficients for major pro-east parties (2002-2014)
The vote-share test, used for the second dependent variable, is conducted as follows. For each
election year, the precinct-level results are broken down by region. Within each region-year, the
results are broken out by party. I examine the results for the primary pro-eastern party for the
election year. The Rozenas test is then conducted on the results for each party, by region, according
the method described below.
In brief, when the distribution of a party’s vote-shares by precinct is plotted, the distribution will
exhibit random peaks that represent a clustering of precincts around particular vote-share values (see
Figure 4.2). By random chance, for example, a large number of precincts might report vote-shares
of 32 percent for the party, resulting in a peak at that value. In an election without falsification,
these peaks should be randomly distributed based on voters’ stochastic decisions to turn out and
cast their ballots one way or another. However, a particular kind of falsification will distort these
random patterns and produce statistically unlikely vote-share clusters (possibly, but not necessarily,
at values divisible by 5—55%, 60%, and so on). The test compares the ‘spikes’ in the actual vote
distribution to those produced randomly through bootstrapped samples of the observed precincts.
By comparing the real distribution with the hypothetical distributions, it is possible to estimate the
number of precincts per region where fraud is suspected.
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Figure 4.2: Vote-share density for the Party of Regions
Such non-random clusters can result from falsification due to human propensity to target
whole numbers when making up figures, but are more likely to reflect agents’ fulfillment of direct
specifications from their principals (Rozenas, 2017). Consequently, while this election forensic
technique is only an indicator of falsification, it is especially well-suited to answering the question at
hand since it allows for a test of how much agents engage in the kinds of behavior that can signal
loyalty to particular patrons. The measure is used to produce a count of suspicious precincts, which
is used as the dependent variable in Poisson models.
4.3.2 Explanatory variables
In order to test the theory, explanatory variable must capture patronage constraints and local
constraints against illegal electoral manipulation. Local constraints are operationalized, following
Harvey (2016), using the regional legislative margin of victory between the largest parties in regional
legislative elections and their largest political rival. This measure is lagged, so that it precedes the
national elections that produce estimates of manipulation that serve as dependent variables. Despite
Ukraine’s unitary system, elected regional legislatures do provide an opportunity for out-parties to
place constraints on the governing party (Romanova, 2013). Margins of victory in regional elections
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are also indicative of the underlying degree of contestation, which is undergirded by civil society
activism, media coverage, oligarchic influence, and other elements of local constraint.
The Ukraine case, with its dramatic political history, provides one unambiguous case of elevated
patronage consolidation during the period covered here: the 2012 legislative election, which takes place
during the Yanukovych presidency but prior to the Euromaidan crisis. This is the only instance in
which the political institutions of the country align with unified government under a patronage-based
party machine, the Party of Regions, and without a major political crisis. Following Yanukovych’s
victory in 2010, the pro-presidential Ukrainian constitution was restored, replacing the post-Orange
constitution that vested greater power in the parliament. Under the pro-parliament constitution,
Ukraine was more fully semi-presidential, with the president and prime minister controlling distinct
patronage pyramids. This division was especially acute after the 2006 legislative election, which
ushered in divided government under President Yushchenko and Prime Minister Yanukovych. The
2004 election, of course, takes place during the Orange Revolution and the attendant collapse of
the patronage networks organized around President Kuchma, a collapse which had its roots in the
earlier Kuchma-gate crisis. The 2012 election represents the height of patronage consolidation in
Ukraine, as well, since the in 2014 the Euromaidan revolution and subsequent conflict results in the
complete dissolution of the Party of Regions and a more fragmented political scene. A more detailed
description of these dynamics is provided by Hale (2014). This period is captured with a dummy
variable Yanukovych, which takes on a value of 1 for the 2012 legislative election.
The history sketched above also suggests that the two 2014 elections, which took place after
Yanukovych fled the country and in the midst of the collapse of the Party of Regions as a political
force, represent the nadir of patronage consolidation from the perspective of pro-eastern candidates.
Since this crisis was sparked by the mass pro-Europe protests and anti-Yanukovych demonstrates at
Kyiv’s Independence Square (Maidan Nezalezhnosti), a dummy variable labelled Post-maidan takes
on a value of 1 for these two elections.
4.3.3 Control variables
A set of control variables are included to help account for other possible explanations for
manipulation, or for innocent voting patterns that could appear suspicious using the election forensic
tools described above. One of these is an election-year variable: an indicator for presidential elections,
which may be more intense drivers of electoral manipulation (Simpser, 2013). The remaining controls
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are socioeconomic variables at the regional level, taken from Ukrainian government statistics. Since
greater education levels and economic development are thought to help deter electoral manipulation,
I include a measure of higher education as well as per capita income. The first of these measures the
number of people with post-secondary education in a region, per capita.5 The second is each region’s
gross regional product divided by its population. Population size is also included, since manipulation
may be more difficult to implement in larger polities. The urban share of the population is included,
because cities may be more vulnerable to forms of manipulation like vote-buying. As government
employees may be particular susceptible to political pressure and the use of administrative resources,
the number of government workers logged is used. Similarly, older Ukrainians are more likely to
be dependent on the state for regular pension dispersal and other services, and more liable to
administrative pressure. A measure of the number of citizens over sixty in each region, logged, is
included. For overviews of the political and socioeconomic correlates of electoral manipulation, see
Lehoucq (2003), Kitschelt and Wilkinson (2007), Stokes et al. (2013), and Schedler (2002).
4.4 Results
The results of this analysis are supportive of the consolidation-constraint model, and challenge
the local-information model of electoral manipulation. Table 4.1 reports the results of the turnout
coefficient models. The local-constraint model holds that regional party margin-east should have
a negative effect on deflationary manipulation against pro-eastern parties. The results in Table
4.1 show that this is the case during the non-Yanukovych years (Models 2) and non-Maidan years
(Model 3), while Figures 4.3 and 4.4 show the interaction effects. As predicted, the interaction of
regional party margin-east and Yanukovych shows that by 2012, the Party of Regions and its allies
were able to reduce the incidence of deflationary manipulation against their party nearly across the
board. Only in the regions of very highest levels of pro-Western support were they unable to reduce
deflationary manipulation, suggesting that agents in those areas still were willing to throw in their
lots with pro-western patronage networks.
Figure 4.3 shows that the reverse is also true. During the period of post-Maidan elections,
when pro-eastern patronage networks were suddenly fragmented by cascading crises, deflationary
5Unfortunately, this variable is only available from the 2001 Ukrainian census.
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Figure 4.3: Marginal effect of Yanukovych on negative turnout coefficients for pro-eastern parties
manipulation against pro-eastern candidates becomes more likely in regions with pro-eastern regional
legislatures, but not in pro-western regions. This result can be interpreted as a shift by agents away
from pro-eastern patronage networks and toward pro-western ones as the relative appeal of the
two options shifts. Where high risks for pro-western manipulation had previously made western
patronage offers less appealing than their eastern counterparts, the sudden de-consolidation of eastern
networks makes the competing offer more appealing. In pro-western regions, this effect is muted
since anti-eastern deflationary manipulation was already in practice in these regions due to low local
risks for such agents.
These results suggest that patronage networks and local risks both influence levels of election
manipulation, but how attributable are they to principal-agent dynamics? The next set of models,
using the number of possibly fraudulent precincts per region as the dependent variable, offers
additional support for the theoretical framework. Since the dependent variable is based on apparently
non-random clustering of precincts around specific vote-shares, it offers an indicator of agent
behavior—the fulfillment of vote-share targets set by principals. Given that the overall indicator
of manipulation provided by the turnout test almost universally detects deflationary rather than
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Dependent variable:
Deflationary manipulation (pro-east party)
(1) (2) (3)
Over sixty (log) 0.142 1.445 1.231
(1.313) (1.666) (1.465)
Gov. employees (log) −0.223 0.412 −0.334
(0.944) (1.154) (1.026)
Urban −2.348 −2.991 −0.045
(2.314) (2.907) (2.514)
Population (log) −0.705 −3.134 −1.727
(1.526) (1.988) (1.699)
Per capita income (log) 0.449∗∗ 2.480∗∗∗ 0.394
(0.224) (0.484) (0.316)
Ukrainian language share −0.017 −2.821∗∗ −2.275∗∗
(0.731) (1.302) (1.109)
Higher education 0.007 0.002 0.002
(0.006) (0.007) (0.006)
Presidential election 0.297 −2.233∗∗∗ 0.162
(0.337) (0.603) (0.368)
Orange Revolution 0.470 3.344∗∗∗ 0.448
(0.591) (0.863) (0.647)






Reg. party margin—east : Yanukovych −2.062
(3.793)
Post-maidan : Reg. party margin—east 2.333∗
(1.367)
Constant −0.610 −14.326 −4.142
(7.982) (10.952) (9.611)
Observations 226 222 222
Log Likelihood −147.29 −108.02 −135.70
Akaike Inf. Crit. 314.59 242.03 297.39
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.1: Logit models of negative turnout test coefficient
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Figure 4.4: Marginal effect of post-Maidan on negative turnout coefficients for pro-eastern parties
inflationary manipulation, I assume that the fraudulent precincts detected by the vote-share test are
generally indicators of deflationary manipulation as well.
As in the prior set of models, increasing local risks for pro-western agents results in reduced
evidence of falsification against pro-eastern parties, both during the Yanukovych presidency (Model 5)
and after the Maidan crisis (Model 6). The marginal effects of those shifts in patronage consolidation
are presented in Figures 4.5 and 4.6. Figure 4.5 shows that the effect of Yanukovych is negative at
all values of regional party margin, implying that the high consolidation of the pro-eastern patronage
network during that period strongly reduced the incentive for pro-western agents to engage in
deflationary manipulation. This effect is smallest in pro-eastern regions, where high local constraints
on pro-western agents made such manipulation difficult to achieve even during the pre-Yanukovych
period. The largest shifts occur in pro-western regions, where the apparent national dominance of the
Party of Regions machine removes an incentive for pro-western behavior by agents. Finally, Figure
4.6 shows the effect of the breakdown of that nationwide pro-eastern patronage network: an increase
in evidence of fraud affecting pro-eastern parties, which is especially sharp in pro-eastern regions. In
pro-western regions the effect of this shift in patronage consolidation is minimal, since such regions
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Figure 4.5: Marginal effect of Yanukovych on number of suspicious precincts
are already more closely aligned with pro-western parties, making anti-eastern manipulation easier
in the pre-crisis period. The effect is largest in pro-eastern regions where the sudden absence of a
consolidated pro-eastern network makes participation in pro-western efforts much more appealing. It
is important to note here, however, that this analysis excludes election results from several of the
most solidly pro-eastern regions—Donetsk, Luhansk, Crimea, and Sevastopol—where the Party of
Regions network might have been expected to survive in the absence of war and annexation.
Lastly, Figures 4.7 and 4.8 show the predicted number of suspect precincts per region, by regional
party margin—east and the variables that capture patronage consolidation, to illustrate substantive
significance. To produce the predicted counts, continuous control variables are held constant at their
mean values. The categorical controls presidential election and Orange Revolution were held constant
at zero. Figure 4.7 shows the near complete absence of suspicious precincts in heavily pro-eastern
regions, with little change when Yanukovych is president. By contrast, the predicted number of
suspicious precincts in a pro-western region is between twenty and forty in the non-Yanukovych
years, but falls to eastern levels during his presidency. Figure 4.8 shows that the Maidan crisis led to
a large jump in the predicted number of suspicious precincts across the board; while the absolute
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Dependent variable:
Number of suspicious precincts (pro-east parties)
(4) (5) (6)
Over sixty (log) −0.155 1.764∗∗∗ 1.304∗∗∗
(0.198) (0.237) (0.257)
Gov. employees (log) 0.309∗∗ 0.088 0.047
(0.137) (0.140) (0.136)
Urban −8.468∗∗∗ −7.478∗∗∗ −5.356∗∗∗
(0.445) (0.442) (0.450)
Population (log) 2.487∗∗∗ 0.563∗∗ 0.775∗∗
(0.251) (0.280) (0.310)
Per capita income (log) 0.301∗∗∗ 1.024∗∗∗ −0.343∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.042) (0.055)
Ukrainian language share 1.867∗∗∗ −0.424∗∗ −0.289
(0.136) (0.176) (0.185)
Higher education 0.010∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.007∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Presidential −0.449∗∗∗ −0.937∗∗∗ −0.299∗∗∗
(0.052) (0.054) (0.056)
Orange Revolution 0.916∗∗∗ 1.448∗∗∗ 0.321∗∗∗
(0.083) (0.086) (0.085)
Number of precincts 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗ 0.001∗∗∗
(0.00005) (0.00005) (0.00005)








Reg. party margin—east : Post-maidan 1.573∗∗∗
(0.120)
Constant −18.250∗∗∗ −31.401∗∗∗ −17.358∗∗∗
(1.371) (1.600) (1.660)
Observations 226 222 222
Log Likelihood −2,932.73 −2,482.33 −1,990.36
Akaike Inf. Crit. 5,887.46 4,992.67 4,008.72
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 4.2: Poisson models of suspicious precincts
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Figure 4.6: Marginal effect of Post-maidan on number of suspicious precincts
increase is largest in pro-western regions (from about 10 to about 50), the relative increase is larger
in pro-eastern regions (from near zero to about 20).
A quick back-of-the-envelope example demonstrates the number of votes at stake is substantively
significant, though not of overweening importance. In the 2007 Ukrainian legislative election, 450
seats in the Verkhovna Rada were allocated by proportional representation to parties winning
more than three percent of the national vote-share. Collectively these parties won approximately
twenty-one million votes, meaning that each seat in the Rada was worth about 46,000 votes. Given
that each precinct includes about 1,000 registered voters on average, the presence of thirty suspicious
precincts in a region might reflect deflationary manipulation that deprived a party of a few thousand
votes. Magnified across Ukraine’s regions, this kind of manipulation could conceivably adjust the
balance of power in the Rada by a handful of seats. And of course, falsification of this kind represents
only one technique available to parties.
4.5 Discussion and conclusion
Despite the difficulties of the case, Ukraine presents an important opportunity to test the
implications of the model, especially in comparison with Russia. Russia shares many institutional
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Figure 4.7: Predicted number of fraudulent precincts by Yanukovych
Figure 4.8: Predicted number of suspicious precincts, by post-Maidan
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and historical features with Ukraine (particularly in eastern parts of the country) as a result of
a shared imperial and Soviet experience. However, patterns of patronage consolidation and local
constraints vary considerably between the two states. Patronage consolidation has consistently
been much lower in Ukraine than in Russia during the period of analysis. A single party of power
largely dominates in Russia, while the party system in Ukraine is much more fragmented and fluid.
Oligarchic interests were largely tamed during the early years of the first Putin administration; rival
oligarchic clans continue to clash behind the scenes in Ukraine. The period in which Ukraine’s
parliamentary-presidential constitution was in force helped establish a two-pyramid structure of
patronage, in Hale’s (2014) terminology, while Russia continues to operate within a more consolidated
vertical of power.
As a result, we should expect to see different patterns of manipulation occur in the two cases.
First, while the direct comparison is not statistically tested here, widespread falsification does appear
to be considerably less common in Ukraine than in Russia. In the Russian case, suspicious results
were captured by the digits test in 24 percent of region-years, whereas in Ukraine the same figure
is approximately five percent—roughly what would be expected due to random chance alone.6
Furthermore, while inflationary manipulation is common in Russia, to the benefit of the ruling
party, suspicious turnout coefficients tend to be negative in Ukraine. This apparent emphasis on
deflationary techniques may be due to the lower levels of patronage consolidation in the country.
Since widespread voter mobilization and voter pressure campaigns can only be deployed by parties
that control substantial patronage resources, cheaper deflationary tactics may easier to pull off for
parties operating in a more fragmented patronage environment. This is a question that may be
usefully addressed in further work.
However, the main benefit of the case in the present study is derived from the rapid fluctua-
tion in patronage consolidation over time. Unlike the Mexican case (where patronage networks
are deconsolidating during the period of study) or the Russian case (where they remain highly
consolidated), Ukraine shifts from a fragmented patronage system after the Orange Revolution, to
one with considerable consolidation around the Party of Regions under President Yanukovych, and
6Note that the digits test results differ from those of the vote-share test presented here; the mean number of suspicious
precincts per region using the vote-share test is approximately 10 percent.
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subsequently back to a fragmented system after the 2014 crisis. The results shown here indicate that
the consolidation and constraint model is better suited to explaining electoral manipulation in this
kind of setting than is the local-information model; that is, while local conditions certainly matter
for explaining electoral manipulation, those conditions are also informed by the overall distribution
of patronage resources backing one party or another.
In particular, the election-forensic analysis conducted here shows that overall deflationary
manipulation targeting the Party of Regions became less severe during the Yanukovych presidency,
but only in regions where constraints on pro-western agents were high. It also found a corresponding
increase in deflationary manipulation in pro-eastern regions when the Party of Regions patronage
network collapsed. Analysis of the models using the vote-share test results as a dependent variable,
while only measuring one type of manipulation, provide further support for the principal-agent model
based on patronage and risk. In those models, higher patronage consolidation around the Party of
Regions led to a steep reduction in the number of suspicious precincts in pro-western regions; the
subsequent breakdown resulted in increased fraud across the board (with especially steep increases
in the east).
In sum, election-forensic analysis shows that overall electoral manipulation and specific signatures
of fraud both respond to shifts in local risks and national patronage consolidation in ways predicted
by the model. Where the Mexican case allowed for an investigation of the effects of shifting local
competition while holding patronage consolidation constant, the Ukrainian case allows for analysis
of shifting levels of patronage consolidation. Both cases demonstrate that the two factors can move
independently, and interactive effect the level of election manipulation that parties can achieve.
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CHAPTER 5
Punishment and protest—survey experimental evidence of the principal-agent
problem, Russia 2016
Illegal forms of electoral manipulation—like vote-buying, voter pressure, and falsification of
results—occur regularly in electoral authoritarian regimes and less consolidated democracies. As part
of a vibrant literature on the function of democratic institutions in authoritarian contexts, a growing
strand of research has worked to explain wide variation in the severity of electoral manipulation
across countries, subnational regions, and time. While a variety of socioeconomic and institutional
factors have been shown to affect the availability of manipulation as a tactic, the most important (and
contentious) factor at work appears to be the competitiveness of the election and the surrounding
political environment. Most recently, principal-agent models have been proposed to show how an
increase in the competitiveness of the election can cause the low-level actors tasked with carrying
out manipulation to refrain from doing so, especially in areas where the principal is less popular
than the national average (Rundlett and Svolik, 2016).
However, it is difficult to distinguish the empirical results of a principal-agent model from those
advanced in a well-established literature on election monitoring: namely, that political principals
direct electoral manipulation away from competitive areas and areas that are monitored by civil
society groups, international observers, and opposition parties. In the monitoring literature, this
is understood as an effort by leaders to reduce the risk that manipulation efforts will be exposed,
with the attendant loss of legitimacy and increased risk of protest. Both the principal-agent and
monitoring models of electoral manipulation expect that manipulation will be less likely in more
competitive regions, though they posit different causal mechanisms. It is difficult to test these
mechanisms outright, given the illegal nature of agents’ work and the extreme sensitivity of principals’
motives. Moreover, if the principal-agent model is correct, agents will avoid engaging in manipulation
in areas where they are likely to be punished for tampering with the election, and will not be
punished in safer pro-regime strongholds even if they do break electoral laws. As a result, patterns
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of agent exposure and punishment may not vary in a statistically detectable way across levels of
competitiveness.
This puts the study of electoral manipulation in a challenging position. An observable empirical
pattern of electoral manipulation can be explained by multiple theories, but the causal mechanisms
underpinning each theory are very difficult to test. This paper takes a different approach, in an
attempt to address this challenge. It uses survey-experimental questions, conducted in Russia in May
2016, to test attitudes toward the punishment of election-manipulating agents and toward protest
as a response to local acts of electoral manipulation. In doing so, it aims to illuminate part of the
incentive structure faced by both agents and principals. Specifically, it investigates how citizens
favor punishment for election-manipulating agents versus protest in response to tainted elections.
It finds that public opinion is generally supportive of criminal punishments for agents who tamper
with elections, that this is especially true of supporters of the largest opposition party, and that
supporters of that party appear to favor harsher punishments when elections are closer. However, it
finds no statistically significant variation in support for protest against electoral manipulation across
partisan groups, using a list experiment to reduce social desirability bias.
That partisanship conditions support for agent punishment implies that agents will be more
vulnerable in areas with more opposition supporters. This creates an incentive for authoritarian
regimes to allow agents who are publicly exposed carrying out election manipulation to face legal
punishment or other penalties, to forestall the opposition’s ability to call for such penalties as a
campaign issue. For an agent caught tampering with an election in an area with active opposition
groups, there is a risk that they will be abandoned by their principal in order to satisfy public
demand for punishment and to preserve the appearance that manipulation is conducted by overzealous
partisans rather than a systemic feature of the regime. By identifying a social foundation for agent
risk in competitive regions—the desire of opposition supporters for legal punishment of electoral
violations—the study shows partial support for the principal-agent models of electoral manipulation.
That partisanship does not condition support for electoral protest—and that support for such
collective action is low even when using a list experiment—is further evidence that the principal-agent
model best explains variation in manipulation. It also indicates a need for further investigation of the
concept of legitimacy costs and the connections between manipulation and protest. If political leaders
face only a small risk of mass protest when contemplating election manipulation, as these findings
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suggest, researchers and good-government reformers will need to look to alternative explanations
for variation in electoral integrity. These include greater attention to election-manipulating agents’
incentives, as elaborated in this project, but also the social psychology of citizens’ reactions to
allegations of electoral manipulation.
5.1 Public opinion and electoral manipulation
It is difficult to distinguish empirically between the predictions of a principal-agent model and a
principal-driven model of electoral manipulation; as discussed below, the two theories posit different
causal routes to the same predictions. Instead of testing outcomes, then, it is possible to test those
causal assumptions by studying public opinion on election manipulation, as one aspect of principals’
and agents’ incentive structure. While there is little previous work on this topic directly, related
work has been done in the study of corruption, which can provide some theoretical guidance. In
particular, individual partisanship and the closeness of elections appear to be important factors.
There are two main schools of thought about what factors can restrain ruling parties from
tampering with elections. A classic view places political leaders’ incentives at the theoretical
forefront. Scholars in this tradition have argued that leaders are reluctant to engage in electoral
manipulation when it is likely to be observed and criticized, in order to avoid costs to their legitimacy.
This logic is well-established. Birch (2011) argues that leaders choose a mix of manipulation tactics
in part based on the observability of manipulation and the associated legitimacy costs. Exposure of
election manipulation may lead to international penalties (Hyde, 2011) or large-scale domestic protest
(Tucker, 2007). In fact, the risk protest in response to election manipulation is often considered to
be the primary factor that might deter a party from engaging in electoral malfeasance (Magaloni,
2010; Fearon, 2011).
It might be reasonable to suggest that, fearing the exposure of electoral manipulation, incumbents
target their efforts in regions where manipulation is unlikely to be observed by opponents—that
is, in the regions where the ruling party is strongest. Indeed, there is considerable evidence that
electoral manipulation is less severe in places where it can be more effectively monitored (Sjoberg,
2013), and that manipulation suppressed by monitors ‘spills over’ into unmonitored districts (Ichino
and Schündeln, 2012). Traditionally these patterns have been interpreted as the result of strategic
decisions by leaders not to devote resources toward manipulation in territories where it is likely
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to be discovered. Altogether, these models do not consider low-level agents’ incentives to be of
much theoretical importance; if the political leader gives the order, the machinery of manipulation is
assumed to hum to life.
Principal-agent models of manipulation acknowledge that political leaders rely on thousands of
front-line agents, whose task it is to actually distribute payments to voters, organize multiple-voting
efforts, stuff ballot boxes, and more. These agents may not share the same incentives as their
political bosses, leading to suboptimal outcomes for the principal. Rundlett and Svolik (2016)
demonstrate formally that the competitiveness of elections affects agents’ behavior. When the
election is uncompetitive and the principal appears likely to win, large numbers of agents are willing
to engage in manipulation on the leader’s behalf, in order to share in the principal’s patronage
rewards. This leads to excessive levels of manipulation and high margins of victory. On the other
hand, during closer elections, agents’ discount the principal’s post-election ability to deliver patronage,
and become increasingly fearful of punishment if the opposing side wins. This causes some agents to
refuse to engage in manipulation, especially in more competitive districts, leading to narrow margins
of victory amid allegations of manipulation. Their model is driven by information; local conditions
give agents insight into the overall state of the election, but on their own do not constrain agents.
Principal-agent models are theoretically compelling, in that they purport to explain two puzzling
patterns of electoral manipulation. However, empirical support for these sorts of models remains
underdeveloped. As a first test of their model, Rundlett and Svolik (2016) show that evidence of
electoral fraud during the 2011 election in Russia is lower in regions with stronger opposition parties
than in regions where the ruling party dominates. However, this pattern would also be consistent
with existing, principal-focused explanations for variation in electoral manipulation. In particular,
previous studies have argued that
As models in which electoral manipulation is constrained by agents’ risk—not by cautious
principals—principal-agent theories do have some empirical support, though the proposition remains
understudied. It is well-known that agents can be punished if their patron loses office (Levitsky, 2003;
Hale, 2006), and anecdotal evidence suggests that agents who are exposed after engaging in election
manipulation may face local penalties even if their patron wins the overall election. Even a winning
principal may face pressure from opposition groups to hand agents over to the courts, for example, or
to strip them of party rank or public office. In competitive areas, where opposition groups are more
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active, principals may give in to this pressure. For example, in Russia (a nationally uncompetitive
case), the chair of a local election commission was fined 200,000 rubles in 2009 (approximately half
the average yearly income), after being convicted of falsifying ballots on behalf of the ruling party.1
Similarly, in 2016, another local precinct commissioner was fined 210,000 rubles for spoiling ballots
cast for an opposition party.2
The challenge facing researchers of election manipulation, however, is that tools like election-
forensic analysis cannot distinguish between the principal-only and principal-agent theories, since
they rely on different logics to predict similar outcomes. Furthermore, a direct test of the principal-
agent model by studying punishment of agents is infeasible. If the data-generating process described
by the principal-agent model is correct, the punishment of election-manipulating agents should
be rare across the spectrum of competitiveness. In non-competitive districts, agents will not face
punishment due to the support of the local political machine, while in competitive districts agents
will strategically reduce electoral manipulation efforts in order to avoid punishment. A statistically
null result is likely to appear as a result, even if the underlying process described by the theory is
true.
In the absence of such a direct test, the next best approach is to test the propositions that
undergird the two theories. How serious is the risk of post-election protest for leaders? If support
for such actions is low, it would call into question the causal story in the principal-led models of
manipulation. And how strongly does the public support severe punishments for individuals caught
tampering with elections? If support for criminal punishment is high, risks to exposed agents are
likely to be intensified by political pressure. Public opinion acts as a latent resource that political
parties, media outlets, and other elite actors can attempt to shape and utilize (Aldrich, 1995; Hooghe
and Marks, 2005; Chong and Druckman, 2007), even in non-democratic regimes (Levitsky and Way,
2010; Schatz, 2009). If public opinion strongly disapproves of individuals who tamper with elections,
1This information was taken from the Honest Elections Public Council, a Kremlin-approved non-governmental agency
that maintained a list of arrests, administrative charges, and criminal proceedings against individuals who have
allegedly helped manipulate an election. The organization and website are now defunct, but an archive is available at
https://web.archive.org/web/20170809084414/http://www.chest-vibor.ru/chronicles/.
2A summary of this event is available (in Russian) from the election-monitoring NGO Golos at http://www.golosinfo.
org/ru/articles/100921.
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opposition parties may be more inclined to make manipulation incidents into political issues, in
order to discredit the incumbent and bolster their own chances. Such efforts help opposition parties
play a two-level game, by raising their profile in the election at hand while also helping them press
for liberalizing reforms to the electoral process (Schedler, 2002). On the other hand, authoritarian
governments may attempt to shore up their support by allowing limited exposure of misdeeds by
low-level officials (Lorentzen, 2013), while aggressively censoring information that could lead to
collective action (King et al., 2013).
Though research on public opinion and electoral manipulation is sparse, there is a well-developed
literature on the analogous topic of political corruption, which can provide a useful platform for the
study of attitudes toward election-manipulating actors. Both are illegal, often covert activities, and
both corruption (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003; Chong et al., 2015; Davis et al., 2004; Gingerich,
2009; Seligson, 2002; Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2013) and electoral manipulation (Birch, 2010;
Carreras and İrepoğlu, 2013) have been found to have negative effects on political participation,
trust, and evaluations of the government.
Similarly, research on how people evaluate the fairness of elections (that is, how they decide
whether it was fair or rigged) may offer insight into how people might react to manipulation. Such
evaluations have been shown to be conditional on respondents’ partisanship (Beaulieu, 2014; Cantú
and García-Ponce, 2015), whether the respondent expected her party to win the election (Hollander,
2014) and whether it did so (Sances and Stewart III, 2015). In addition, the closeness of elections
has been shown to affect judgments about the fairness of elections (Wolak, 2014). If the effect of
competitiveness on voters’ attitudes is a rational one, as Singh et al. (2012) and Blais et al. (2015)
argue, voters on the losing side may take a more negative view of election-manipulating agents in
close elections (see also Thompson and Kuntz (2004), and Kuntz and Thompson (2009)). If, instead,
voters are more responsive to normative concerns about the quality of democracy (Cho and Kim,
2016), the effect of competitiveness on attitudes toward manipulation should be minimal.
5.2 Theory: Competitiveness, electoral manipulation, and public opinion
Political candidates and party leaders can benefit in multiple ways from engaging in electoral
manipulation. They improve their chances of winning, build and maintain networks of clients (Harvey
2016), and send signals to other political actors (Simpser, 2013). However, candidates and leaders
cannot deliver these benefits singlehandedly. Instead, they rely on large networks of agents whose
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actions influence the results. These networks are usually organized as pyramids, with small numbers
of high-level actors overseeing a larger number of actors at lower levels (Auyero, 2007; Knoke, 1990;
Levitsky, 2003). A leader at the national level can be linked to a large number of local agents
through intermediaries like governors and party officials, as a result.
This reliance on low-level actors to carry out electoral manipulation efforts opens up the possibility
that principals’ and agents’ incentives may diverge, leading to less-than-optimal outcomes for political
leaders. As Rundlett and Svolik (2016) depict in their formal model, agents may produce far more
manipulation than is necessary to win the election when the incumbent is popular (and agents
feel secure in illegally affecting the outcome). However, when the incumbent’s position looks less
secure, agents who operate in more competitive districts will withhold their efforts, hoping to avoid
punishment if the opposition takes power. Their model assumes that agents are well informed about
local political conditions, an assumption that is well supported in by previous work (Stokes et al.,
2013; Zarazaga, 2014).
As discussed above, few researchers have studied public attitudes toward the act of electoral
manipulation. If public opinion favors punishment for those who tamper with elections, two
mechanisms are possible, with implications for understanding the principal-agent dynamic. First,
citizens might generally favor stronger punishment for electoral manipulation in close elections
compared to non-competitive elections. This would be consistent with the idea that ‘stolen’ elections
are more objectionable to citizens than elections in which the outcome was not in doubt (Tucker,
2007) and the finding that respondents are more forgiving of those who sell their vote to the party
they already support (Gonzalez Ocantos et al., 2014). Such a result would also help confirm the
information-based mechanism advanced by Rundlett and Svolik (2016). If respondents’ willingness
to punish election manipulators is conditional purely on the closeness of the election, it suggests
that agents will primarily keep their eye on the overall state of the race. Close national elections are
risky for agents, in this view, and local conditions serve primarily as an indicator of the national
environment.
Hypothesis 1: Respondents will favor stronger punishments for election manipulating
agents in more competitive elections than in uncompetitive elections.
However, it is also possible that local political conditions do more than inform agents about
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national trends, and instead create risks that actively constrain agents at the local level. The
presence of a locally assertive opposition party, in particular, may increase the risk to agents of
participating in a manipulation effort. For example, opposition-party representation on election
commissions makes it easier to expose acts of tampering (Kovalov, 2014; Bader, 2012; Calingaert,
2006), and opposition party figures are more likely to pursue court cases against election irregularities
in regions where the governing party does not dominate the local courts (Popova, 2006). The local
mix of partisan affiliation may also affect the risk to election-manipulating agents, if attitudes toward
election manipulators are conditional on respondents’ partisanship.
From the literature on public attitudes toward corruption, it is clear that individuals evaluate
political corruption differently based on their partisan affiliation (Anderson and Tverdova, 2003;
Eggers and Spirling, 2014), a result that is mirrored by research on attitudes toward the overall
fairness of elections (Beaulieu, 2014; Cantú and García-Ponce, 2015; Hollander, 2014; Sances and
Stewart III, 2015). In both cases, respondents are consistently more likely to overlook (or even favor)
acts of corruption or electoral manipulation if they are conducted by co-partisans. These earlier,
related results suggest that partisan affiliation is likely to condition attitudes toward those who
engage in electoral manipulation. Such a result would suggest that hostility towards election-rigging
is not widespread across citizens, but confined to particular parties. It would also be in line with
the view that opposition parties in electoral authoritarian regimes draw on ideologically committed
supporters (Greene, 2007). If the local-constraints version of the principal-agent model is correct,
willingness to punish agents should be grounded in partisanship.
Hypothesis 2: Opposition-party supporters will support stronger punishments for election-
manipulation agents than supporters of the dominant party.
Finally, it may be the case that the competitiveness of the election and respondents’ partisan
affiliation interact to affect attitudes toward agents, as has been shown to be the case for related
issues. For example, supporters of the losing party in an election are more dissatisfied with democracy
following close elections than uncompetitive elections, while winners show the opposite pattern
(Howell and Justwan, 2013). This would also be in line with the literature on ‘stolen’ elections
(Tucker, 2007). Here it is important to distinguish between supporters of the largest opposition
party, which has a chance to meaningfully challenge the ruling party, and smaller opposition groups
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which do not (Wolak, 2014). Support for this hypothesis would indicate that agents face elevated
risks only in areas where a party with a high national profile is active and popular.
Hypothesis 3: The effect of competitiveness on attitudes toward election-manipulating
agents will be conditional on partisanship, with supporters of large opposition parties
favoring stronger punishments in close elections.
The foregoing three hypotheses are intended to test different versions of the principal-agent
model of manipulation. The competing theory holds that principals withdraw their agents from
competitive territories in order to forestall post-election protest. If the principal-oriented theory,
focused on legitimacy costs, is correct, it is likely that supporters of opposition parties will be more
likely to endorse protests as a response to electoral manipulation than supporters of the ruling party;
principals can get away with manipulation in areas where their supporters predominate, but are
forced to avoid manipulation in pro-opposition territories.
Hypothesis 4: Opposition-party supporters will be more likely to support electoral protest
than ruling-party supporters.
5.3 Data and methods
In order to test these hypotheses, two survey experimental questions were incorporated into a
monthly omnibus conducted by the Levada Center—an established, independent Russian survey
organization—in May 2016.3 The nationally representative sample is made up of individuals randomly
selected based on their physical addresses; these individuals were interviewed face-to-face by Levada
Center employees. As interviewers progressed through their routes, they alternated treatment and
control versions of the questionnaire, randomly assigning respondents to treatment or control groups.
All told, the survey reached 1,602 respondents. The Levada Center provided a standard battery of
socioeconomic data on each respondent, including: age, gender, work status, income, education level,
and self-reported vote history.
In particular, respondents are asked to provide their vote choice in the 2011 parliamentary
3The survey took place prior to the Levada Center’s designation as a “foreign agent” by the Russian Ministry of
Justice in September 2016.
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Figure 5.1: Partisan vote-choice, 2011 election
election (the most recent at the time of the survey). As Figure 5.1 shows, a plurality of respondents
reported voting for the ruling party, while the next two largest categories are non-voters and those
who declined to answer. The Communist Party of the Russian Federation (KPRF) is Russia’s
primary parliamentary opposition party, though it has been considerably tamed by the Kremlin since
the more freewheeling 1990s. It is the next largest category of voters, followed by smaller groups
who supported the Liberal Democratic Party of Russia (a nationalist party) or the social democratic
party A Just Russia (see Golosov 2012 for an overview of Russia’s party system). Supporters of
various minor parties make up the smallest group.
The Russian case is a useful one for testing the implications of the principal-agent model. While
the country has become increasingly authoritarian under the government of Vladimir Putin, it holds
regular multiparty elections at multiple levels. Opposition parties, along with civil society groups,
actively monitor elections (Buzin et al., 2016). When acts of electoral manipulation are exposed,
opposition parties regularly press for investigations and criminal charges. From time to time, they
are even successful: in recent years, election commissioners found guilty of tampering on behalf
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of the ruling party have received fairly stiff sentences under the criminal code (Golos, 2015). The
existence of an active, if fairly subdued opposition, suggests that if principal-agent dynamics are at
work in Russia, they will be fairly hard to detect, making it a tough case for testing the theory.
Other factors that are known to affect attitudes toward acts of corruption, discussed above, can
either be held constant by a one-country case selection strategy, or distributed randomly between
treatment and control groups in a survey experiment. The first category of causes includes the state
of the economy, while the second includes the availability of information, clarity of responsibility for
corruption, the level at which corruption takes place, and the salience of the issue for individuals
and for national politics. Likewise, a single-country survey experimental design holds constant (or
distributes randomly) socioeconomic and political factors that can influence how widespread and
severe electoral manipulation is, which could in turn affect respondents’ attitudes. These include
socioeconomic inequality (Lehoucq and Molina, 2002; Ziblatt, 2009), poverty (Stokes, 2005; Nichter,
2008), education levels (Kitschelt and Wilkinson, 2007), population size (Larreguy et al., 2016),
ethnicity (Goodnow et al., 2014) and urbanization (Birch, 2011). In addition, the type of electoral
institutions (Birch, 2007) and the level of economic corruption (Birch, 2011) are understood to affect
the appeal of manipulation as a strategy for incumbents.
The first experimental question is a vignette experiment, which was designed to elicit attitudes
toward those who engage in election manipulation. Vignette experiments allow the researcher to
evaluate whether respondents’ view of a subject changes when the nature of the subject, or the context
of the question, is changed. This technique has been used to study a variety of sensitive subjects
(e.g. Gilens (1996), Corrigan and Watson (2007), Wirth and Bodenhausen (2009), and Felson and
Feld (2009)). Since the experimental format does not require a single individual to simultaneously
compare two sensitive subjects, social desirability bias and design effects can be reduced. Instead,
the researcher is able to extract variation in attitudes from the treatment and control groups overall.
This format is well-suited to identifying average attitudes toward election-manipulating agents, a
sensitive topic, in competitive and non-competitive elections.
The text of the survey questions are presented below, with the treatment condition listed in
bold and the control version following in brackets. Russian-language versions are provided in the
appendix.
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Q1. Imagine a close [uncompetitive] election is taking place, in which no one [everyone]
knows which party will win. Now imagine that a local election official is caught tampering
with the election results in his precinct. In your opinion, how severely should this electoral
crime should be punished, compared to an ordinary crime like stealing a car? Should the
election official be punished
• Much less severely than someone who steals a car
• Somewhat less severely
• About the same
• Somewhat more severely, or
• Much more severely than someone who steals a car
The question calls attention to the competitiveness of the election twice, to reduce the chance
that the respondent does not notice the treatment. It pegs one form of illegal activity—election
manipulation—to another form of illegal activity, in order to reduce social desirability bias further
(which may be exacerbated by the in-person survey method). The respondent is not being asked to
agree or disagree with tampering with elections, but rather to compare punishments for two clearly
illegal activities. There should be little shame in advocating harsher penalties for car thieves than
for ballot-stuffers, or vice versa. Vehicle theft was chosen as the point of comparison in order to
avoid floor and ceiling effects, in the expectation that comparison to a substantial property crime
would split respondents more evenly than comparison to a minor property crime (e.g. shoplifting)
or to violent crimes. To my knowledge, this question is the first attempt in the literature to gauge
public opinion of those who carry out election manipulation, rather than attitudes toward recipients
like vote-sellers or public opinion on the overall level of manipulation.
The second question is aimed at attitudes toward protest. While all protest is in a sense political,
the four control items in the question are intended to be purely economic. These sorts of protest
are relatively common in Russia, used as a means of drawing the Kremlin’s attention to particular
economic problems. Such protests may challenge local authorities, but do not undercut the authority
of the president or the national ruling party. The treatment condition includes a fifth, sensitive item
concerning illegal electoral manipulation by local officials. The text is as follows.
Q2. Sometimes public protests occur in Russia. I am going to read you a list of [four]
five events, which could lead people to participate in a protest. In your opinion, how
many of these events would justify protest? You do not need to tell me which items in
particular would justify protest, just the overall number.
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• A pothole on a side road has not been repaired for several weeks
• Unpaid wages by a local employer for several months
• A one-percent increase in income taxes
• A major reduction in benefits for retirees
• Local officials trying to illegally influence the outcome of elections
The individual responses to each question constitute the dependent variables of this study. Since
the response variable for Q1 is ordered, the results are analyzed using ordered logistic regression
models. Since Q2 is a list experiment, it is analyzed using the methods for dealing with sensitive-item
surveys proposed by Imai (2011) and Blair and Imai (2012). Mutz (2011) advocates against control
variables in vignette experiments, since the randomization procedure should already ‘control’ for
correlation between the dependent variable and non-treatment variables (and statistical hypothesis
testing already accounts for the possibility of a spurious correlation appearing by chance). Introducing
theoretically unnecessary covariates has the negative effect of introducing noise into the model and
inflating standard errors. However, when there are theoretically grounded reasons to believe that
the treatment effect will be mediated by certain characteristics of the population, covariates may
be included as interaction terms with the treatment. Since the effect of partisan alignment is of
theoretical interest, I include separate models in which this covariate interacts with the treatment.
Partisan affiliation indicates which party, if any, the respondent voted for the in the 2011 legislative
election.
5.4 Results
5.4.1 Legal punishment for election-manipulating agents
Figure 5.2, below, presents a histogram of the response variable divided intro treatment and
control groups. This raw data illustrates two results. First, respondents are generally supportive
of criminal punishment for those who tamper with elections. While it is clear that respondents
gravitated toward the middle option (indicating that the punishment for such electoral crimes should
be roughly equivalent to that for stealing a car), it is also clear that those who believe manipulation
should be punished ‘much more severely’ outnumber those who favored much less severe punishment
by approximately three to one . In Russia, theft can be punished with up to two years in prison
(Criminal Code of the Russian Federation, Section VIII, Article 158). While this is not a statistical
test, the survey shows that Russian respondents favor criminal punishment for election-manipulating
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Severity Much less Less Same More Much more
N (%) 102 (6) 225 (14) 613 (38) 309 (19) 346 (22)
Table 5.1: Distribution of support for punishment of election-manipulation agents
Figure 5.2: Histogram of support for punishment of election-manipulating agents by experimental
groups
agents, a fact which argues in favor of a principal-agent understanding of manipulation patterns.
However, the histogram also indicates that there is no significant difference between the treatment
and control groups as a whole. Indeed, the mean response in the control group was 3.36 (indicating
a preference for punishments somewhat more severe than for car theft), while in the treatment
group the mean response was 3.35. Model 1 in Table 5.2 shows that there is indeed no statistically
significant difference between the treatment and control groups’ response to the question. As a
result, Hypothesis 1 is not supported: competitiveness of the election alone does not generate broadly
higher levels of demand for punishment of electoral manipulation.
However, this apparent homogeneity obscures important partisan differences. Model 2 excludes
the treatment variable and focuses on partisanship alone. The model includes dummy variables for
supporters of the Communist Party of the Russian Federation, the Liberal Democratic Party, minor
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parties, those who declined to answer, non-voters, and United Russia. The ruling party, United
Russia, serves as the baseline category. Individuals who voted for the KPRF are significantly more
likely to favor harsher punishments for election manipulators, compared to supporters of the ruling
party. This supports Hypothesis 2: supporters of Russia’s largest opposition party are likely to
support harsher punishments for election-manipulators than are the supporters of other parties.
Furthermore, KPRF voters are more likely to hold this position regardless of the competitiveness of
the election, suggesting that they are more likely to view electoral manipulation as a problem in and
of itself.
Model 3 includes the interaction of the treatment variable, electoral competitiveness, with partisan
affiliation. The results of this model suggest that partisanship matters for how individuals evaluate
election-manipulating agents in competitive and non-competitive elections, especially among the
supporters of smaller parties. However, it only suggests tentative support for Hypothesis 3, which
applies to the KPRF. No statistically significant effect of the interaction of KPRF support and
competitiveness is found at the traditional p < .05 level. However, Figure 3 shows that the marginal
effect of KPRF support is positive and just short of this threshold for competitive elections.
Additional analysis of the data also suggests an interaction effect. Figure 5.4 depicts the density
of simulated average treatment effects on the treated for United Russia supporters and KPRF
supporters. The results show clear differences in the estimated effect of electoral competition on the
two parties’ supporters’ attitudes toward criminal punishment for election manipulators. Treatment
has essentially no effect on United Russia supporters; the peak of the distribution is tightly centered
around zero. By contrast, a competitive election appears to make criminal punishment for election-
manipulating agents substantially more appealing to KPRF supporters. These results must be
interpreted with caution, given the size of the two samples: 68 KPRF supporters were exposed to
the treatment condition and 72 to the control, while the figures for United Russia supporters are 299
treated and 315 in control. Nevertheless, these results offer tentative support for Hypotheses 3.
Figures 5.5 through 5.7 show the predicted probability of respondents choosing each level of
punishment, comparing treatment and control conditions. The figures show clear patterns. For the
LDPR and A Just Russia (as well as minor parties), a negative interaction can be seen in which
respondents who considered a competitive election were more likely to support punishments that
were as strict as for stealing a car or less. The effect is quite sizable. For example, supporters of
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Figure 5.3: Marginal effect of KPRF support on attitudes toward punishment of election-manipulating
agents, by treatment condition
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Minor parties 0.141 1.273∗∗
(0.367) (0.563)




Treatment : A Just Russia −1.455∗∗
(0.628)
Treatment : KPRF 0.211
(0.336)
Treatment : LDPR −1.204∗∗
(0.473)
Treatment : Minor parties −1.940∗∗∗
(0.737)
Treatment : No answer 0.439∗
(0.258)
Treatment : Non-voters −0.038
(0.229)
Observations 1,595 1,595 1,595
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table 5.2: Ordered logit models of Question 1 (punishment for election-manipulating agents)
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A Just Russia have a thirty percent probability of supporting much more severe punishment in
non-competitive elections, but only a ten percent probability in competitive elections.
As shown in Figure 5.6, non-voters and United Russia voters behave in the same way: their
willingness to punish election-manipulating agents does not change with the competitiveness of the
election. This suggests that supporters of the ruling party, like non-voters, are tenuously connected
to the electoral process. They are generally supportive of penalties for those who manipulate
elections, but the degree of competitiveness does not influence their thinking. These respondents
make up approximately sixty percent of the nationally representative sample. The bulk of citizens,
then—those who support the ruling party or are disengaged from national politics—do not appear
to evaluate electoral manipulation in partisan terms. Nor, as Model 2 shows, do they appear to be
more willing to punish electoral manipulation in close elections, when manipulation may make a
difference in the outcome.
Finally, supporters of the KPRF and those who declined to answer show a positive interactive
effect in Figure 5.7; they generally support stiffer penalties for tampering in more competitive
elections. That these two groups behave similarly is suggestive that both groups are generally
opposition supporters. These are the only groups who appear to be motivated by pragmatic concerns,
being more willing to punish election manipulation during more competitive races.
5.4.2 Support for electoral protest
Table 5.3 shows the analysis of Q2, where respondents’ support for protest is the dependent
variable. Model 4 shows the results for the non-sensitive control items, while Model 5 models the
final, sensitive item: protest in response to electoral manipulation. As the results show, supporters
of the LDPR and those who withheld their party affiliation are more likely to protest on economic
issues than supporters of the ruling party (the base category). However, no partisan group is more
likely to support protests based on local electoral malfeasance. Figure 5.8 illustrates this pattern,
presenting the estimated proportion of each party group that responded to the sensitive item. The
proportion of respondents who would support protests against electoral manipulation ranges from
approximately 40 to 50 percent across the different electoral groups, with no statistically significant
variation. Partisan affiliation, by itself, does not appear to increase support for electoral protest.
This is a substantively important finding. If partisan affiliation does not condition support for
electoral protest, it indicates that areas with more United Russia voters (for example) will not
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Figure 5.5: Treatment effects for smaller parties
(4) (5)
Coef. (control) SE (Control) Coef. (Treatment) SE (Treatment)
(Intercept) 2.120 0.065 0.400 0.101
Just Russia -0.454 0.329 0.293 0.432
KPRF 0.144 0.165 0.099 0.252
LDPR 0.438∗∗ 0.188 -0.021 0.318
Minor parties -0.254 0.291 0.460 0.541
No answer 0.241∗∗ 0.114 -0.411 0.182
Non voters -0.001 0.108 -0.061 0.164
(∗∗ p < 0.05)
Table 5.3: Item count technique regression (maximum likelihood) model of support for protest
121
Figure 5.6: Treatment effects for United Russia and non-voters
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Figure 5.7: Treatment effects for KPRF and refusals
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Figure 5.8: Estimated proportion of respondents answering the sensitive item in the affirmative by
self-reported vote-choice in the 2011 election
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necessarily be areas with a reduced risk of protest if manipulation is uncovered there. This challenges
the theory that electoral manipulation is diverted to such regions in order to reduce the legitimacy
costs of election-tampering and mitigate protest risk. Together with the previous results which
indicate that partisan affiliation does appear to condition local attitudes toward punishment of
agents, , they imply that agent-level dynamics may be a more proximate cause for variation in
patterns of electoral manipulation. It also suggests that, while local conditions may do more work in
explaining variation in manipulation, national conditions may be more effective at explaining protest.
These conditions may include the overall competitiveness of the election, which could not be tested
in the list experiment due to logistical constraints in the survey, or the organizational capacity and
strategic decision-making of opposition groups. It does not appear, however, that partisan affiliation
drives public opinion toward manipulation and protest in a way that can provide a ready-made
resource for party leaders.
5.5 Discussion
These results help distinguish between competing explanations for the fact that more competitive
districts frequently exhibit less severe electoral manipulation. While the results are not completely
dispositive, they do suggest that principal-agent dynamics are an important part of the explanation.
In Russia, a tough case given its difficult history with multiparty democracy, public opinion is
generally supportive of stiff penalties for individuals who engage in electoral manipulation; this is
especially true of supporters of the largest opposition party. This helps explain anecdotal evidence
of criminal punishment for election commissioners caught tampering with the vote in their precincts:
public support for such actions makes the pursuit of criminal penalties an appealing tactic for
opposition parties and opposition-minded civil society groups, and makes shielding agents politically
difficult for local authorities.
The experimental aspect of the project also helps better understand the causal mechanisms that
underpin the principal-agent dynamic. It may be the case that agents are primarily interested in
the national state of the race; certainly if their principal is defeated, the likelihood of patronage
rewards diminishes sharply and the risk of political punishment rises accordingly. However, this
view does not fully capture the risk that agents evaluate when weighing the costs and benefits of
electoral malfeasance. Even when the principal remains in place following the election, local penalties
can still be applied—as the unlucky Russian election commissioners subjected to six-figure ruble
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fines can attest. The experimental data suggest that Russians as a whole do not support harsher
punishments for election manipulation during competitive elections compared to non-competitive
ones. Consequently, the national incentive-structure for agents does not change sharply as elections
become more competitive. Instead, that risk structure appears to be more likely to be conditional on
local partisan balances. Supporters of the KPRF are more willing to punish electoral manipulation
that supporters of other parties, and appear somewhat more likely to support harsher punishments
in close elections; a larger pool of KPRF supporters in a region is thus likely to make electoral
manipulation exceptionally risky for agents.
Finally, the list-experiment conducted for Question 2 found fairly deep support for protest as
a response to electoral manipulation; across different partisan groups about half of respondents
were estimated to approve of such collective action. This indicates that electoral manipulation is
indeed a risky endeavor for political principals. However, no differences across partisan groups were
detected. This suggests that higher levels of support for electoral protest among opposition groups
may not be a plausible explanation for reductions in electoral manipulation in more competitive
areas. This complicates explanations for variation in manipulation that are based on legitimacy costs.
Of course, further research on the role of public opinion in shaping patterns of electoral manipulation
is necessary. For example, even if attitudes toward electoral protest are consistent across partisan
groups, legitimacy-cost explanations may still be important if opposition supporters are easier to
mobilize after tainted elections.
This research has broader implications as well. It suggests that, while normative support for
clean elections is reasonably well entrenched even in an electoral authoritarian case like Russia,
the depth of that support is at least somewhat conditional on partisan affiliation. This is in line
with research on public support for democracy, and implies that the conditionality of support for
democracy in the abstract extends to more concrete threats to democratic accountability, like rigged
elections. Finally, these results may not be generalizable to more closed authoritarian regimes, where
partisan competition is more restrained and governments rely more on repression than on supportive
public opinion.
5.6 Conclusion
Public attitudes toward electoral manipulation, those who engage in it, and protest as a response
to it are all relatively under-studied. Investigating these attitudes can help establish the micro-
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foundations for theories that purport to explain variation in manipulation and its consequences. This
paper represents a first attempt at using survey experimental techniques to analyze a problem that
would otherwise be very difficult to untangle. Does manipulation diminish in competitive regions as
a result of principal-agent dynamics, or as a result of careful allocation of resources by principals?
The same empirical electoral patterns might be explained by either theory; qualitative research,
though useful, would be difficult to carry out in the context of law-breaking agents and high-level
political principals.
Instead, this project has attempted to analyze the incentive structure around electoral manip-
ulation for agents and principals, by studying public opinion on criminal penalties for agents and
protest against principals. It has found evidence to support the principal-agent view of manipulation:
respondents clearly favor criminal penalties for agents who tamper with elections. This effect is most
pronounced among supporters of the largest opposition party. It also found tentative support for
the claim that competitive elections encourage supporters of the primary opposition party to favor
harsher punishments. At the same time, partisan affiliation does not appear to affect respondents’
attitudes toward anti-manipulation protest. This suggests that, if principals are withdrawing agents
from competitive districts, it is not likely in response to the risk that the regime will suffer legitimacy
costs if manipulation is exposed. That is, even ruling-party supporters appear willing to support
protest against electoral manipulation. Instead, the results lend support to a principal-agent model
of manipulation, in which agents who are well-informed about local conditions avoid engaging in
manipulation as local conditions become riskier for them personally.
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APPENDIX A
A.1 Appendix A overview
The following appendix includes additional information and robustness checks in support of the
analysis presented in the main text. The first section presents histograms for the raw and centered
/ scaled local opposition data, along with a histogram of the final variable. The second section
presents models using local opposition as a measure of local constraints, but with a new measure
of patronage consolidation: executive constraints from the Polity dataset. In the third and fourth
sections, additional non-electoral measures of local constraints are used. These are expert ratings of
local openness and a dummy variable for ethnic republics, respectively. Fifth, a series of models
of vote-buying/voter pressure and administrative fraud are conducted, after dropping one year’s
worth of data, in order to check for misleading results driven by outlying years. A sixth section
presents multilevel models of the two dependent variables. Seventh, robustness checks show that the
assumptions underlying the interaction effects shown in the main article are supported. Next, maps
are provided that illustrate the estimates of falsification and vote-buying / voter pressure by region
and year. Finally, OLS models are compared with FGLS models of vote-buying / voter pressure.
A.2 Raw and centered / scaled data for local opposition
The following histograms show the distributions of legislative and gubernatorial competitiveness,
before and after centering and scaling by variance. The range of each variable is similar, as is the
leftward skew (elevated competition is more common than restricted competition). The distribution
of the final variable, local opposition is also shown.
Variables and descriptive statistics
Table A.1 presents correlation coefficients for the three explanatory variables and the two
dependent variables, showing the modest negative correlation between any fraud and absentee
coefficient. Table A.2 provides descriptive statistics for all variables used in the study.
Local opposition and executive constraints
As an alternative measure of patronage consolidation, I use a measure of executive constraints
taken from the Polity IV dataset (Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers 2016). This variable captures the
ability of other actors to limit the decision-making powers of chief executives, with higher values
indicating greater constraints (and thus less consolidation). In a context like Russia, where patronage
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Figure A.1: Histograms for local opposition (raw and scaled)
Figure A.2: Local opposition in 2003
Putin app. Local opp. UR gov. share Any fraud Absentee coef.
Putin approval 1.00 0.09 -0.15 0.03 0.05
Local opposition 0.09 1.00 0.20 -0.09 0.18
UR governors share -0.15 0.20 1.00 -0.01 -0.05
Any fraud 0.03 -0.09 -0.01 1.00 -0.2
Absentee coefficient 0.05 0.18 -0.05 -0.2 1.00
Table A.1: Correlation coefficients for explanatory and dependent variables
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Figure A.3: Local opposition in 2011
n Mean SD Median Min Max
Local opposition 471 0 1 0.169 -2.677 2.075
UR governors share 508 0.555 0.166 0.659 0.284 0.695
Putin approval 508 0.762 0.081 0.790 0.640 0.860
Presidential 508 0.500 0.500 0.500 0 1
Population (log) 506 7.038 1.032 7.101 2.890 9.360
Pensioners (log) 508 5.598 0.160 5.615 4.768 5.901
Poverty 500 0.208 0.105 0.185 0.057 0.828
Higher education 490 7.332 3.204 6.974 0 22.590
Gov. employees (log) 500 1.847 0.393 1.811 0.847 3.518
Urban 506 0.689 0.139 0.692 0.237 1
Unemployment 507 7.244 7.250 6.700 0 55.500
Any fraud 482 0.257 0.438 0 0 1
Absentee vote coefficient 500 0.135 0.330 0.159 -1.617 1.041
Table A.2: Descriptive statistics
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Figure A.4: Marginal effects of local opposition on falsification, conditional on executive constraints
politics is endemic, a lack of limits on the executive is both a symptom and cause of consolidated
ability to dispense patronage resources. The variable is lagged so that it captures the environment
prior to the election at hand. In this section, I show the results of models using local opposition as a
measure of local constraints; in addition, I also include executive constraints in later models that
employ different measures of local constraints. Since higher values of executive constraints indicate
less consolidated patronage, I expect that falsification will be more likely in uncompetitive regions
when national executive constraints are low, while dispersed forms of manipulation will be more
likely in competitive regions under the same circumstances. As Table A.3 and the accompanying
figures show, these hypotheses are supported.
Local openness and electoral manipulation
One alternative to local openness as a measure of local constraints is provided by expert ratings
of the ‘democratic-ness’ of each of Russia’s regions (Petrov and Titkov 2010). These ratings evaluate
each region on ten dimensions, including the independence of regional judiciaries and security
services, transparency, political pluralism, media independence, and civil society activity. Higher
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Dependent variable:





Population (log) −0.517∗∗ −0.008
(0.219) (0.028)




Higher education −0.002 −0.0002
(0.043) (0.006)






Local opposition −2.201∗∗ 0.383∗∗∗
(1.053) (0.133)
Executive constraints −0.376 0.066
(0.382) (0.048)








Akaike Inf. Crit. 515.628
Residual Std. Error 0.513 (df = 452)
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.3: Models of manipulation using local opposition and executive constraints
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Figure A.5: Marginal effect of local opposition on vote-buying / voter pressure, conditional on
executive constraints
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scores indicate greater political openness and thus greater local constraints, as some combination of




Presidential −0.14 −0.12 −0.16
(0.23) (0.23) (0.24)
Population (log) −0.42∗ −0.41∗ −0.37∗
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Pensioners (log) −2.30∗∗∗ −2.27∗∗∗ −1.98∗∗∗
(0.79) (0.79) (0.76)
Poverty 1.48 1.44 0.01
(1.67) (1.69) (1.42)
Higher education 0.01 0.01 0.03
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gov. employees (log) −1.03∗ −1.02∗ −0.82
(0.57) (0.56) (0.54)
Urban 0.17 0.23 0.19
(1.09) (1.10) (1.07)
Unemployment −0.03 −0.02 −0.01
(0.03) (0.02) (0.02)
Local openness 0.16∗∗ −0.40∗∗ 0.14
(0.06) (0.17) (0.19)
UR governors share 10.04∗∗∗
(3.63)
Local openness : UR govs. share −0.30∗∗∗
(0.11)
Executive constraints (lag) −3.09∗∗
(1.26)




Local openness : Putin approval −0.19
(0.25)
Constant 10.97∗∗ 29.60∗∗∗ 9.52
(5.56) (8.33) (8.14)
Observations 463 463 463
Log Likelihood −254.94 −255.82 −258.60
Akaike Inf. Crit. 533.88 535.65 541.21
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Presidential 0.16∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population (log) −0.02 −0.02 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Pensioners (log) 0.41∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Poverty 0.25 0.18 0.31∗
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19)
Higher education −0.001 0.0003 −0.002
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gov. employees (log) 0.02 0.03 0.01
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Urban 0.41∗∗∗ 0.39∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Unemployment −0.01∗ −0.01∗ −0.01∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Local openness 0.001 0.03 −0.002
(0.01) (0.02) (0.02)
UR govs. share −0.56
(0.46)




Local openness :UR govs. share 0.02
(0.01)
Local openness : Executive constraints (lag) −0.01
(0.005)
Local openness : Putin approval 0.02
(0.03)
Constant −2.39∗∗∗ −3.61∗∗∗ −2.39∗∗
(0.72) (1.01) (1.02)
Observations 476 476 476
R2 0.21 0.21 0.20
Adjusted R2 0.19 0.19 0.19
Residual Std. Error (df = 464) 0.51 0.51 0.51
F Statistic (df = 11; 464) 10.96∗∗∗ 10.99∗∗∗ 10.88∗∗∗
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.5: FGLS models of dispersed manipulation using local openness
135
Figure A.6: Marginal effect of UR governor share on falsification, conditional on local openness
The results, shown in Tables A.4 and A.5, are substantively similar to those presented for local
opposition in the main text. With regard to falsification, falsification is significantly more likely in
regions with low local openness than in high-openness ones when patronage is more consolidated
via United Russia (Figure A.6). A similar result is suggested when executive constraints is used
(Figure A.7); note that the relationship appears inverted because executive constraints is an inverse
measure of patronage consolidation. Putin approval does not appear to have a significant relationship
with falsification at any level of local openness (Figure A.8). Likewise, Figures A.9 and A.10 show
an increase in the severity of dispersed manipulation in high-constraint regions as United Russia
becomes more dominant and when constraints on the chief executive decline. The marginal effect of
local openness is not affected by Putin approval; it is positive and similarly sized regardless of the
incumbent’s approval rating. Similarly, the effect of Putin approval itself is not significant at any
level of local openness (Figures A.11 and A.12).
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Figure A.7: Marginal effect of national executive constraints on falsification, conditional on local
openness
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Figure A.8: Marginal effect on falsification, using local openness and Putin approval
Figure A.9: Interaction of local openness and UR governors share on vote-buying / voter pressure
138
Figure A.10: Interaction of local openness and executive constraints on vote-buying / voter pressure
Non-electoral measure of local constraints: Ethnic republic status
Ethnicity is an important marker of political openness, since ethnic homogeneity is known to
make electoral manipulation easier, by reducing the costs of monitoring compliance and reducing the
risk of exposure (Hale, 2007). Minority ethnicity is especially likely to play this role in Russia, where
it has been politicized by the central government since the early days of the Soviet Union. Beginning
in the 1920s, the Soviet government recognized ethnic homelands within the Russian Soviet Republic.
Minority ethnic elites were promoted into leadership positions in the regional communist party,
government, industries, and educational institutions. Minority ethnic identity in these republics was
also reinforced through officially-promoted symbols like national museums, literature, art, music,
and folklore (Martin, 2001, pp. 9-17). As a result, minority ethnic identities became highly salient,
and served to unify regional elites. These titular ethnic regions often claimed the most independence
from the center in the 1990s, but have been among the most devoted to United Russia in the period
of Putin’s government (Hale, 2007). The variable ethnic republic is a binary variable that takes a
value of one if a region is a titular ethnic republic within the Russian Federation, and a value of
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Figure A.11: Marginal effect of local openness on vote-buying / voter pressure at varying levels of
Putin approval rating
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Figure A.12: Marginal effect of Putin approval rating on vote-buying / voter pressure at varying
levels of local openness
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Figure A.13: Marginal effect of ethnic republic status on falsification, conditional on UR governors
share
zero for all other regions. Since republics are expected to be less politically open and have lower
local constraints on average, ethnic republic should be positively correlated with administrative
fraud when national patronage is more consolidated. As Tables A.6 and A.7 and Figures A.13
through A.18 show, the results are partially supportive of the consolidation-constraint model, and
not supportive of the incumbent-popularity model. Falsification is significantly more likely to occur
in ethnic republics than in non-republic regions as United Russia becomes the dominant patronage
vehicle in the country; the probability of fraud nearly doubles in republics, while remaining constant
in non-republics. However, the interactive hypothesis is not borne out when executive constraints
is used as a measure of patronage consolidation. Still, while the probability of fraud is higher in
republics than in other regions, this difference is not affected by Putin’s approval rating, lending no
support to the incumbent-popularity hypothesis.
With regard to dispersed forms of manipulation, the consolidation-constraint model is also largely
supported while the incumbent-popularity model is not. As UR governors share increases, dispersed





Presidential −0.11 −0.09 −0.14
(0.24) (0.24) (0.24)
Population (log) −0.15 −0.15 −0.14
(0.22) (0.22) (0.22)
Pensioners (log) −1.66∗∗ −1.64∗∗ −1.46∗
(0.80) (0.80) (0.78)
Poverty 1.37 1.36 0.48
(1.63) (1.66) (1.42)
Higher education −0.003 −0.002 0.01
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Gov. employees (log) −0.42 −0.40 −0.29
(0.58) (0.58) (0.55)
Urban 2.14∗ 2.18∗ 1.98∗
(1.18) (1.19) (1.17)
Unemployment −0.03 −0.03 −0.01
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02)
Ethnic republic −0.19 4.44∗∗ 1.84
(0.85) (2.21) (2.28)
UR governors share 0.12
(1.12)








Ethnic republic:Putin approval −0.92
(2.95)
Constant 8.21 8.18 6.47
(5.70) (6.38) (5.94)
Observations 462 462 462
Log Likelihood −250.13 −250.38 −251.65
Akaike Inf. Crit. 524.27 524.77 527.29
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01





Presidential 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Population (log) −0.03 −0.03 −0.03
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Pensioners (log) 0.39∗∗∗ 0.41∗∗∗ 0.40∗∗∗
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Poverty 0.16 0.08 0.15
(0.22) (0.22) (0.19)
Higher education −0.003 −0.002 −0.003
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Gov. employees (log) −0.02 −0.01 −0.02
(0.08) (0.08) (0.07)
Urban 0.44∗∗∗ 0.42∗∗∗ 0.43∗∗∗
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Unemployment −0.01∗ −0.005 −0.01∗∗
(0.003) (0.003) (0.003)
Ethnic republic 0.03 −0.36 −0.32
(0.12) (0.31) (0.31)






Ethnic republic:UR governors share −0.19
(0.20)
Ethnic republic:Executive constraints 0.07
(0.07)
Ethnic republic:Putin approval 0.32
(0.40)
Constant −2.18∗∗∗ −2.33∗∗∗ −2.24∗∗∗
(0.75) (0.82) (0.78)
Observations 474 474 474
R2 0.18 0.18 0.18
Adjusted R2 0.16 0.16 0.16
Residual Std. Error (df = 462) 0.52 0.52 0.52
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
Table A.7: FGLS models of dispersed manipulation, using ethnic republic status
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Figure A.14: Marginal effect of ethnic republic status on falsification, conditional on executive
constraints
Figure A.15: Marginal effect of ethnic republic status on falsification, conditional on Putin approval
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Figure A.16: Marginal effect of ethnic republic status on vote-buying / voter pressure at varying
levels of UR governors share
Figure A.16), though this result is only statistically significant at the highest observed level of
patronage consolidation. Likewise, non-republics see more dispersed manipulation when executive
constraints are lower, though this effect barely achieves conventional statistical significance. Finally,
Putin’s approval rating does not significantly change the effect of regional status on the severity of
dispersed manipulation.
Interaction term robustness checks
In order to avoid misinterpreting interaction effects, Hainmueller et al. (2016) recommend a
simple diagnostic. Based on their recommendation, I divide the data into three bins based on terciles
of the variable local opposition and produce an estimate of the dependent variable for each tercile
(drawing on dummy variables for each tercile as well as the control and explanatory variables in
the main models. The binning estimates are non-parametric, and thus can be used to test the
assumption that the interaction effect is linear (as assumed in the models). I use this procedure
to test each dependent variable, using local opposition and UR governors share as the explanatory
variables. Figure A.19 shows the results for centralized manipulation (fraud) and Figure A.20 shows
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Figure A.17: Marginal effect of ethnic republic status on vote-buying / voter pressure at varying
levels of executive constraint
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Figure A.18: Marginal effect of ethnic republic status on vote-buying / voter pressure at varying
levels of Putin approval
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Figure A.19: Testing the assumptions of a linear interaction of UR governors share and local
opposition on falsification
the results for dispersed manipulation (vote-buying and voter pressure). In both cases, the solid
line and ribbon represent the linear interaction model with 95% confidence intervals, while the dots
and vertical lines represent the binned estimates for each tercile of the data with 95% confidence
intervals. A histogram at the bottom of the figures shows the distribution of the data. Figure A.19
shows that the assumptions of the linear interaction model are well-supported for the model of any
fraud; all three binning estimates are close to the marginal effect line and well within the confidence
intervals. The assumptions of the linear model are generally supported for the model of absentee
coefficient (Figure A.20), but with an additional wrinkle that points toward future research. In that
case, the middle-tercile binning estimate falls slightly above the confidence interval of the linear
estimate (though the two sets of confidence intervals overlap comfortably). This suggests that it
may be the case that vote-buying and voter pressure are more common at middle values of local
opposition, but decline as local constraints increase further. This hypothesis might be tested in
future research on cases with higher levels of local contestation.
Additionally, Esarey and Sumner (2018) warn that models that make use of interaction terms are
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Figure A.20: Testing the assumptions of a linear interaction of UR governors share and local
opposition on vote-buying / voter pressure
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Figure A.21: Marginal effect of local opposition on falsification, conditional on UR governors share,
with standard and FDR confidence intervals
vulnerable to false positives, since interaction models effectively partition the data into subsamples;
testing the same variables against these subsamples raises the risk that coefficients will appear
statistically significant purely due to chance. They suggest a method for compensating for this
risk by controlling the false discovery rate (FDR) and adjusting standard errors for the marginal
effects accordingly. Figures A.21 and A.22 demonstrate this procedure, and show that even when
compensating for the FDR, the marginal effect of local constraints on vote-buying / voter pressure
and falsification remain statistically significant (and inversely related) at higher levels of patronage
consolidation.
Maps of dependent variables
Figures A.23 through A.28 and A.29 through A.34 illustrate the estimated levels of falsification
and vote-buying / voter pressure by region, respectively. Since the falsification estimate is binary,
the first set of maps are two-toned, with regions colored in black indicating regions that showed
suspiciously non-random trailing digits for either the ruling party or the largest opposition party
(darker gray indicates an NA value for the estimate). For the second set of maps, brighter values
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Figure A.22: Marginal effect of local opposition on vote-buying / voter pressure, conditional on UR
governors share, with standard and FDR confidence intervals
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Figure A.23: Falsification, 2003
indicate a greater reliance on vote-buying / voter pressure. The maps allow for inspection of
individual regions’ results, but also depict some general patterns. Falsification regularly appears in
the same regions from election to election, especially in Russia’s Caucasus regions, Siberia, and the
far east. The prevalence of vote-buying and voter pressure appears to increase over time, as does the
variation among regions; these techniques are especially common in Russia’s western regions during
later elections.
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Figure A.24: Falsification, 2004
Figure A.25: Falsification, 2007
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Figure A.26: Falsification, 2008
Figure A.27: Falsification, 2011
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Figure A.28: Falsification, 2012
Figure A.29: Vote-buying / voter pressure, 2003
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Figure A.30: Vote-buying / voter pressure, 2004
Figure A.31: Vote-buying / voter pressure, 2007
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Figure A.32: Vote-buying / voter pressure, 2008
Figure A.33: Vote-buying / voter pressure, 2011
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Figure A.34: Vote-buying / voter pressure, 2012
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APPENDIX B
B.1 Marginal effects plots
Marginal effects plots for the remaining models in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 in Chapter 3 are provided
below. In general, they show that the results for Models 3, 4, 6, and 7 confirm the results shown in
the main text for Models 2 and 6. That is, they show that when patronage conditions favor the
PAN, fraud affecting that party is more likely in regions where a PAN governor is in office or an
alternation in the governorship has ever occurred. They also show the converse effect; that shifts
in local control away from the PRI result in reduced probability of PAN fraud even when national
patronage resources remain under PRI control.
B.2 Parallel trends assumption for difference-in-differences models
The parallel trends assumption for difference-in-differences models appears to be satisfied for
Nayarit and Durango. The plots below show the estimated relationship between turnout and absolute
vote-share for the PAN and the PRI in Nayarit (the treatment case) and Durango, from 1991 to 2012.
Figure B.9 shows the estimated level of manipulation on behalf of the PAN; the coefficients increase
in parallel prior to the first alternation in power in Nayarit in 1997, though with an anomalous dip
for Durango in 1997. In all cases, PAN manipulation appears to be less common in the treatment
case than the control case, a difference which intensifies after treatment. As shown in Figure B.10,
the parallel trend assumption also appears to be satisfied for the PRI prior to treatment in Nayarit,
after which outcomes in the two states become much more varied.
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Figure B.1: Marginal effects of PAN president on PAN fraud
Figure B.2: Marginal effects of alternation on PAN fraud
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Figure B.3: Marginal effects of unified (PRI) government on PAN fraud
Figure B.4: Marginal effects of alternation on PAN fraud
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Figure B.5: Marginal effects of PAN president on PAN fraud
Figure B.6: Marginal effects of PAN governor on PAN fraud
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Figure B.7: Marginal effects of unified (PRI) government on PAN fraud
Figure B.8: Marginal effects of PAN governor on PAN fraud
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Figure B.9: Estimated PAN manipulation in treatment and control cases, 1991-2012
Figure B.10: Estimated PRI manipulation in treatment and control cases, 1991-2012
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APPENDIX C
C.1 Russian-language version of survey-experimental questions
Q1: ПРЕДСТАВЬТЕ ВЫБОРЫ, В КОТОРЫХ ОДИН УЧАСТНИК ЛИДИРУЕТ С НЕБОЛЬ-
ШИМ ОТРЫВОМ, ТАК ЧТО НИКТО НЕ ЗНАЕТ, КТО ПОБЕДИТ. ПРЕДСТАВЬТЕ, ЧТО
ЧЛЕН МЕСТНОЙ ИЗБИРАТЕЛЬНОЙ КОМИССИИ УЛИЧЕН В ПОДТАСОВКЕ РЕЗУЛЬТА-
ТОВ ВЫБОРОВ НА СВОЕМ УЧАСТКЕ. ПО ВАШЕМУ МНЕНИЮ, НАСКОЛЬКО СУРОВО
НУЖНО НАКАЗЫВАТЬ ПОДОБНОЕ ПРЕСТУПЛЕНИЕ, ПО СРАВНЕНИЮ НАПРИМЕР,
С УГОНОМ АВТОМОБИЛЯ? ДОЛЖЕН ЛИ ПРЕДСТАВИТЕЛЬ КОМИССИИ БЫТЬ НА-
КАЗАН ...
1. гораздо менее сурово, чем кто-то, совершивший угон автомобиля
2. несколько менее сурово
3. примерно так же
4. несколько более сурово
5. гораздо более сурово, чем кто-то, совершивший угон автомобиля
Q2: ИНОГДА В РОССИИ ПРОИСХОДЯТ ПУБЛИЧНЫЕ ПРОТЕСТЫ. Я ЗАЧИТАЮ
ВАМ СПИСОК ИЗ ПЯТИ СОБЫТИЙ, КОТОРЫЕ МОГУТ ЗАСТАВИТЬ ЛЮДЕЙ ВЫЙТИ
НА ПРОТЕСТНЫЕ АКЦИИ. ПО ВАШЕМУ МНЕНИЮ, СКОЛЬКО ИЗ ЭТИХ СОБЫТИЙ
ОПРАВДЫВАЮТ ПУБЛИЧНЫЙ ПРОТЕСТ ПРОТИВ НИХ? ВАМ НЕ НУЖНО ГОВОРИТЬ,
КАКИЕ ИМЕННО СОБЫТИЯ ОПРАВДЫВАЮТ ПУБЛИЧНЫЙ ПРОТЕСТ - ТОЛЬКО
ОБЩЕЕ ЧИСЛО ТАКИХ СОБЫТИЙ В СПИСКЕ (НОЛЬ, ЕСЛИ ВЫ СЧИТАЕТЕ, ЧТО
НИЧТО ИЗ ПЕРЕЧИСЛЕННОГО НЕ ПОДХОДИТ)
• на одной из улиц несколько недель не ремонтируется яма в асфальте
• местный работодатель задерживает зарплату на несколько месяцев
• местные чиновники пытаются незаконно повлиять на результаты выборов
• подоходный налог повысится на один процент
• существенно уменьшатся пенсии
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